

TO COMPEL WITH ARMED FORCE: A STAFF RIDE HANDBOOK FOR THE
BATTLE OF TIPPECANOE NEAR PROPHET'S TOWN,
INDIANA TERRITORY, 7 NOVEMBER 1811

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
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
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ABSTRACT

TO COMPEL WITH ARMED FORCE: A STAFF RIDE HANDBOOK FOR THE BATTLE OF TIPPECANOE NEAR PROPHET'S TOWN, INDIANA TERRITORY, 7 NOVEMBER 1811, by MAJ HARRY D. TUNNELL, IV, USA, 162 pages.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

4th U.S.	An Arabic numeral followed by "U.S." denotes a United States Army Infantry Regiment. This example is for the 4th United States Infantry Regiment
American northwest	Refers to the post-1800 geographic area formerly encompassed by the Northwest Territory.
DOW	Died of wounds.
IN militia	Indiana militia. The state or type of militia unit by function (KY militia, dragoon, mounted riflemen, etc.) is designated in order to prevent confusion. It was common at the time to refer to a unit in formal and informal writing by the commander's name. For example the company of mounted riflemen commanded by Captain Spencer is referred to as: Captain Spier Spencer's Company of Mounted Riflemen of the Indiana Militia. Other units might be referred to by simply the commander's name: Robb's company. In cases where the type of unit is not clear, clarifying remarks are added: Robb's company (IN militia).
KIA	Killed in action.
Northwest Territory	Geographic area in the United States defined by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The area encompassed current day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota. The area began to be divided into territories and states after 1800. The status of the various geographic areas in the Northwest Territory continued to change until they became states.
New Purchase	Geographic area defined in the 1809 Treaty of Fort Wayne.
Old Northwest	See American northwest.
Seventeen Fires	The United States.
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure.
WIA	Wounded in action.

You will approach and order him to disperse, which he may be permitted to do, on condition of satisfactory assurances that in future he shall not assemble or attempt to assemble any number of Indians, armed or hostile in attitude. If he neglects or refuses to disperse he will be attacked and compelled to it by the force under your command. He will probably in that case be taken prisoner. His adherents should be informed that in any case they shall hereafter form any combination of a hostile nature, and oblige the government to send an armed force against them, they will be driven beyond the great waters, and never again permitted to live within the Jurisdictional limits of the United States.

William Eustis, Secretary of War, *Letter to Governor Harrison*

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Military History is the account of how force served political ends and how man, individual hero or leader or aggregated professionals, conscripts, or irregulars, accomplished this service.¹

Colonel F. B. Nihart, USMC, *Military Affairs*

The study of military history has always been important to soldiers. General of the Army George C. Marshall, while he was a colonel at the Infantry School, directed the writing of a series of case studies that were published as *Infantry in Battle*. The Army Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, formed an ad hoc committee in 1971 to determine the need for the study of military history in the Army. The committee's review determined that there continued to be a need for military history studies and made several recommendations about how to incorporate history studies into the officer education program. The committee's recommendations also resulted in the publication of *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History*.²

The staff ride provides an excellent methodology for the study of military history because it offers a detailed program of study for campaigns and battles. The unique aspect of the staff ride is that after classroom work the campaign or battle study includes a visit to the battlefield site. After the battlefield visit there is a final period of instruction that synthesizes the information learned during the preliminary classroom studies and the field visit.

Staff rides have been an important tool, in the American Army, to train leaders since the early twentieth-century. Staff rides in the American Army were first implemented as a formal part of the education of army officers at the General Service

and Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1906. Major Eben Swift led a small contingent of students to Chattanooga, Tennessee, to study the 1864 Atlanta campaign.³ Since that first experience in 1906, the staff ride has remained an important part of formal military educational programs.

Staff rides are also an integral part of informal programs conducted as home station training. Units often sponsor staff rides as part of their officer and noncommissioned officer development programs. The staff ride remains relevant to the study of military history because it permits students to become familiar with a campaign or battle, and to conduct an analysis of the engagement(s) at the actual locations where key events happened. Finally, the staff ride promotes critical thought about the actions surrounding a particular aspect of military history.

It is simple to incorporate staff rides into many types of unit training programs. Staff rides are vehicles to develop leaders through an analysis of a previous commander's use of terrain, conduct of maneuver, or the decision-making process of leaders under the extreme stress of battle. Trainers and students often confuse staff rides with other types of training events that include battlefield visits or terrain analysis at a field site. Therefore, it is important to define what a staff ride is as well as some of the other terms commonly used to describe the study and analysis of battles and campaigns.

The terms "staff ride," "historical battlefield tour," and "tactical exercise without troops (TEWT)" are the most commonly confused or misused terms when describing the activities that organizations perform whenever they are conducting training at a battlefield. Dr. William G. Robertson, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command

and General Staff College, in *The Staff Ride* has already developed definitions for these terms. This study will use the definitions developed by Robertson.

A staff ride is an event that:

... consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from each. It envisions maximum student involvement before arrival at the site to guarantee thought, analysis, and discussion. A staff ride thus links a historical event, systematic preliminary study, and actual terrain to produce battle analysis in three dimensions. It consists of three distinct phases: preliminary study, field study, and integration.⁴

Historical battlefield tours are visits to battlefields or campaign sites that do not include preliminary study. Historical battlefield tours that are led by an expert can stimulate thought and promote student discussion, but they will be limited by the students' lack of systematic preparation. TEWTs utilize hypothetical scenarios that are played out on actual terrain and involve the employment of current doctrinal concepts. During TEWTs, terrain and doctrine, rather than history, are the instructional vehicles.⁵

There are many battlefields throughout the United States that support the development and conduct of staff rides. The imagination of those developing the staff ride is the only thing that limits ideas about which battlefield to use. Many of the sites have easy access because they are open to the public and are part of permanently established state or national parks. Other locations may be on privately owned land and may require one to coordinate with the owners for approval to visit the site. The available sites span the spectrum of American eighteenth-and nineteenth-century warfare. There are already many staff rides for American Revolutionary War and Civil War battles that are available to the public. In addition to Revolutionary and Civil War locations, there are also battlefields available that cover the various Indian wars. Units

overseas (particularly those units in Europe or Korea) can develop staff rides for locations in their areas.

This handbook describes a staff ride for the Tippecanoe battlefield at Battle Ground, Indiana. The field study phase of the staff ride covers the 7 November 1811 battle between the Shawnee led Indian confederacy and U.S. forces commanded by General William Henry Harrison. A staff ride of the Tippecanoe campaign allows one to examine many lessons that still apply to twentieth-century military operations, especially in the realm of operations other than war. A critical analysis of the centers of gravity, decision points, force protection measures, and aspects of battlefield leadership that were important almost 190 years ago will provide insight about different notions of how to think and make decisions.

Students of the military art often overlook the Battle of Tippecanoe because it occurred at a time of relative peace between the American Revolution and the War of 1812. The Tippecanoe campaign is nonetheless important because it was a critical step that helped the United States establish dominance over the American northwest. There were continuing tensions in the American northwest among the Americans, Indians, and British prior to the Tippecanoe battle. The War of 1812 eventually forced a resolution to the political and military struggles in this part of America. The Tippecanoe battle served as a precursor to the types of political and military activities that happened in the territory during the War of 1812.⁶ Henry Adams, who has written extensively about early United States history, called the Battle of Tippecanoe “a premature outbreak of the great wars of 1812.”⁷

The organization of this staff ride provides the participant with background information about events that led to the battle and not just what happened at the battle site. Chapter two provides an overview of the relationships and treaty obligations among the United States and various Indian tribes in the Northwest Territory and the American northwest from the late eighteenth-century through the War of 1812. Chapter three describes the Tippecanoe campaign. Chapter four describes the important battlefield activities at Tippecanoe. The suggested route of the staff ride, battlefield vignettes, and discussion points make up Chapter five. The attached appendices provide information about casualties, meteorological data, biographical sketches, tactics, doctrine, and how nineteenth-century Americans and Indians organized for battle.

¹F.B. Nihart, *Military Affairs*, as quoted in Robert Heintz, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute, 1966), 149.

²John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley, *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* (Washington DC: Center of Military History, 1982), ix-x.

³William G. Robertson, Edward P. Shanahan, John I. Boxberger, and George E. Knapp, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Chickamauga, 18-20 September 1863* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), ix.

⁴William G. Robertson, *The Staff Ride* (Washington DC: Center for Military History, 1987), 5.

⁵*Ibid.*, 5.

⁶Alfred Pirtle, *The Battle of Tippecanoe* (Louisville, KY: John P. Morton and Co., 1900), xviii.

⁷Henry Adams, *History of the United States of America During the Administration of James Madison* ed. E. N. Harbert. 3rd ed. (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., 1986), 342.

CHAPTER TWO

EXPANSION INTO THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY

. . . the opinion of Mr. Jefferson on the subject, went so far as to assert a claim of the United States as lords paramount to the lands of all extinguished or decayed tribes, to the exclusion of all recent settlers.¹

Governor Harrison, *Letter to the Secretary of War, William Eustis*

In order to fully understand the context of the Tippecanoe Campaign, it is important to consider how America developed her claims to the areas that made up the Northwest Territory. It is also important to review America's relationship with the Indian tribes in the area. These issues are important because the Battle of Tippecanoe resulted from American attempts to settle new areas in the American northwest and from Indian attempts to prevent American expansion.

During the eighteenth-century there were several competing factions for the control of the territory in North America. Spain, France, and Britain were the major European powers that claimed rights to territory in North America. Great Britain eventually gained the rights to all of France's North American territory upon the conclusion of the French and Indian War in 1763. Control of the immense area was important because of the vast revenues to be gained from the fur trade.²

There were several ways to manage the fur trade in North America. In addition to private ventures, governments owned or sponsored trading posts in an area and bartered directly with individual Indians or Indian tribes for furs. The first traders dramatically improved the quality of life of the Indians they came into contact with. The Indians were a relatively primitive society before the arrival of European traders. The traders introduced iron, steel, and firearms that supplemented or replaced the traditional

Indian tools and weapons made of bone, wood, or stone. These new technologies allowed the Indians to improve their ability to hunt and produce items important to sustaining a higher quality of life. As their lifestyle changed the Indians became more dependent on the resources gained through trade. Indian reliance on a particular government for trade also had political consequences. One eventual consequence was that a government could demand allegiance from an Indian tribe, that was a trading partner, during the various wars in North America.³

During the period between the French and Indian War and the Revolutionary War, the British made efforts to reorganize their territory in North America. On 7 October 1763, the British issued a Royal proclamation to regulate the governmental organization of the colonies and to territorially separate the colonists and the Indians. The proclamation established colonial boundaries and created a vast interior region that was under the direct jurisdiction of the government in Great Britain. The western limit of the colonial area ran generally along the Appalachian crest from eastern Florida to Quebec. This western limit became known as the "Proclamation Line."⁴

The Proclamation Line provided for the separation of the colonists and the Indians by prohibiting colonial governments from purchasing land or establishing new settlements in areas west of the line. The royal government in Britain would manage activities with the Indians in the interior.⁵ Although there were eventually modifications to the line, the Proclamation Line was generally in effect until the American Revolution.

Even though the British government attempted to prevent friction on the frontier by separating the Indians and the colonialists, there continued to be disputes. These disputes often resulted in major outbreaks of violence, such as the 10 October 1774 battle between the Shawnee Indians and the militia forces at the white settlement of

Point Pleasant (West Virginia). The day-long battle resulted in the Treaty of Camp Charlotte, which gave the settlers control of the area that would eventually become Kentucky and established the Indian-white boundary at the Ohio River.⁶

Within a year of the Treaty of Camp Charlotte the American Revolution was underway. Even more so than the Camp Charlotte Treaty and previous agreements, the Revolutionary War had many unexpected consequences regarding Indian lands in the area set aside under the 1763 Royal Proclamation. The 1783 Treaty of Paris, that ended the American Revolution, defined the western boundary of the new American Republic as the Mississippi River. It also gave the United States all former British possessions from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, southwest through the Great Lakes to the Mississippi River. The area in which the British had prohibited new settlements under the 1763 Royal Proclamation now belonged to the United States. After the Treaty of Paris, the Indians theoretically retained title to the land set aside under the 1763 proclamation, however, the United States government viewed these Indians (many of whom were allied with Great Britain during the Revolutionary War) as a conquered people with few rights.⁷

The political dynamics that developed as a result of alliances formed during the Revolution continued to influence frontier events after the war. Most of the woodland Indian tribes⁸ allied themselves with the British during the Revolutionary War. The Indians viewed the Americans as the enemy rather than the British, because the British were more generous with trade goods, and the settlers encroaching on Indian areas were from the colonies seeking independence.⁹ The British continued to support their former allies during the post-Revolution period, in their own efforts to prevent United States expansion.

The political traditions of the United States and the Indian tribes were distinctly different, and the accompanying confusion that these differences caused resulted in frequent problems and misunderstandings. The United States viewed the various Indian tribes as independent nations who should be dealt with in the same fashion as a European nation. Many problems arose because the Indians did not politically organize themselves in ways that American political leaders understood. An Indian tribe was generally a group with common cultural traditions that did not have a central authority to make and enforce political decisions because the tribe included several subgroups (called septs or clans) that were politically semiautonomous.¹⁰

Indian perceptions about land ownership also differed from the American point of view. The eighteenth-century northwestern Indian viewed land as a resource to be occupied and used. Once the desired resources were exhausted the group moved to another area.¹¹ The Indian concept of common use rather than ownership was significantly different from Euro-American concepts that encouraged one to amass large tracts of land as symbols of wealth.

Conflict on the frontier between Indians and Americans was inevitable because of the different perceptions about one another and the American government's desire to settle the new territory. During the post-war period the United States planned to establish control over her new territories. Exploitation of the potential wealth in the American northwest provided the United States with one way to pay off the country's large war debt that resulted from the Revolution, since the Articles of Confederation did not allow Congress to levy taxes.¹² The government sponsored expeditions to explore the new areas and provided incentives to individuals to move to the frontier. The Indian tribes' options to maintain their traditional communities and ways of life were few after

the Revolution. The tribes could attempt to coexist with the white man, or they could contest any American encroachment upon their traditional territory.

After the Revolution the British maintained a continued interest in the American northwest. The British wanted to retain their lucrative fur trade in the area bordered by the Mississippi River, Great Lakes, and Ohio as well as to protect Canada. Initially, the British wanted an Indian buffer state between British possessions in Canada and the United States. The final boundaries established by the Treaty of Paris made this impractical because the treaty ceded the desired area to the United States. In order to protect their North American interests, the British encouraged the northwestern Indian tribes to resist American expansion and to keep the Americans south of the Ohio River. Any Indian success at keeping settlers south of the Ohio would create a *de facto* Indian buffer state even if a *de jure* one was impossible.¹³

The Treaty of Paris and the subsequent Jay Treaty allowed the British to maintain existing posts and garrisons on United States soil until 1796. Maintenance of these posts allowed the British to continue a profitable fur trade in the area and to control the important trade routes along the Great Lakes. The posts also provided the northwestern Indians with guns, ammunition, and other supplies. As a result of the treaties, the British maintained garrisons at Detroit and Fort Macinac in Michigan, as well as several others that controlled entrances to the Great Lakes.¹⁴

Engagements with the Indians continued in the American northwest as the United States dispatched forces to take control of her new territories and to establish communities in the unsettled countryside. In 1787, Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance. This ordinance outlined the procedures to govern the area that would eventually become Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota.

The ordinance described the requirements for territorial government and the conditions for statehood in a vast area designated as the Northwest Territory. The ordinance also stated that the area would become no less than three states and no more than five. The Northwest Ordinance prohibited the invasion of any land that the Indians retained title to except in the case of a lawful war authorized by Congress.¹⁵

The Northwest Ordinance formalized the procedures to settle the area south of the Great Lakes. Prior to the ordinance, President George Washington tried to develop policies designed to gain control of the Indian titled lands east of the Mississippi. The policy was to make the area attractive to settlers by providing land grants or selling government land at extremely low prices. The growth of the white settlements would also kill off much of the game thereby making the area unattractive to the Indians. Washington felt that the loss of game coupled with government inducements would cause the Indians to sell their land government in return for better land to the west of the Mississippi. The enticements worked, and large numbers of settlers flocked to the frontier. The Indians, however, did not desire any land beyond the Mississippi River and insisted that the frontier should remain at the Ohio River.¹⁶ As the Indians resisted white encroachment of their lands, violence erupted and forced the president to send a series of military expeditions to attempt to establish American dominance in the region.

The first military expedition to the Northwest Territory occurred in 1790. After a two-month training period, General Josiah Harmer left Cincinnati with a 1,400-man force. In September 1790, Harmer's force fought a combined Indian force of Miami, Shawnee, Potawatomi, and Chippewa in the Maumee valley. The Indians, led by Chief Little Turtle and Chief Blue Jacket, dominated the action and defeated the Americans. At the end of the battle, Harmer's casualties were 183 killed and 31 wounded.¹⁷ After

the expedition failed, problems in the territory increased as the Indians gained confidence.

Since the Indian harassment increased, Congress voted in 1791 to raise another expedition to deal with the strife in the northwest. The force gathered for the campaign also turned out to be an inadequately trained and disciplined element. The quality of the soldier was often poor because enticements to enlist for the campaign were few. The offer of a scant two dollars per month pay usually resulted in the enlistment of men “purchased from prisons, wheelbarrows and brothels.”¹⁸

The army, organized in March 1791, consisted of about 1,400 men. General Arthur St. Clair was the commander of the force. The expeditionary force led by St. Clair was plagued by poor leadership, poor supply discipline, and desertion. The Indians, once again led by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, engaged the expedition on 4 November 1791 at dawn. The battle still stands as the worst defeat of American arms during the Indian Wars; there were 920 Americans engaged and the Indians killed 632 and wounded 264.¹⁹

In 1792, Congress authorized the organization of the American Legion (“Legion” was then a term that denoted a combined arms force). General Anthony Wayne commanded the American Legion that consisted of infantry, artillery, and light dragoons. A combination of ongoing peace negotiations with the Indians and Wayne’s desire not to employ the Legion before it was prepared kept the Legion from conducting major operations for two years. Wayne used the two years wisely, building and garrisoning small outposts throughout the area in order to protect his lines of communication. Wayne also spent the time training, emphasizing strict training standards and using Steuben’s *Blue Book* to teach close-order drill. In addition to close-order drill, the Legion

trained extensively on marksmanship and the employment of field fortifications--so that the force could quickly build redoubts and abatis while on campaign to provide protection for encampments.²⁰

As Wayne continued his preparations for action against the Indians, the British became increasingly alarmed and feared that Detroit might be the possible objective of Wayne's army. The British, in violation of the 1783 peace treaty between the United States and Great Britain, established Fort Miami to protect the approaches to Detroit. In addition to providing protection for the British garrison at Detroit, establishment of the fort gave the northwestern Indians confidence that the British would continue to lend aid and support to the Indian attacks against Americans. By the summer of 1794 the situation on the frontier had deteriorated to the point that military action became necessary. As the Legion left its winter quarters at Fort Washington (Cincinnati, Ohio), several units of mounted Kentucky militia arrived to reinforce the well-trained and well-supplied army.²¹

On 20 August 1794, Wayne defeated a large Indian force four miles from Fort Miami at the Battle of Fallen Timbers, near present day Maumee, Ohio. After the battle the Indians retreated toward their British allies in Fort Miami and attempted to gain sanctuary inside the protective walls of the fort. The British closed the gates and refused to shelter the Indian force. The Indians, without refuge and their confidence in their British allies destroyed, had little choice but to seek terms with Wayne's advancing Legion.²² Wayne's victory at Fallen Timbers resulted in the 1795 Treaty of Greenville.²³

The treaty was a masterpiece in that it allowed American access to the disputed areas and established the conditions for future American expansion. The treaty relinquished the United States' claim to all Indian lands in the Northwest Territory except

for parts of Ohio and sixteen other small tracts of land. These tracts of land were administrative areas at strategic locations throughout the Northwest Territory. The treaty allowed the United States to build forts at these locations as well as to have unrestricted access to important waterways, portages, and other mobility corridors. The treaty also allowed the United States to survey the sixteen tracts and to have the right of free passage to them. Finally, the treaty required the Indians to recognize that they were under the protection of the United States. As a protectorate of the United States, the Indians could sell their land, but only to the United States government.²⁴

As things quieted down after Wayne's successful campaign, the United States began to take additional steps to develop the frontier area. In 1800 all of the Northwest Territory, with the exception of Ohio, became the Indiana Territory. During the early 1800s the Indiana Territory was a sparsely populated area with William Henry Harrison as the first territorial governor.²⁵ Harrison was not a stranger to the American northwest; as a young officer he served in the American Legion commanded by Anthony Wayne. After leaving the army, Harrison remained in the area and served as the Northwest Territory's delegate to Congress, before his appointment as governor by President Adams. After his appointment as governor, Harrison established the capital for the territory at Vincennes and began his administration of the immense area.

United States public policy toward the Indians in the Old Northwest shifted during the administration of Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson stated his Indian policy in his second inaugural address on 4 March 1805. In this address, Jefferson stated that, "humanity enjoins us to teach them agriculture and the domestic arts."²⁶ The address implied that Jefferson wanted to find ways to peacefully coexist with the Indians on the frontier. Jefferson's inaugural remarks were deceptive and his private views quite different. A

27 February 1803 letter to Governor Harrison outlined the “unofficial” United States policy.

Jefferson’s letter told Harrison to draw the Indians to farming and to encourage Indian indebtedness to the United States’ trading posts. The reason for the emphasis on agriculture was twofold. Once the Indian was a farmer, he would realize that he did not need vast areas of land for hunting and would sell them to the United States. The second point was that Indians would need to buy their farming supplies from the trading posts. Once Indian leaders were sufficiently in debt, the United States could offer them the opportunity to sell off their lands to reduce their debt. If peaceful attempts to gain territory failed and hostilities ensued, Jefferson told Harrison that “seizing the whole country of that tribe and driving them across the Mississippi, as the only condition of peace, would be an example to others and a furtherance of our final consolidation.”²⁷

As white encroachment of Indian lands continued, many Indians began developing different ideas about the possession of land and how to live in the same areas as white men. The sustained American expansion was an indicator to many Indians that it was impossible to peacefully coexist with white settlers. The Shawnee, who were frequently on the periphery of white settlements, often had to move as the white settlements expanded. The Shawnee became preeminent among the Indians as far as resisting inroads made by white settlers into Indian territory, even though they were not always successful at resisting white encroachment. As settlers began to move into the wilderness and settle different parts of America, the Shawnee moved several times in the American south and northwest, eventually winding up in Ohio. Although forced to migrate, the Shawnee developed a reputation that made them feared by the settlers for their warlike prowess.²⁸

Two Shawnee brothers eventually emerged as Indian leaders who attempted to unify the Indians throughout the Old Northwest. The two brothers were Tenskwatawa and Tecumseh who moved from Ohio to the Indiana Territory after the Treaty of Greenville.²⁹ Tenskwatawa, or "The Prophet," was a spiritual leader in the Shawnee tribe and rose to prominence about 1805. The Prophet preached that Indians should abandon alcohol and anything associated with the Americans' way of life. The Prophet's teachings also emphasized a return to the traditional Indian ways. Tenskwatawa was very familiar with one of the most common evils associated with the white man--alcohol. Before the development of his revivalist religion and subsequent rise to power as the "Shawnee Prophet," Tenskwatawa had been a vagabond and a drunk.³⁰

The Prophet's brother, Tecumseh, attempted to organize the Indians politically. The Prophet's religious ideas often attracted Indians to the various villages that the brothers established, and Tecumseh used their attendance to offer his ideas about reestablishing Indian ownership of lands lost to white encroachment. Tecumseh eventually established an Indian confederacy or amalgamation of tribes. Tecumseh, a respected warrior and leader, served as the political leader of the confederacy. In his role as organizer and leader of the confederacy, Tecumseh traveled throughout the American northwest and south to gain support for his pan-Indian confederacy. By 1810, Tecumseh would have over 1,000 warriors gathered from various tribes. Tecumseh's confederacy included Shawnee, Kickapoo, Delaware, Ottawa, and Chippewa Indians.³¹

Tecumseh's ideas about how to protect Indian lands were a radical departure from traditional Indian thought. Tecumseh proposed that all Indians were linked culturally, racially, and politically. Because of these common associations any Indian land was under the common ownership of all Indians. A particular tribe had the right of

transitory ownership as long as they physically occupied an area. Once a tribe abandoned an area, the land reverted to common Indian ownership and required the mutual agreement of all tribes to sell the land.³²

If Tecumseh could successfully establish an amalgamation of tribes, it would destroy ideas of tribal independence and limit the authority of tribes to establish individual confederacies. Accomplishment of this goal would establish joint ownership of all Indian lands and prevent individual tribes from making separate land cessions to the United States.³³ The resulting confederacy would strengthen the Indian's political and military responses to the encroachment of Indian lands by the United States government. The confederacy led by Tecumseh settled near the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers in 1808. The village established by Tecumseh and his brother, known as Prophet's Town, became the headquarters of the confederacy.

During the years between 1800 and 1810, a series of disputes erupted between the Indians and the territorial government at Vincennes. The problems ranged from Indian attacks of settlements, to settlers violating treaty provisions and hunting on Indian lands. Harrison's continued treaty negotiations with separate tribes rather than the confederacy or representatives from all tribes caused friction between the Indians, settlers, and the territorial government. The most serious problems stemmed from the Treaty of Fort Wayne (1809). In this treaty, a few tribes ceded 3,000,000 acres of land to the United States. Tecumseh, who was traveling to gather support for his confederacy during the treaty negotiations, did not agree to the land cessions. Since Tecumseh's followers and many other area tribes did not agree to the provisions of the treaty, the confederacy refused to recognize its terms.³⁴

By the summer of 1810 both sides were posturing for war in the territory. Tecumseh continued to travel in attempts to strengthen his confederacy. Between 1810 and 1811, the secretary of war ordered an infantry regiment and two separate companies to the Indiana Territory. Even though the American military presence increased, Harrison, the Prophet, and Tecumseh met several times during 1810 and 1811 and attempted to resolve the developing problems. Harrison and Tecumseh conducted the most important series of meetings; the last one occurred during the summer of 1811. The two leaders discussed rumors that the confederacy was preparing for war, Indian and white attacks on one another, and Indian dissatisfaction with land cessions.³⁵

The final meeting was inconclusive and Tecumseh traveled south to recruit others for his confederacy. Harrison believed that the confederacy was a major threat and grew determined to destroy its headquarters at Prophet's Town and force the dispersion of its occupants. Shortly after Tecumseh began his southern journey, Harrison began to prepare for a campaign in the new purchase. Harrison recruited and organized his force. The force left Vincennes late in September 1811 and began moving toward the new land cessions.³⁶

After a brief halt to train and establish an army post, Harrison continued the march through the new purchase and arrived in the vicinity of Prophet's Town on 6 November 1811. The American force and the Indian confederacy fought the Battle of Tippecanoe the day after Harrison's army arrived outside of Prophet's Town and the




Fig. 1. Treaty of Fort Wayne

American army defeated the confederacy, destroyed the Indian headquarters at Prophet's Town, and returned to Vincennes.

After the battle the confederacy immediately dispersed. As a result of the battle, the confederacy lost a large part of its support from other tribes. Tecumseh returned from his southern trip after the battle was over and tried to rebuild the federation. Without the manpower pledged from the tribes formerly in the confederacy, the amalgamation of tribes could not present itself as a major military threat to the United States.³⁷ In a final effort to regain any chance for Indian independence in the American northwest, Tecumseh joined forces with the British.

At the time of the Tippecanoe battle, an ongoing national debate existed in America about the merits of going to war with Great Britain. Napoleon had been waging war on the European continent during much of the first decade of the eighteenth-century, and the effects of the Napoleonic wars retarded American commerce. The French and British tried to establish naval blockades during the Napoleonic wars to interdict each others' sea lines of communication. The French blockades had little effect, since they were not enforceable because Great Britain was the dominant naval power at the time. The English naval policies seriously disrupted American trade and frequently resulted in the impressment of American seamen.³⁸

The problems with Britain, and to a lesser extent France, occurred throughout the first decade of the nineteenth-century. Congress, the shipping classes in New England, and many newspapers became incensed with British practices. These highly charged emotions prompted many Americans to promote the idea of war with Great Britain. Tippecanoe fueled the war fires in the American east, as many citizens blamed America's frontier problems on Britain's influence over the northwestern Indian tribes.

As a reaction to the battle and the British aid to the Indians, Congressman Henry Clay called for the punishment of Canada and Britain.³⁹

By the Spring of 1812, the Indians were able to begin raiding the white settlements on the frontier again. The increased Indian attacks in the northwest and the potential for war with Britain and her Indian allies persuaded the United States to raise another force for service in the Old Northwest. General William Hull arrived in Dayton early in June 1812, to assume command of the forces in the Northwest Territory. Later that month on 18 June 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain. After his arrival, Hull conducted inconclusive operations throughout the area. Eventually, a combined British-Indian force placed Hull's command under siege at Detroit. Hull surrendered the Detroit force and all of the other U.S. forces in the area on 16 August 1812 to the British and Indian force led by General Isaac Brock and Tecumseh.⁴⁰

After Hull's surrender William Henry Harrison became the Supreme Commander of the Northwest Army.⁴¹ There were two major actions in Harrison's area that were significant enough to influence the outcome of the war in the Old Northwest. The first major event was a naval one during which Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry defeated the British naval force on Lake Erie 10 September 1813. After his victory Perry sent his famous dispatch to Harrison at Fort Meigs: "We have met the enemy and they are ours."⁴²

Once the Americans controlled Lake Erie, the British-Indian position at Detroit became untenable and British General Henry Proctor (Brock's replacement) prepared to abandon Detroit. Simultaneously, Harrison prepared to invade Canada. Perry ferried Harrison's force across Lake Erie to the mouth of the Detroit River. American forces led

by General Harrison began occupying Fort Malden and Detroit on 27 September 1813.⁴³

After securing Fort Malden and Detroit, Harrison's army pursued Tecumseh and Proctor into Canada. On 5 October 1813, the American army engaged and defeated the British-Indian force at the Battle of the Thames near Moraviantown (Ontario, Canada).

Tecumseh died during the battle, and Harrison's forces routed the combined British-Indian force.⁴⁴

Following the Battle of the Thames, all of the major impediments to continued American settlement of the Old Northwest disappeared. The destruction of the Indian confederacy that began at Tippecanoe became complete when Tecumseh died in Ontario. In the end, most of the tribes recognized the authority of the United States in the Old Northwest.⁴⁵ After the War of 1812, there was never another serious Indian threat in the American northwest. In 1816 Indiana became the nineteenth state, and by 1826 almost all Indian title to land in Indiana was extinguished.⁴⁶

¹C. F. Klinck, ed., *Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction in Early Records* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), 63. This is from an extract of a letter from Governor Harrison to the secretary of war, 4 July 1810. The letter explains Harrison's position on determining with whom he needs to negotiate to purchase Indian lands. In the letter, Harrison states that it was President Jefferson's opinion that the United States did not need to negotiate land purchases with tribes that recently moved to the area. So from Harrison's perspective, the Miami was the major tribe with rightful claims to territory in Indiana. Harrison felt that the remaining tribes, such as the Shawnee (who migrated to Indiana after the Treaty of Greenville, 1794) did not have legitimate claims.

²Robert G. Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison: Apprentice in Arms," *Northwest Ohio Quarterly* 65.1 (1993), 21. The fur trade continued to be the single most profitable industry in North America well into the 1790s.

³Fairfax Downey, *Indian Wars of the United States Army, 1776-1875* (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1963), 7-8; Allan W. Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 34, 38, 88-90; and James A. Maxwell, ed., *America's Fascinating Indian Heritage* (New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1978), 149-153. The Iroquois generally sided with the British, and the Great Lakes Algonquian tribes usually sided with the French during the early Colonial period. Most tribes sided with the British during the American Revolution.

⁴Lester J. Cappon, ed., *Atlas of Early American History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 86; and Maxwell, ed., 152.

⁵Cappon, ed., 86; and Maxwell, ed., 152.

⁶Allen W. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967), 107-117 describes the battle and peace negotiations between the Indians and the militia.

⁷Charles Beavans, ed., *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States: 1776-1949*, vol. 12 (Washington: GPO, 1974), 9-10; Cappon, ed., 16; and Jack J. Gifford, "The Northwest Indian War" (Ph.D. diss., University of California--Los Angeles, 1964), 34-35.

⁸Michael Johnson, *American Woodland Indians* (Great Britain: Osprey, 1995), 5. Eighteenth-century woodland Indians lived east of the Mississippi River, throughout the Great Lakes region, and the northeastern United States and Canada. A few woodland tribes (namely the Shawnee) lived at one time in the southeastern United States. Woodland Indians also share a language association. Woodland Indian language groups are: Algonkian, Iroquoian, Siouan, and Muskogian.

⁹Downey, 7; and Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 34.

¹⁰Benjamin Drake, *Life of Tecumseh* (Cincinnati: E. Morgan & Co., 1841; reprint, New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, 1969), 17-18; David R. Edmunds, *Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1984), 46-72, 97-98; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967; New York: Bantam, 1970), 723-726; Logan Esarey, *A History of Indiana* 2 vols. (Indianapolis: Hoosier Historical Press, Inc., 1970), 89-91; and Fred L. Israel, ed., *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648 - 1967* vol. 1 (New York: Chelsea House, 1967), 664. After the Revolution the United States adopted an Indian policy that recognized Indian tribes as governments and allowed the Indians to hold complete title to United States government land in the area that became the Northwest Territory. A Congressional Ordinance of 7 August 1786 divided Indian country into two areas separated by the Ohio River. Superintendents of Indian affairs were appointed to two year terms in each area. The superintendent licensed all traders. Indian agents and military officers were prohibited from personal trading with the Indians. Regular passports, signed by an Indian agent, were required for travel in Indian country. This ordinance bears some similarity to the Royal Proclamation of 1763.

¹¹Drake, 17-18; Edmunds, 46-72, 97-98; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967; New York: Bantam, 1970), 723-726; and Esarey, 89-91.

¹²Esarey, *History*, 89-91; and Gregory J.W. Urwin, *The United States Infantry: An Illustrated History, 1775 - 1918* (New York: Blandford Press, 1988), 30. The Articles of Confederation provided the initial framework of government for the United

States. The Articles were largely ineffective and eventually replaced by the United States Constitution. The Constitution became effective in 1789.

¹³Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 107 and 116, describe British efforts to define the American boundary at the Ohio River during the negotiations to end the Revolutionary War. The references also describe continued British promotion of the idea that the Indians should focus on the Ohio River as the Indian-white border after the signing of the Treaty of Paris. Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 763 describes British efforts to establish an Indian buffer state at the negotiations to end the War of 1812. It would have required the United States to cede Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, Wisconsin, half of Ohio, and part of Minnesota. The American negotiators refused to entertain the idea of the land cessions.

¹⁴Beavans, ed., 9-14; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 363; Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983, New York: Bantam, 1984), 239-240; David R. Edmunds, "The Thin Red Line: Tecumseh, the Prophet and Shawnee Resistance" *Timeline* 4.6 (1987-1988), 15; and Urwin, 30. The British did turn over their posts to the United States in 1796. After turning over their posts to the United States the British established new posts in Canada to fulfill the role of those British posts formerly in the United States. Fort Malden, for example, was established on the Canadian side of the Detroit River after the British turned Detroit over to the United States. After 1796 the British continued to support the northwestern Indian tribes from their posts in Canada and with British traders (or army personnel disguised as traders) that traveled throughout the American northwest.

¹⁵See Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; and New York: Bantam, 1984), 138-140 and 699 for more detail on the impact of the Northwest Ordinance and the attitude of the local settlers toward the ordinance. The ordinance also prohibited slavery or other forms of involuntary servitude, described procedures for territorial representation in Congress, and had clauses designed to promote education. The Northwest Ordinance is relevant to Congressional authority to declare war because the United States Constitution was not in effect until 1789. The U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8 grants Congress the authority to declare war and to raise and support armies.

¹⁶Washington proposed his plan as early as 1783 and the Northwest Ordinance was one method to bring it to fruition. Washington's plan is from Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart* (New York: Bantam, 1992; New York: New York: Bantam, 1993), 880. Indian insistence on the Ohio River boundary is from Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison," 14 and Russell Weigley, *History of the United States Army* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 90. Weigley also notes that the British continued to encourage the Indians to seek the river as the border.

¹⁷Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 363-368 and Jason Hook, *American Indian Warrior Chiefs* (New York: Sterling Publishing Co. Inc., 1990), 18.

¹⁸Downey, 52-53; and Weigley, 91.

¹⁹Downey, 54-60; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 392-401; Eckert, *Gateway to Empire* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 701-702; and Hook, 18-19 provide detailed accounts of the battle. Part of the problem that St. Clair faced was that he began the expedition without ample supplies, so his soldiers were on reduced rations from the start. Camp followers probably consumed part of the army's provisions even though St. Clair prohibited releasing the supplies to them. Additionally, about 300 militia deserted and St. Clair sent a company of regulars to catch them. Finally, the night prior to the attack, St. Clair's force did not establish proper defensive positions. The Indian attack at first light quickly overwhelmed the American position. Only twenty-four members of those engaged returned uninjured. In addition to the American soldiers killed and wounded, there were over 200 camp followers killed. There were 66 Indians killed and nine wounded. Eckert reports that Chief Blue Jacket, a white man adopted by the Shawnee, killed and scalped his brother during the battle. The boys were separated as youngsters and Blue Jacket (Marmaduke Van Swearingen) grew up to be a Shawnee war chief. Blue Jacket's brother (Charles Van Swearingen) served as a captain on St. Clair's expedition.

²⁰Esarey, *History*, 122; Gifford, 319-321; Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison," 10-24; and Weigley, 93. Weigley calls Wayne the "Father of the Regular Army" because he provided the army with its first "model of excellence." Wayne issued every officer in his command a copy of the *Blue Book* and demanded that they become proficient in the drills that it contained. Wayne also trained his units in open order formations in addition to the standard formations. The Legion trained extensively with the bayonet and live ammunition. In addition to marksmanship training Wayne conducted maneuver live fire and blank fire exercises. Wayne also conducted training exercises that included soldiers dressed and acting like Indians to simulate an opposing force. Wayne commented that "We must burn a good deal of powder, . . . to make . . . marksman and soldiers." Wayne's approach to training was unique for the time period. William Henry Harrison, who would lead American forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe, served as a company grade officer in General Wayne's command.

²¹Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 425-427; and Bruce Grant, *American Forts Yesterday and Today* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1965), 96-97.

²²Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 426-429.

²³Greenville is the modern spelling. Greeneville is the eighteen-century spelling and is still found in many references.

²⁴Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 439; and Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Affairs. Laws and Treaties* 2 (Washington: GPO, 1904), 39-43. The treaty also formally gave the United States control of a few other areas to which the United States had previously extinguished Indian title. The treaty specified annuity arrangements to compensate the Indians and had clauses about the punishment of whites that murdered Indians (and vice versa). The treaty established the means for the United States to gain title to land that the United States felt was already American territory (after the Treaty of Paris).

²⁵Howard Peckham, *Indiana: A Bicentennial History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), 36 and Family History Section, Indiana Historical Society, *Census of Indiana Territory for 1807* (Indianapolis: Family History Section, Indiana Historical Society, 1980). Peckham's estimate is that the territory had a population of about 2,500. The 1807 Census shows a population of 2,587. The figures are somewhat misleading because the census only counted free white males of voting age; the census did not count women, children, slaves (although illegal, there were slaves in the area), etc. Some estimates of the population are as high as 25,000 people. The original Indiana Territory encompassed most of the Northwest Territory except for Ohio. The area of the Indiana Territory decreased as Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin became populated enough to become territories, separated territories, or states.

²⁶Klinck, ed., 58. This reference contains an extract of Jefferson's speech from James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897* (Published by Authority of Congress, 1901), I, 380.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 56-57. Jefferson said that his letter was "unofficial and private." Several sources describe the letter or quote passages from it. There are some slight variations between sources but the concepts of turning the Indians toward agriculture, forcing their indebtedness, and removing them beyond the Mississippi River are essentially the same in each reference.

²⁸Drake, 21; Hook, 14-15; and Johnson, 6. The Shawnee were a woodland tribe of the Algonkian language group who moved from the Cumberland River area in Tennessee to Ohio. Shawnee groups also lived as far south as Georgia and Alabama.

²⁹Reed Beard, *The Battle of Tippecanoe* (Chicago: Hammond Press, W.B. Conkey Co., 1911), 22; and Peckham, 40. Initially the brothers established a village in Greenville similar to the one that they would establish at Tippecanoe. The Ohio village was established in an area that violated the terms of the Treaty of Greenville. In the Spring of 1808 the Kickapoo and Potawatomi tribes offered the brothers land in Indiana. The brothers relocated to Indiana and established Prophet's Town on the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash rivers.

³⁰Beard, 13-14; Rachel Buff, "Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa: Myth, Historiography and Popular Memory," *Historical Reflections* (1995), 279; Drake, 86-88; Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 346-348; David R. Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 7-8, 11, 19; Edmunds, *Quest*, 83-98, 160; Esarey, *History*, 182; Hook, 22-23; and Pirtle, 2. The Prophet said that he had a dream in which he saw all who had died as drunkards "with flames issuing from their mouths." The Prophet also preached that Indians should return to the traditional Indian lifestyle which also included prohibitions on Indian and white intermarriages. The Prophet's religion emphasized that Indians needed to reject practices learned from white men (to include the tools, clothes, and food learned from contact with whites). The Prophet's teachings specifically focused on abandoning anything associated with Americans and said that Americans developed from an evil spirit. According to the Prophet, the French

and British developed from the same Master of Life deity that the Indians. By teaching that the British and French shared the same positive spiritual legacy as Indians the Prophet gave his followers a way to continue their access to the white man's technology (although in a limited way). The Prophet promoted obviously political topics such as the idea that Indians should unite in common goals as one people. Buff notes that the Prophet's ideas focused on a return to traditions that would ensure restoration of land and peace and that politics and religion were traditionally associated with one another in Indian culture. Edmunds and Buff believe that the Prophet's role was much more significant than is usually acknowledged and that the religion that he sponsored was a genuine movement in its own right, rather than merely a subset of Tecumseh's confederacy. Many authors submit that the Prophet's movement predates Tecumseh's and was the initial reason that Indians assembled--to hear the Prophet and not Tecumseh. Regardless of whether or not the Prophet's movement predates Tecumseh's political efforts it is commonly recognized that between the two brothers, Tecumseh's leadership and influence was ascendant at the time of the Battle of Tippecanoe.

³¹Drake, 43; Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 11-13; and Hook, 26. Tecumseh is often referred to as an "Indian Chief," this is incorrect. Although he was a political and combat leader, Tecumseh was never recognized as a chief in the traditions of the Shawnee tribe. In fact, Tecumseh usually referred to himself as a warrior. Tecumseh's confederation ultimately included tribes as far away as the west side of the Mississippi River. The Chickasaws and Choctaws in the American south refused to join the confederacy but the Creeks (Alabama) sent a party north with Tecumseh in 1811-1812.

³²Beard, 23; Edmunds, *Quest*, 97-98; and Pirtle, xiii.

³³Adams, 351; and Downey, 83.

³⁴Hook, 26. The Indian nations listed on the treaty are: "Delawares," "Putawatimies," "Miamies," and "Eel River Miamies." See Kappler, ed., 101-104 for a copy of the treaty. Adams, 334-335, has an excellent map that shows Indian cessions from 1795-1810 and includes this treaty. Adams, 342-364 also details many of the problems such as Indian attacks, treaty violations, and 1809 treaty issues that led up to the Battle of Tippecanoe. Eckert, *Gateway* 339-340, 352 and Maxwell, ed., 152-153 discuss some of the methods used to gain Indian agreement during treaty negotiations. American treaty negotiators employed many different methods to gain Indian agreement to treaties; some of the methods were ethical and many were not. See Chapter 3, note 8 for more detail on negotiation practices during treaties.

³⁵Adams, 360; and Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., *The Territory of Indiana 1810-1816: Territorial Papers of the United States* vol. 8 (Washington: GPO, 1939), 130. The 4th U.S., a company from the 7th U.S., and a company from the Rifle Regiment were the regular army organizations ordered to report to Harrison and serve in the Indiana Territory. Adams, 357-359 details Indian-white attacks (1810-1811) and the 1811 meeting. Hook, 27-30 provides details of the meeting to include Tecumseh's threats that war would ensue if the land dispute remained unsatisfactorily addressed.

³⁶Bil Gilbert, *God Gave Us This Country* (New York: Atheneum, 1989), 268-269; and Peckham, 41.

³⁷Drake, 155-156.

³⁸Adams, 374-376; Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 365-370; and Maurice Matloff, ed., *American Military History Volume 1: 1775-1902* (Pennsylvania: Combined Books, 1996), 120-123. Britain and France both adopted policies which could lead to the search and seizure of American merchant shipping regardless of whether or not the ship carried contraband. Great Britain was the dominant naval power of the time and carried out its policies with greater effect. An example of British action is the *Chesapeake* incident. On 22 June 1807, a British warship, *Leopard*, fired on the *Chesapeake*, an American warship in American waters. The British accused the Americans of hiring British deserters as sailors. The crew of the *Leopard* boarded the *Chesapeake* and impressed some members of the crew. President Jefferson enacted the Embargo Act as a response to these types of European naval policies. The Embargo Act restricted any international trade in American ports and was extremely unpopular with American merchants. The 1809 Non-Intercourse Act replaced the Embargo Act and restricted trade with only Great Britain and France. The United States declared war on Great Britain in the summer of 1812; a Senate vote to declare war on France failed by two votes.

³⁹Adams, 376; Israel, ed., 664; Matloff, ed., 120-121; and Pirtle, 10.

⁴⁰Drake, 157; Klinck, ed., 147; and Weigley, 118-120.

⁴¹Weigley, 123 and 132. Weigley considers Harrison a competent officer whose militia performed well. Weigley's analysis is that, "When volunteer companies were led by a William Henry Harrison or an Andrew Jackson, who used them with regard to their limitations but who both disciplined and inspired them, meeting the British was not likely to end in rout and might even lead to victory."

⁴²Adams, 707 provides an excellent summary of the Lake Erie battle. Heinl, 166 contains Perry's complete quotation.

⁴³Adams, 708-709.

⁴⁴Adams, 710-715 and Klinck, ed., 184-215, discuss the Battle of the Thames in some detail. Klinck, ed., also provides some primary source accounts of Tecumseh's death. Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart* is a biography of Tecumseh and has extensive notes on Tecumseh's participation in the Battle of the Thames.

⁴⁵Adams, 717; and Klinck, ed., 194.

⁴⁶Adams, 1297; and Israel, ed., 664.

CHAPTER THREE

TIPPECANOE CAMPAIGN

... he [the President] is so far off he will not be injured by the war; he may sit in his town and drink his wine, while you and I have to fight it out.¹

Tecumseh, *Remark to Governor Harrison*

Setting the Stage

Tecumseh's adamant refusal to accept the provisions of the Treaty of Fort Wayne should have foreshadowed the inevitability of an Indian war. Each side harbored fears that it would not be able to achieve relative security and protection from the threat posed by the other. Harrison feared that Tecumseh would prevent a survey of the lands ceded by the treaty. Settlers feared that Indian raids would continue or the Indians would attack Vincennes. Tecumseh and the tribes allied with him feared that the Seventeen Fires² would consume all of the Indian lands. These fears made the campaign and resulting battle inevitable; the only question that remained was when the battle would happen.

Harrison often received guidance from the administration in Washington to continue his efforts to extinguish Indian title to lands in the Indiana Territory. Even though the president and his administration changed, subsequent administrations encouraged continued efforts to gain territory. Throughout his years as governor Harrison proved extremely adept at gaining land cessions to support the growing expansion of settlements along the frontier. Between 1802 and 1809, Governor Harrison managed to extinguish Indian title to over one hundred million acres.³

Tecumseh worked for more than a decade to organize and establish a confederacy or amalgamation of tribes. Starting in 1801 and continuing until his death

in 1813, Tecumseh proposed a grand plan that would allow the Indians to maintain their independence and regain lands lost to American encroachment. The grand plan for the confederacy was a simple idea that proposed that Indians on both sides of the Mississippi should join forces when they received a "great sign." All of the united tribes would regain their lands lost to white encroachment--peaceably at first and by force if necessary. The goal of the confederacy was to "take over the place of the whites which had been usurped from them."⁴

Tecumseh had a great deal of success establishing his confederacy, and by 1805 he had more tribes pledged to the coalition than any previous Indian confederacy.⁵ Tecumseh's headquarters at Prophet's Town continued to increase in size as more tribes pledged their support to the Indian confederacy. Small groups of warriors or individual braves who supported Tecumseh's plans to fight white encroachment moved with their families to the village at Tippecanoe (In the summer of 1810 the size of the village grew from 1,000 warriors and their families to 3,000 warriors alone, who were camped within thirty miles of Prophet's Town).⁶

Politically, Tecumseh focused his efforts on recruiting support from the various Indian leaders. Active support from the tribal chiefs meant that they would provide Tecumseh with manpower at his Tippecanoe headquarters and additional forces if hostilities erupted. For material support, Tecumseh relied on the British. Although he refused until the War of 1812 to establish a formal political-military alliance with the British, Tecumseh accepted supplies from them on a routine basis. By 1810, Tecumseh's warriors were well supplied by the British forces in the area. The warriors were so well supplied that they refused to buy anything from American traders since the British provided them with guns, ammunition, and other supplies at no cost.⁷

The Almost War

As American possessions continued to expand, there were growing concerns on each side about the threat of war. Harrison and Tecumseh met several times between 1808 and 1810 to try and prevent hostilities as well as to discuss the impact of the most recent land cessions. The meetings and discussions between the two leaders were temporary measures at best. They had little long term effect because each side focused on short term remedies that would protect their particular political or military interests.

Tecumseh was clearly focused on protecting Indian lands as well as re-negotiating the rights to territory already ceded to the United States. Tecumseh also used the meetings as a way to buy time for the confederacy until the organization was strong enough to act politically or militarily to regain formerly held Indian territory. Harrison, on the other hand, was determined to protect the territory gained during previous negotiations as well as his ability to treat with individual tribes for new land cessions.⁸ President Madison's administration encouraged these efforts to secure new territory. The secretary of war, William Eustis, wrote to Harrison and directed him to extinguish the Indian title to lands east of the Wabash. Harrison concluded several treaties, including the Treaty of Fort Wayne, shortly after receiving this guidance. The agreements were ratified after the new year, and the lands gained as a result of the Treaty of Fort Wayne were quickly offered for public sale.⁹

The Treaty of Fort Wayne was a major catalyst for the Tippecanoe campaign. In the spring of 1809, Harrison met with several representatives of the area tribes at Greenville, Ohio, and gained rights to more than three million acres of land in Indiana. This agreement became final on 30 September 1809, at Fort Wayne, Indiana.

Tecumseh was away recruiting tribes for the confederacy during the treaty negotiations. As a result of his absence, the treaty was concluded without the input of Tecumseh and his band at Prophet's Town. The subsequent meetings between Tecumseh and Harrison at Vincennes were a result of Harrison's desire to take possession of the new purchase and Tecumseh's desire to retain the area for the Indian's use.

Each side tried to gain the support of the undecided Indian tribes throughout the area. Tecumseh continued traveling to meet with various Indian tribes. Harrison either met with the various Indian chiefs or sent letters by messenger to them. The purpose of Harrison's missives was to limit the influence of Tecumseh among the leaders of the different tribes in the territory. The nature of Harrison's message depended upon the disposition of the recipient toward the United States. Tribes that maintained an attitude of friendship toward the United States were congratulated for not joining Tecumseh. Tribes that considered joining Tecumseh's coalition received letters that threatened their destruction by the United States. Many of Harrison's letters had the expected effect--such as the congratulatory one sent to Chief Black Hoof who responded that he would maintain a standard of friendship. The threatening letter to the Wyandot tribe had the opposite effect. The Wyandots considered the letter a declaration of war and decided to join Tecumseh.¹⁰

Whenever Tecumseh left on a recruiting trip his brother remained in charge at Prophet's Town. The Prophet had neither the political acumen or discipline of his older brother and often encouraged the warriors at Tippecanoe to take actions that drew the United States and the confederacy closer to war. During one of Tecumseh's absences in July 1810, the Prophet urged the warriors at Prophet's Town to destroy a white settlement and proposed an attack on Vincennes. This caused a rift among the tribes

supporting the confederation; many individuals left Prophet's Town and some tribes refused to support the confederacy.

Nonetheless, the Prophet convinced approximately 500 warriors to strike out for Vincennes. The warriors canoed down the Wabash and established camp about fifty miles from Vincennes. After establishing their camp, the braves reconnoitered the town in preparation for an attack. Harrison, through his intelligence network, was informed of the proposed Indian attack. In order to protect the capital, Harrison raised three companies of volunteer militia and stationed them a few miles above Vincennes at Fort Knox. Tecumseh, warned of his brother's plans, quickly returned to the headquarters at Tippecanoe to put a stop to the intended attack. Tecumseh's efforts were successful and he delayed the inevitable confrontation.¹¹

Because of the increasing tensions between the settlers and the Indians on the frontier, Harrison and Tecumseh met twice at Vincennes. Harrison initiated the first meeting by writing to Tecumseh. A messenger read the letter to Tecumseh and his brother at Prophet's Town in July 1810. Harrison's emissary told the brothers that:

Although I must say that you are an enemy to the Seventeen Fires, and that you have used the greatest exertions to lead them [Indians] astray. In this you have been in some measure successful; as I am told they are ready to raise the tomahawk against their father.

. . . Don't deceive yourselves; do not believe that all nations of Indians united are able to resist the force of the Seventeen Fires. . . . what can a few brave warriors do against the innumerable warriors of the Seventeen Fires? Our blue-coats are more numerous than you can count. . . . Do not think that the red-coats can protect you; they are not able to protect themselves. . . . What reason have you to complain of the Seventeen Fires? Have they taken anything from you? Have they ever violated the treaties made with the red men? You say they have purchased lands from those who had no right to sell them. Show that this is true and the land will be restored. Show us the rightful owners. I have full power to arrange this business; but if you would rather carry your complaints before your great father, the President, you shall be indulged. I will immediately take means to send you. . . .¹²

Tecumseh declined the trip to Washington, preferring instead to meet with Harrison at Vincennes. During the August 1810 meeting Tecumseh told Harrison that the Treaty of Fort Wayne was not valid. Furthermore, Tecumseh threatened that if the land was not restored Harrison would see "how it will be settled."¹³ Harrison countered that the Shawnee did not have the right to represent the Indians at treaty negotiations because they had been driven from their traditional homelands in Florida and Georgia by the Creek Indians. Moreover, since the Miami occupied the land when the Shawnee were in the south, the Miami were the appropriate tribe to deal with during treaty negotiations. Finally, Harrison stated that all Indians were not one people and the Shawnee did not have the right to come from a "distant country" and tell the Miami how to dispose of their lands.¹⁴

The strongly stated positions almost resulted in a fight between the Indians present and Harrison's contingent. The meeting reconvened the next day with Harrison and Tecumseh outwardly displaying more restraint. Harrison asked Tecumseh if he planned to prevent a survey of the land on the Wabash. Tecumseh replied that he was determined to maintain the pre-1809 boundary. Harrison promised to pass Tecumseh's concerns to the president, but he did not think it would make a difference. The governor also emphasized that the American title to the land "will be protected and supported by the sword."¹⁵ Tecumseh told Harrison that he wanted to support the United States, but if the President did not agree to his terms, then the Indians would support the British.¹⁶

Since the establishment of Prophet's Town, Harrison routinely received various reports about activities at the village, such as its size and the intent of the Indian leaders there. The spies, traders, and government Indian agents that made up a large part of Harrison's frontier intelligence system continually submitted reports that gave Harrison

reason for grave concern about the potential threat from the Indians at Prophet's Town. As Harrison's suspicions grew, he began to believe that Tecumseh and his brother were preparing for war with the United States.

In the spring of 1811, another incident occurred that raised the alarm for Harrison. Part of the annuity that the United States paid to area Indian tribes was salt, an important commodity in short supply on the frontier. As the boat moved up the Wabash to distribute the salt annuity the Prophet seized the entire shipment for his use at Tippecanoe. Upon their return to Vincennes the boatmen reported seeing hundreds of Indian canoes lined up along the banks of the Wabash. This made Harrison realize that Tecumseh's warriors could move much faster down the Wabash to attack Vincennes than an overland force, and any attack could happen with little warning.¹⁷

The situation deteriorated as incidents between the Indians and the settlers continued to result in violence. Harrison also recognized the enduring threat of an Indian attack on Vincennes. As a result of the increased disorder and his continued concern for the protection of Vincennes, Harrison wrote to Secretary Eustis requesting reinforcements, as well as the authority to take the offensive if war seemed imminent. In response to Harrison's requests for assistance, Eustis sent the 4th U.S. to Vincennes.¹⁸

The continued unrest along the frontier brought Harrison and Tecumseh together for another meeting at Vincennes on 27 July 1811. In addition to discussions over the land ceded by the 1809 treaty, Harrison requested that Tecumseh turn over two Potawatomi warriors who were accused of murdering some settlers. Tecumseh refused to turn them over to Harrison because the whites, Tecumseh explained, were not

murdered. The settlers were executed because they had killed two Wea Indians without provocation.¹⁹

The two days of meetings concluded with Tecumseh telling Harrison that he planned to leave for the south to visit tribes and bring back more Indians for the confederacy. Tecumseh asked Harrison to delay any action in the disputed area until his return in the spring. Tecumseh explained that the land on the Wabash was the best hunting ground and that since the size of the Tippecanoe village would grow with new arrivals the Indians needed the land to feed the increased population. Tecumseh closed by stating that upon his return he would go to Washington and talk to the president.²⁰

Tecumseh left for the south to meet with the Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Creek tribes in order to gain their support for his confederacy and for war with the United States. Before departing he directed his brother to go back to Prophet's Town and avoid any premature battle with Harrison's forces. Although Tecumseh told Harrison that he would return in the spring, Harrison's spies reported that a major event sponsored by Tecumseh (they were not sure what) was to occur in the late fall. Harrison knew that if he were to take action it would have to be before Tecumseh's return.²¹

The Campaign

The campaign really started in the summer of 1811, as both sides were making final preparations to protect their interests. Harrison began to make his intent clear to the administration through an extensive letter writing effort to the secretary of war. Harrison was convinced that the key to breaking up the Indian union and that the best way to continue to extinguish Indian title to land, was to continue to deal with individual chiefs or small tribes rather than a unified politically powerful Indian body. Harrison also

felt that Tecumseh's efforts to increase the number of tribes pledged to the confederacy posed a serious threat to America's interests. Harrison expressed his concerns in a letter to Secretary of War Eustis:

A step of this sort would be of infinite prejudice to the United States. . . . It would shut the door against further extinguishment of Indian title upon the valuable tract of country south of the Wabash. . . . The establishment of tranquillity between the neighboring tribes will always be a sure indication of war against us. . . .²²

In the same letter Harrison proposed taking the initiative during Tecumseh's trip to the south. Harrison's letter to Eustis continued and emphasized that Tecumseh's absence:

. . . affords a most favorable opportunity for breaking up his Confederacy. . . . He is now upon the last round to put a finishing stroke to his work. I hope, however, before his return, that that part of the fabrick [sic] which he considered complete [the coalition of tribes] will be demolished and even its foundation rooted up. . . .²³

Secretary Eustis quickly responded in a 17 July 1811 letter. Eustis told Harrison that: "If the Prophet should commence, or seriously threaten hostilities he ought to be attacked; provided the force under your command is sufficient to ensure success."²⁴

Three days later the secretary of war dispatched another letter to Harrison that provided additional guidance and modified the earlier hard-line approach to the problem:

Since my letter of the 17th instant, I have been particularly instructed by the President [Madison] to communicate to your excellency his earnest desire that peace may, if possible, be preserved with the Indians, and that to this end every proper means may be adopted. By this it is not intended . . . that the banditti under the Prophet should not be attacked and vanquished, providing such a measure should be rendered absolutely necessary.²⁵

Harrison obviously felt that the time was right to take some strong action against the Indians. There were compelling reasons why Harrison felt the need for action. One concern was the continued material support that the British gave the Indians. The

possibility of a British-Indian military alliance posed a threat to American security on the frontier. Although Harrison was not sure of how much British support the Indians were getting, there was a common perception that a British-supported Indian war was likely. Harrison felt that he should crush the Indians before the British could openly aid them.²⁶

The other reason that Harrison believed that the time was right was because of the absence of the coalition's leader, Tecumseh. Whenever Tecumseh left on one of his trips, the Prophet was in charge of the Indian coalition. Harrison realized that Tecumseh was the driving force behind the coalition and that the Prophet did not have the same leadership or tactical skills as his brother. In short, it would be easier to destroy or disrupt the coalition while the Prophet was in charge. Another significant consideration for Harrison was the constant threat of an Indian attack on Vincennes. Harrison felt that a major military operation would deter future Indian attacks or break up the confederacy.

An 18 September 1811 letter from the secretary of war outlined the secretary's views on the situation and gave Governor Harrison further encouragement to complete preparations for an expedition against the Prophet. Eustis told Harrison that:

The course to be pursued with the Prophet and his assemblage, must depend, in a great measure, if not wholly, on his conduct, and on the circumstances which occur as you approach him.

You will approach and order him to disperse, which he may be permitted to do, on condition of satisfactory assurances that in future he shall not assemble or attempt to assemble any number of Indians, armed or hostile in attitude. If he neglects or refuses to disperse he will be attacked and compelled to it by the force under your command. He will probably in that case be taken prisoner. His adherents should be informed that in case they shall hereafter form any combination of a hostile nature, and oblige the government to send an armed force against them, they will be driven beyond the great waters, and never again permitted to live within the Jurisdictional limits of the United States.

You will Judge the expediency of taking the chief or any of the associates as hostages. The objection to this measure appears to be, that it acknowledges the principal as an enemy entitled to respect, and implies the inconvenience of entering into & performing stipulations with a man of bad faith.

A post may be established on the new purchase on the [W]abash, if in your judgment it is required for the Security of the purchase or the Territories.²⁷

After Harrison received the secretary of war's approval to take action against the Indians, he began to increase the size of the force available for any possible expedition. The regulars, commanded by Colonel John Parker Boyd, were already under his command so Harrison began to activate militia units and recruit volunteers to augment the regulars. The pool of potential recruits extended outside of Indiana's territorial boundary. Kentucky actively supported the proposed campaign and provided militia to augment Harrison's force.²⁸ Many settlers in Kentucky considered imminent hostilities in Indiana a threat to their security. On 31 August 1811 a Lexington, Kentucky newspaper endorsed military action by writing: "If Harrison is defeated for want of your help you will have the enemy to fight on your own shore of the Ohio ere long."²⁹

There was not a large body of experienced manpower to cull for Indian fighters. Militia volunteers were generally hastily armed civilians with little military experience who had never seen, heard, or fought a hostile Indian warrior.³⁰ A lack of combat experience was prevalent among all of the potential combatants because there had not been a major military operation in the region since the 1794 Fallen Timbers campaign. Harrison needed to rely on training and adequate numbers to overcome the lack of experience in the army. By mid-October, Harrison was able to assemble a force of about 1,100 men to conduct the campaign.³¹

One problem that Harrison faced was how to design a legitimate reason for military action against the Indians. Although Eustis endorsed Harrison's desire to occupy the new purchase and march on the Prophet if required, only Congress had the authority to declare war. Harrison, as governor, could occupy the new purchases, but

the Tippecanoe village remained beyond the boundary of the new land cessions.

Harrison had limited authority to march against the Prophet, but a move beyond the 1809 boundary still constituted an invasion of Indian territory without the consent of Congress.³²

Several circumstances combined to give Harrison a pretense to conduct a show of force. Tecumseh told Harrison in one of their meetings that he would contest efforts to survey the land cessions.³³ There was also the issue of the two Potawatomi Indians who had killed the whites earlier in the summer. Finally, a few Indians, encouraged by the Prophet, stole several horses from settlers during a raid in September 1811. The incident was not enough for offensive action, but it did provide a valid excuse for a significant show of force.³⁴

On 26 September 1811 Harrison's force left the territorial capital and headed for the new purchase. Harrison's force moved about sixty-five miles north of Vincennes to the site of present day Terre Haute, Indiana and established camp. The army stopped for almost a month to build a fort, train, and gather supplies. Establishment of the fort, named Fort Harrison, accomplished several important objectives. First, it was a method to formally occupy the new cessions. The fort also provided a secure location for the army to stockpile supplies and protect its line of communication as they moved further into hostile territory.

Several important events transpired while Harrison's force established the new post. Harrison sent a delegation to the Delaware Indians to secure the assistance of a few Delaware chiefs as negotiators with the Indians at Prophet's Town. The chiefs, who agreed to help Harrison, were delayed while enroute to join the army. As the chiefs moved to Fort Harrison they were intercepted by a war party from

Prophet's Town. The war party forced the chiefs to accompany them to the Tippecanoe village. The Delawares were eventually released and resumed their journey to join Harrison. The delegates, furious because of their detention, arrived at Fort Harrison on 27 October 1811. The Delawares were able to provide Harrison with intelligence about the Prophet's intentions and activities at the village. The chiefs reported that the warriors at the Tippecanoe village war danced every night and that the Prophet promised to burn alive the first prisoners captured.³⁵

An Indian party from Prophet's Town provided Harrison with his excuse to enter the Tippecanoe area and take offensive action. On the night of 10 October 1811, one of the Indians shot and severely wounded one of the sentinels at the fort. Harrison increased the size of his force with additional companies from Vincennes and prepared to march. Upon arrival of the additional force his strength grew from roughly 900 men to about 1,100 regulars and militia.³⁶

Initially, Harrison thought that without Tecumseh's leadership the advance of an army would demoralize the Indians enough to make them desert or agree to Harrison's desires. The attack on the sentry made Harrison realize that the Indians at Prophet's Town were prepared to fight. Rather than hastily move against the Prophet in early October, Harrison waited for his supplies to catch up with the army.³⁷ Shortly after the attack on his sentry, Harrison wrote Eustis and told him that "Nothing now remains but to chastise him [the Prophet] and he shall certainly get it."³⁸ The inevitable clash between the Seventeen Fires and the amalgamation of tribes was only a few days march away from happening.

After receiving and consolidating his supplies at the fort, Harrison did not waste any time. Harrison left Lieutenant Colonel Miller (4th U.S.) with a small detachment to

garrison the fort as the army moved north toward Tippecanoe. The day after starting the march Harrison sent a delegation of Delaware and Miami Indians to Prophet's Town with a message for Tenskwatawa. The message demanded that the Potawatomies, Winnebagoes, and Kickapoos should return to their tribes, that the stolen horses should be returned, and that the murderers of the whites should be surrendered. The delegation departed and was never heard from again.³⁹

There were two main routes to Prophet's Town from Fort Harrison. The shorter route was on the south side of the Wabash and consisted of densely wooded terrain that was favorable for ambush. The second route was on the opposite side of the river, and although longer, it passed through more open terrain, enhancing the security of the force. Harrison ordered a route cleared along the southern side of the Wabash and began moving the army along the trail. Movement along the southern route created the impression that the army was taking the less secure route. The army crossed the river to the more secure route on 31 October 1811. The deception was successful and the force did not encounter any Indian scouts during its transit through most of the new purchase.⁴⁰ Within a matter of days, the army reached the extreme boundary of the land cession at the Vermillion River.

At the river the army halted and built a blockhouse to cache supplies and boats. The army was within fifty miles of Prophet's Town, and crossing the Vermillion into Indian territory would be an act of war.⁴¹ On 3 November 1811 Harrison left a small detachment at the blockhouse and crossed the Vermillion River into Indian Territory. The army arrived in the vicinity of Prophet's Town on 6 November 1811.

The army continued its march to within a few hundred yards of Prophet's Town before deciding to camp a short distance away from the village near Burnett Creek.

During the early morning hours of 7 November 1811, several hundred Indians attacked the army's encampment. After a fierce fight of about two hours the Indians retreated. The next day the American's burned Prophet's Town and began the long march back to Vincennes.

Following the battle, a small party of Indians established a camp on Wildcat Creek, while the rest of the Prophet's Town Indians dispersed. The scattering Indians spread the news of the defeat. The immediate impact of the Indian loss was that tribes and individuals deserted the coalition. The remaining confederacy was so degraded that it could not pose a serious threat to American expansion without British assistance. After the Battle of Tippecanoe, Tecumseh would never be able to organize a solely Indian confederacy with the same degree of success.⁴²

Analysis

The campaign provides an excellent example of an operation other than war that includes many of the elements of peace operations. As such, one can glean several lessons from the Tippecanoe campaign. An analysis of the campaign provides insight into how the levels of war relate to these types of operations and demonstrates the unique aspects of an operational design involved in them. The levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) are defined by the consequences of their outcome and are as relevant to operations other than war as they are to conventional warfare.⁴³ Tippecanoe lends itself to an analysis of the levels of war in a ill-defined operational environment.

American strategic goals during the era remained consistent with Jefferson's unofficial instructions that required Harrison to exhaust Indian title to lands peacefully or force the Indians across the Mississippi. The strategic goal that Tecumseh expressed for the confederacy was also straightforward. The confederacy wanted to develop a

political and military amalgamation of tribes that was strong enough to resist American advances through negotiation or by force of arms. In order to support their strategic goals, the Indians developed a de facto alliance with the British for material support. The Indians also used intertribal agreements to support anticipated manpower requirements and to ensure the political unity of the confederacy.

Operational levels of war are characterized by the American expeditions to defeat the Indians. The earlier expeditions led by Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne are examples of major operations that were conducted without clearly defined strategic goals; these expeditions were merely punitive in nature. Harrison's operation into the land purchase was clearly a major operation designed and conducted to achieve a strategic goal, which was to reduce the major Indian threat in the area. Reduction of this threat allowed the United States to continue its policy of extinguishing Indian title to land in the territory as rapidly as possible.

The operational objective of the Tippecanoe campaign was to make the confederacy ineffective by destroying its base of operation which would result in the loss of support for the coalition from other tribes. The objective could be accomplished by a show of force or combat. An additional operational objective of the Tippecanoe campaign was to demonstrate United States resolve to enforce treaty obligations. The campaign would terminate when the Indians at Prophet's Town had dispersed and the village was destroyed--regardless of whether the Indian displacement was peaceful or by force.

The confederacy's operational objectives are not as clearly defined. Operationally, the Indians wanted to demonstrate to the United States that previous treaty negotiations were not valid. Tecumseh's paradigm held that the Treaty of Fort




Fig. 2. Route, Tippecanoe Campaign

Wayne was invalid unless it was endorsed by a single unified Indian political entity. In order to achieve his operational goal, Tecumseh planned to contest the United States' occupation of the lands ceded by the 1809 treaty.

Tecumseh also wanted to improve the military strength and capability of the confederacy. This could be demonstrated by increasing the number of Indians at Prophet's Town and the number of tribes that could be assembled on demand to conduct military operations. The size of the available Indian force was important to establish the military and political credibility of the confederacy with the United States. A major Indian success in the field against the United States military forces would serve the same purpose as well as increase the credibility of the confederacy among any undecided Indian tribes. Consequently, it was important for Tecumseh to win any engagement with an American army. The operational specifics of Tecumseh's grand plan were not clearly defined. The general operational objective was that the tribes would assemble on command (a great sign) and regain their lands through negotiation or force.

Tactically, the United States planned to occupy the land cessions with troops and build forts to show permanency. Harrison also wanted to conduct a show of force in the Tippecanoe area large enough to force the Indians to disperse. Part of Harrison's plan required destroying Prophet's Town which, he felt, would cause the confederacy to lose the support of tribes already pledged to it and cause any undecided tribes to decline membership in the confederacy.

The Indians' tactical plans are difficult to discern, and one must rely on previously established models with respect to Indian tactics. Tecumseh never clearly stated how he proposed to stop the United States from occupying the land purchases.

One option is that the warriors could have canoed down the Wabash and attacked Vincennes. While this was a possibility that did cause a great deal of concern, there was not a recent precedent for that type of large-scale attack. The Indians could have continued to conduct raids and attacks on outlying settlements, but they probably would have had little chance for any type of operational success with these types of tactics.

An analysis of the Indian engagements with Generals Harmar and Wayne leads one to believe that the Indians might have tried to conduct a series of ambushes on an American force in close terrain.⁴⁴ Previous major defeats of large American forces had garnered some longer term gains for the Indians. The Indians were able to prevent encroachment of their lands for almost five years because of their military successes against Harmar and St. Clair. In both of these operations the Indians picked the time and location of the engagements, unlike their fight with General Wayne and the American Legion at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Tecumseh would have been familiar with the successes and failures of these campaigns. Had Tecumseh been present during the Tippecanoe campaign, one can only surmise that he would have applied the lessons learned during combat with Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne.⁴⁵

In order to meet their own strategic goals which were to protect Canada and maintain a lucrative fur trade in North America, the British supported the Indians at the operational and tactical levels of war. The British pursued an operational design that promoted the establishment of an Indian buffer state and British control of crucial trade routes along the Great Lakes to achieve their strategic goals. At the tactical level, the British provided substantial covert aid to the northwestern Indian tribes.⁴⁶

	UNITED STATES	INDIAN CONFEDERACY	GREAT BRITAIN
STRATEGIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gain Indian land • Assimilate Indians peacefully or drive them across the Mississippi 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retain land • U.S. recognizes confederacy as the agency to negotiate with 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protect Canada • Maintain North American fur trade
OPERATIONAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make confederacy ineffective • Show U.S. resolve regarding treaty enforcement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Show that 1809 treaty is invalid • Improve military capability and size of the confederacy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indian buffer state • Control Great Lake LOCs
TACTICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Occupy 1809 land cessions • Force confederacy to disperse • Destroy Prophet's Town 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prevent occupation of 1809 land cessions • Attack Vincennes, raid settlements, or attack forts • Ambush military forces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Indian combat operations with advisors, equipment, and supplies • Maintain posts along the Great Lakes

Fig. 3. Campaign Analysis, Levels of War

The operational design of the campaign also provides some interesting lessons. The components of operational design are centers of gravity, lines of operation, decisive points, and culmination points. Centers of gravity are that characteristic, capability, or location from which a force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Lines of operation are how a force is connected to its base of operation. Decisive points are the keys to centers of gravity. Decisive points influence the outcome of an

action by providing the commander with a marked advantage over the enemy by helping to gain or maintain the initiative. Decisive points can be geographical in nature or things that sustain command. The final element of operational design is the culmination point. The culmination point has offensive and defensive applications. Offensively, the culminating point is reached at the time and place where the attacker's combat power does not exceed the defenders. During the defense, a defender culminates when he can no longer assume the counteroffensive or defend successfully.⁴⁷

The centers of gravity for the United States and the confederacy are very similar. In each case the center of gravity is the ability to sustain the political efforts to accomplish the strategic goals. The United States' center of gravity was presidential policy about continued territorial expansion. The confederacy's center of gravity was the political unity of the confederacy and the continued support of various tribes for Tecumseh's plan.

Harrison's lines of operation were clearly exterior and extended about 150 miles from Vincennes through the new land purchases to Prophet's Town. This line of operation was supported by land lines of communication (LOCs) from Vincennes, through Fort Harrison, and Boyd's Blockhouse. The Wabash provided an excellent water LOC that supported resupply between the capital and the outposts. The Indian line of operation was interior because the confederacy operated from Prophet's Town and remained in the general vicinity of the village. Normally, Indian lines of operation were not supported by well-established LOCs. Campaigning Indian forces were largely self-sustaining through foraging.⁴⁸

There were several decisive points for each side during the campaign. Harrison obviously considered Tecumseh's leadership and experience a decisive point. In

Harrison's mind, the best way to neutralize Tecumseh's leadership was to attack the center of the confederacy in Tecumseh's absence. The result of a successful attack would "destroy the fabric" of the confederacy because the tribes would see the futility of war with the United States and withdraw their support for the confederacy. The obvious risk involved was that Tecumseh would be able to rebuild the coalition faster than Harrison expected. Another decisive point for Harrison was to destroy Prophet's Town. Even though it might be simple for the Indians to move their headquarters to another location, successful destruction of the village would demonstrate the resolve and power of the United States. A successful demonstration of resolve and power would also cause the confederacy to lose support.

The decisive points for the confederacy were the preparedness of the United States military force, the force's ability to sustain itself, and the army's battlefield leadership. In the past, Indian forces had the most success against poorly trained American expeditions that exercised poor field discipline. Another characteristic of the earlier expeditions was their poor logistical ability to sustain themselves. The Harmar and St. Clair expeditions did not maintain enough supplies on hand to conduct a campaign, plus they did not adequately protect their LOCs. Battlefield leadership was also a decisive point for the Indians, because poor American commanders in the past did not employ sound tactical principles during movement or while in static positions.

The force under Harrison was a mix of militia and regulars with very little campaign experience. Harrison, however, seemed to have mastered many important lessons from General Wayne's conduct of the Fallen Timbers campaign. Harrison ensured that his LOCs were well established and guarded, and he paid close attention to the tactical aspects of employing his force. Harrison also used deception to prevent

compromise of the route, and he planned a route that gave him several terrain advantages in regard to employment of the force.⁴⁹

Harrison's force would have culminated if it had lost its ability to attack and destroy Prophet's Town. The Indians, in order to succeed, needed to degrade Harrison's force enough so that the army could not attack and destroy Prophet's Town. Any failure to destroy the village allowed Tecumseh to claim that the confederacy maintained its integrity. The culminating point for the confederacy was any battlefield defeat. A battlefield defeat would demonstrate the ability of the United States to occupy and control Indian territory by force. Figure 4 highlights the key aspects of operational design.

	UNITED STATES	INDIAN CONFEDERACY
CENTER OF GRAVITY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidential policy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political unity • Tribes continued support
LINES OF OPERATION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Exterior • Supported by land and water LOCs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interior • Highly mobile forces that were foraging in nature
DECISIVE POINTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tactical Employment • Field Discipline • Logistical Discipline • Leadership 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tecumseh's leadership • Prophet's Town
CULMINATING POINTS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Loss of ability to attack and destroy Prophet's Town 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inability to protect Prophet's Town • Inability to attack and defeat the army

Fig. 4. Campaign Analysis, Operational Design

Tactically, Americans and Indians were generally even on the frontier, and in that respect the Indians of the American northwest limited opportunities for United States expansion. From the end of the Revolutionary War until the Battle of Tippecanoe, several Indian armies were able to organize and execute independent military operations that prevented the United States from achieving operational and strategic goals. The Indians were not able to stop the American expansion in the territory in the long term. The last chance for the Indians' to succeed in the Old Northwest was to conduct operations in conjunction with the British during the War of 1812. These combined Indian-British efforts also met with defeat because the United States' ability to continually muster and sustain large military forces in the field finally overwhelmed the northwestern Indians.

¹Allan Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 550. Tecumseh made this remark to Governor Harrison during one of their first meetings at Vincennes, Indiana Territory. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the land cessions under the 1809 treaty.

²Indian term for the United States.

³John Sugden, *Tecumseh's Last Stand* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 59.

⁴Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 533-534. This was the general theme of Tecumseh's speeches to the tribes he visited. The grand plan was also carved on wooden slabs and distributed to tribes with specific instructions. The inscription on the slabs had a dual meaning. One translation was benign and provided to curious whites; the other interpretation described the grand plan and was solely for Indian use. The slabs are referenced in many of the research materials. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 532 provides details about the slabs and includes a diagram of one.

⁵Eckert, *Gateway*, 342. Previous Indian confederacies were generally short term and formed to meet an immediate threat. The confederacies organized to fight the different expeditions led by Generals Harmar, St. Clair, and Wayne are examples of these types of short term alliances. Tecumseh's ideas centered around establishing a long term confederacy or amalgamation of tribes that would deal with the United States on a political as well as military level.

⁶Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 535-538.

⁷Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 535; and Pirtle, 10-11. The British had military posts and trading posts in Canada around the Great Lakes area that serviced Indian tribes in Indiana, Illinois, etc. British traders also traveled throughout the area and could often act as agents for the British government. During various times the British offered bounties for white scalps or prisoners that the Indians captured. These practices continued as late as the War of 1812. See Eckert, *Gateway* for details on some of the British bounty practices. See Matloff, ed., 124-126 for more detail about Indian manpower contributions to the British during the War of 1812.

⁸Retaining the ability to treat with individual chiefs was to American advantage. It was not uncommon for Americans to ply Indians with alcohol and gifts or to find minor village chiefs (who did not have any real authority to sell land on behalf of their tribe) and gain land cessions from them. There were also instances when the treaties were ethical and conducted with the appropriate chief. In any case, it was not to Harrison's advantage to deal with one centrally unified body of Indians who were opposed to further land cessions.

⁹Carter, ed., 16, 119; and Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 758. Secretary of War William Eustis informed Harrison in a 5 May 1810 letter that several treaties from the fall of 1809 had been ratified. This would include the Treaty of Fort Wayne which was signed 30 September 1809 and proclaimed 16 January 1810. Before the treaty of Fort Wayne was valid a supplemental treaty with the Wea Indians was required. This treaty was signed on 26 October 1809, and ratified 25 January 1810. See Kappler, ed., 101-104 for copies of the treaty and the supplement. A Congressional act for the sale of lands gained through the Treaty of Fort Wayne passed on 30 April 1810. The Proclamation of Public Land Sales for the area was issued 3 May 1811. The proclamation specified what lands were for sale, the office in charge of the sale, and the date of the sale.

¹⁰Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 535-536.

¹¹Esarey, *History*, 98; and Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 498-501. This is not the same post that is currently in Kentucky. Fort Knox, Indiana Territory was established at Vincennes in 1787.

¹²Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 542-543. The full text of the letter is contained in the reference cited.

¹³Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967; New York: Bantam, 1970), 605.

¹⁴Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967; New York: Bantam, 1970), 605; Esarey, *History*, 185.

¹⁵Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967; New York: Bantam, 1970), 605.

¹⁶Downey, 85; Drake, 122; and Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967; New York: Bantam, 1970), 609-610. At the conclusion of Harrison's comments there was an outburst from Tecumseh and the Indian delegation. The Indian outburst resulted in the Indians brandishing tomahawks and the American infantry guard was called up to the area. Harrison even drew his sword before calm prevailed.

¹⁷Cleaves, 64; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 535-536; and Pirtle, 7. The occupants of Prophet's Town had been without the salt annuity because the Prophet refused to accept it. Tecumseh was away from Prophet's Town when his brother refused the salt the previous year as well as the next year when he confiscated all of it. A copy of Harrison's letter describing the incident can be found in Draper Mss. 1X15.

¹⁸Carter, ed., 20, 130, 131; Draper Mss. 1X15; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 551-552; Esarey, *History*, 98; and Adam Walker, *A Journal of Two Campaigns of the Fourth Regiment U.S. Infantry in the Indiana and Michigan Territories* (Keene, New Hampshire: Sentinel Press, 1816), 8-11. A company from the 7th U.S. was in Vincennes by the time Colonel Boyd and the 4th U.S. (plus one company from the Rifle Regiment) arrived. The 4th U.S. was from the east coast and was ordered to Pittsburgh, PA then Newport, KY and finally to Vincennes, Indiana Territory. Upon their arrival at Vincennes the units were posted to Fort Knox.

¹⁹Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 555-557; Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 3; and Esarey, *History*, 185-186. See Kappler, ed. 39-45 for a copy of the Treaty of Greenville. Many sources (including Harrison's correspondence) note that justice was not always reciprocal. The Treaty of Greenville authorized the Indians to drive settlers off of Indian lands (or punish them in any manner they saw fit). The treaty also specified measures to redress "injuries done by individuals on either side." The injuries were rarely equitably dealt with, for example, the Indians had turned over offenders for trial, which resulted in convictions followed by hangings for the Indians. Harrison forced some whites to stand trial for murders of Indians; however, a white was never punished for murdering an Indian. This is probably one of the reasons that Tecumseh refused to acknowledge the incident as a murder or turn the Indians over to Harrison. Harrison recognized the injustice of this and in some of his letters seems sympathetic to the Indian plight regarding contact with white civilization, particularly in the area of American justice and corruption by alcohol. A few of the places that contain copies of Harrison's letters (describing injustices to Indians) are the Draper MSS. and Carter, ed., *The Territory of Indiana 1810-1816*.

²⁰Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 557.

²¹Downey, 86-87; Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 763; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 558; Edmunds, *Quest*, 219; and Hook, 30. Tecumseh is known to have traveled as far south as Georgia and Alabama. Tecumseh may have traveled to the Carolinas, Florida, Mississippi, and Arkansas during his 1811 trip. Tecumseh hoped to return before spring and left instructions that his brother should appease the whites, if necessary, in order to make sure that the confederation did not fall apart. Tecumseh felt

that he could build a confederacy strong enough to demand return of formerly held Indian lands or fight to regain them if required. Tecumseh thought that the confederacy would be strong enough to act on the grand plan once he returned from the south. Tecumseh ordered his brother not to take any premature action and to have the village disperse if attacked. Tecumseh felt that Prophet's Town could be rebuilt if destroyed by Harrison but the coalition of tribes could not if they were defeated on the battlefield.

²²Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 762-763.

²³Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 763.

²⁴Glenn Tucker, *Tecumseh: Vision of Glory* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1956), 219.

²⁵Tucker, 219.

²⁶Adams, 355.

²⁷Carter, ed. 133-134.

²⁸Pirtle, 16-17.

²⁹James Green, *William Henry Harrison: His Life and Times* (Richmond: Garrett and Massie, Inc., 1941), 119-120; Lexington newspaper quoted in Tucker, 218.

³⁰Gilbert, 270; and Pirtle, 37.

³¹This figure includes 350 regulars but it does not include the two companies of militia that remained behind to guard the settlements, etc.

³²The concept of invading Indian territory without the consent of Congress is from Tucker, 219. For additional information on entering Indian territory one can review several documents. The Northwest Ordinance specified that the Indians could not be invaded or disturbed except in "lawful wars authorized by Congress." The United States Constitution also gives Congress the authority to declare war. One can look at specific treaties to determine the legality of settlers, military, traders, etc. to enter Indian territory. Sometimes the treaties specified the right of Indians to enter or use ceded land. For example, some treaties allowed the Indians to use United States "public lands" for hunting and fishing. The Treaty of Greenville even gave the Indians the right to expel unwanted settlers from their lands. Present day Indian tribes still retain hunting and fishing rights under certain treaties. The Chippewa recently had their hunting and fishing rights affirmed in a 1983 court decision. See Duane Champagne, ed., *Native America: Portrait of the Peoples* (Detroit MI: Visible Ink Press, 1994), 55-91 for examples of current Indian claims in the American northeast.

³³Draper Mss. 1X14; and Drake, 132-133. Harrison wrote to Eustis on 6 June 1811 and told him that Indian actions were "by no means indicative of a pacific

disposition." Harrison received several reports that led him to believe that the Prophet and Tecumseh were hostile. A Kickapoo chief visited Vincennes and warned Harrison that Tecumseh and his brother harbored hostile designs regardless of whatever peaceful overtures they made. The governor of Missouri, General William Clarke, told Harrison that the Mississippi Indian tribes received war wampum belts from Tecumseh inviting them to go to war against the Americans. Clarke further warned that the war would start with an attack of Vincennes and that the Sacs Indians had agreed to join the confederacy and had already sent a delegation to Fort Malden for arms and ammunition. Reports from the Chicago area indicated that the tribes in that area had already decided to go to war with the United States. A party surveying the 1809 land cessions was interrupted by a band of Wea Indians. The group of Indians disarmed the survey party, tied them up, and detained them overnight. The Indians released the surveyors the next day and told them that they thought that they were deserters from the local garrison. The surveyors interpreted the Indian action as a manifestation of hostile intent and declined to complete the survey. Harrison, however, was not sure whether or not to consider the act as hostile.

³⁴This incident is summarized from several sources. The summary of the theft is from Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 555. The use of the theft as a pretense for a show of force is from Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 765 and Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 560-561. The Indians actually stole the horses twice. One party of Indians successfully conducted a horse-stealing raid. The settlers went to Prophet's Town and reclaimed their horses. After the settlers left, the Prophet set the braves out to re-steal the horses. The Indians surprised the settlers, but did not kill them, they simply walked into the camp, held the settlers under guard, and took all of the horses. Harrison also included descriptions of Indian horse-stealing raids in various pieces of correspondence. Some of these letters are in the Draper MSS.

³⁵Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 561-563; Pirtle, 29-30; and Florence G. Watts, ed., "Lt. Charles Larrabee's account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* (1961), 233. The chiefs who were detained at Prophet's Town eventually provided Harrison with valuable intelligence regarding the Prophet's strength. The chiefs reported that Harrison's show of force caused the Wea and Miami Indians to abandon the Prophet as well as a group of Potawatomi Indians. The loss of support from Wea, Miami, and Potawatomi groups caused the Prophet's strength to dwindle to about 450 warriors. Harrison was concerned that the Prophet might receive reinforcements because there were several sympathetic and large villages of Potawatomi Indians to the rear of Prophet's Town.

³⁶Adams, 362; and Pirtle, 27, 30-32. Harrison requested four companies of volunteers (two from Kentucky and two from Indiana). Two companies eventually arrived and participated in the campaign. The territorial laws of the time allowed colonels to turn out their commands in an emergency without the permission of the governor. Harrison applied directly to General Wells of Jefferson County, Kentucky for volunteers and informed the Governor of Kentucky at a later date. Harrison told the governor that he felt that it would be faster to approach Wells directly and he felt confident that the governor would approve of the action since Kentucky was initially

prepared to provide a larger compliment of troops for the campaign. Harrison, as governor, had the authority to commission officers in the Indiana militia and did so once the volunteers arrived. That is the reason that General Wells and a few others are referred to by multiple titles in the source material. Wells is sometimes called general (Kentucky militia) or major (Indiana militia).

³⁷Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 562; and Pirtle, 27, 29. American expeditions often relied on contractors to conduct their resupply operations. The contractors that supported Harrison arrived later than expected and forced Harrison to delay his departure from Fort Harrison. St. Clair's expedition demonstrated to Harrison the folly of conducting operations without proper logistics support. Harrison was an ensign in the 1st U.S. shortly after St. Clair's defeat and was aware that many of St. Clair's difficulties with supplies attributed to his defeat. See Green, 26-29 for a description of Harrison's arrival at the 1st U.S. and Fort Washington. Gilbert and Eckert provide excellent descriptions of St. Clair's expedition and the troubles he had with supplies and desertion. Gilbert, 53-155 also provides a description of Harrison's arrival at the 1st U.S. and Fort Washington.

³⁸ Tucker, 221.

³⁹Adams, 362-363; Drake, 148; Draper 1X1; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 563. Esarey, *History*, 187; Pirtle, 31-32, 37; and Wesley J. Whickar, ed., "Shabonee's account of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 17 (1921), 355. Harrison never saw the delegation again although there are indicators that it reached Prophet's Town. There are several possibilities: the Prophet might have had the delegation killed, the delegation might have been released and traveled down the wrong side of the Wabash trying to reach Harrison, or the delegation might have abandoned the campaign. The Prophet apparently sent some type of delegation to the army after receiving Harrison's message. It is not clear who made up the delegation and its exact purpose. Shabonee indicates that the delegation was supposed to buy time for the Prophet while he prepared the Indians at Prophet's Town for battle.

⁴⁰Adams, 364; *The Frontiersmen*, 563; Edmunds, *Quest*, 155; Pirtle, 37; Tucker, 222; and Whickar, ed., 355. Indian scouts watched Harrison's army during their movement from Vincennes. Apparently, the Indians stopped watching the army or lost contact with it after it left Fort Harrison because the delegation that was supposed to meet Harrison was reported to have traveled down the wrong bank of the Wabash. Shabonee highlights this and remarks that "We expected that the white warriors would come up on the south bank of the river, and then we could parley with them; but they crossed far down the river and came on this side, right up to the great Indian town."

⁴¹Adams, 364; and Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 756. The blockhouse was named Boyd's Blockhouse in honor of Colonel Boyd (4th U.S.). Establishment of the blockhouse also provided a place for resupply boats to drop off needed supplies for Harrison's element. The Wabash was an important transportation route for Indians and whites in the area. Harrison was very careful about securing his line of communication, a lesson probably learned from St. Clair's failed expedition and General Anthony

Wayne's success at Fallen Timbers. Wayne spent the winter prior to his campaign building and manning forts along his expected LOC. Wayne also built a fort two days before the Fallen Timbers battle (Fort Deposit). The fort was used to cache all of the excess baggage and equipment not needed for combat. Wayne also knew that the Indians fasted before a battle, consequently, the delay caused by building the fort was to his advantage and the Indians detriment. The Indian force was physically weakened by one or two days of fasting and some of the Indians departed before the battle in search of food. Fort Deposit was built on August 17, 1794 and the battle was fought on 20 August 1794. Eckert, *Gateway*, Gifford, and Gilbert provide detail on the Indian tradition of fasting before battle and the impact of fasting at Fallen Timbers.

⁴²Beard, 75; Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 558; Eckert, *Gateway*, 385; Edmunds, *Quest*, 159-117; and Pirtle, xvi-xviii, 77. An example of the effect of Tippecanoe on recruiting tribes for the confederacy is found in Draper Mss. 4YY73. During his visit to the Creek Indians Tecumseh proposed that the Indians in the north would drive the whites south of the Ohio River while the southern Indian tribes would drive the whites north of the Cumberland River. The Creeks sent a delegation to Tippecanoe with Tecumseh in order to make an assessment on the viability of the plan. The delegation arrived at Tippecanoe shortly after the Battle. The delegation returned to their tribe convinced that Tecumseh's plan would not work.

⁴³Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993), 1-3. Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations* (Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994), 15 identifies peace operations as a subset of operations other than war. *Peace Operations* also notes that the doctrine for more standard combat operations (found in *Operations*) should be included whenever planning peace operations.

⁴⁴These engagements are highlighted because the Indian battle plan was based on taking advantage of the Indian's natural mobility by conducting a series of ambushes or engagements in close terrain. The St. Clair engagement is different because the Indian tactical plan was changed at the last minute to take advantage of the fact that the Americans were so unprepared. The Indians attacked St. Clair's poorly defended encampment at first light and successfully routed the Americans. Although he did not participate in the Harmar fight, Tecumseh was probably familiar with the tactics used during the engagement.

⁴⁵Eckert *Gateway*, 185-187, 220-223; Edmunds, *Quest*, 33-34, 39-43; and Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 5. Tecumseh was a scout and spy for the Indian confederacy at St. Clair's defeat and he led an Indian war party against the American army at the Battle of Fallen Timbers.

⁴⁶Downey, 55; Drake, 79; Esarey, *History*, 122; Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison," 17; and Urwin, 30. British soldiers from the Detroit garrison attacked St. Clair's expedition as part of the forces commanded by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket. 30 June 1794, Canadian militia, dressed as Indians, participated in an Indian attack of an

American supply column departing Fort Recovery (Ohio) during General Wayne's Fallen Timbers campaign.

⁴⁷Definitions for the elements of operational design are from *Operations*, 6-7 to 6-9.

⁴⁸Gilbert, 174-175 notes that it took between two hundred to four hundred deer and a like number of turkeys per day to sustain an Indian force of about 1,200 warriors during the Fallen Timbers campaign. The British, through military posts or traders, often supported Indian forces in the field with weapons and ammunition and some foodstuffs. The Indians also supplemented wild game with corn and other food stuffs that they grew or procured locally. In general, however, the Indians had greater mobility because of the foraging nature of their sustainment program. The drawback to this type of logistical plan is that large Indian forces could not campaign in an area for extended periods of time because they quickly depleted the resources needed to conduct sustained operations.

⁴⁹Harrison served as a regular army ensign, lieutenant, and captain (1st U.S. and the American Legion). Harrison was one of General Wayne's Aides during the Fallen Timbers campaign and commanded a frontier outpost after the campaign.

CHAPTER FOUR

TIPPECANOE BATTLE

... the troops nineteenth twentieths of whom had never been in action before behaved in a manner that can never be too much applauded.¹

General Harrison, *Post-Battle Report*

The Approach

Harrison faced a few unexpected difficulties after stopping to build the blockhouse. The army's trackers came across signs that indicated that large war parties were moving south. Additionally, Harrison received word that a few Indians had ambushed the supply boat enroute to the army and forced it to return to Fort Harrison. A quick response would mitigate the threat of a possible Indian attack on Vincennes. General Harrison ordered Major Jordan and forty soldiers to return to Vincennes and prepare defenses there. There was little to do in order to redress the lost resupply; the army would have to continue without the additional provisions.²

Harrison's 2 November 1811 letter to the secretary of war provides some insight into his frame of mind. Although Harrison still hoped that a display by the army would force the Indians at Prophet's Town to disperse, he remained ready to attack and force their dispersion. Harrison wrote the letter to inform Eustis that the Indians attacked the resupply boat and killed a member of the crew. Harrison also noted that 4 November 1811 was the anniversary date of General St. Clair's defeat by an earlier Indian confederacy. Harrison told Eustis that if attacked he hoped to "alter the color with which it [St. Clair's defeat] has been marked in our calendar for the last twenty years."³

The army left the blockhouse on 3 November 1811 and crossed the Vermillion into Indian territory. The blockhouse, twenty-five feet square with breastworks on each corner, held the army's boats and heavy baggage. A small detachment of nine soldiers commanded by a sergeant remained to guard the equipment. Although the army dropped off its unneeded equipment at the blockhouse, it remained a large and cumbersome element. The column that crossed the Vermillion included a supply train of wagons, cattle, hogs, and canons that were needed to support the infantry and mounted troops.⁴

As Harrison maneuvered the army into Indian territory, he was careful to avoid terrain that would inhibit the employment of his force. This often meant taking a less direct route toward Prophet's Town if it provided better security afforded by the open prairie. Harrison consistently relied on his company of spies and guides to move ahead of the force and reconnoiter. Harrison also carefully posted advance guards and flank security. Traveling on open terrain allowed Harrison the freedom to employ his mounted elements forward of the column in a security role and quickly reorient the army in case of an attack.

The army conducted a slow and arduous approach to Prophet's Town on 6 November 1811. Scouts carefully investigated every site that offered the Indians an opportunity to ambush the column. Harrison took pains to change the order of march whenever the terrain required, sometimes changing formation as often as three times in a mile and a half. Throughout the last day of the march the army encountered seemingly hostile parties of Indians. The Indians, with insulting gestures, rebuffed the interpreter's efforts to communicate. Harrison dispatched Captain Toussant Dubois, commander of the spies and guides, with a flag of truce to request a conference with the

Prophet. As Dubois moved toward the town, Indians appeared on both of his flanks and attempted to cut him off from the army. Once he realized that the Indians were trying to separate Dubois from the column, Harrison recalled him and ordered the army to continue the approach toward Prophet's Town.⁵

As the army moved closer to the village, Harrison prepared for an attack. Leaders halted their columns, ordered the men to place their backpacks in the wagons, and formed their units for battle before continuing their march. As the army came within sight of the town, units changed into their final attack formations and prepared to conduct an immediate assault. Although Harrison wanted to adhere to his initial orders and resolve the situation peacefully, he remained prepared to fight because the Indians continually demonstrated hostile intentions.⁶ For instance, in October, the Indians from Prophet's Town had wounded the sentry at Fort Harrison. In November, another party of Indians had ambushed the resupply boat. The last indicator of the Indians' willingness to fight was that they had barricaded the village with breastworks. All of these observations left Harrison with few options if the Prophet refused to communicate with the army.

Harrison decided to place the interpreters in front of the army as it advanced and give the Prophet a final opportunity to communicate his intentions. The Indians, seemingly surprised by Harrison's final dispositions in preparation for an attack, sent a delegation to meet with Harrison before the army could start the assault. The delegation expressed surprise at the army's rapid advance and seeming haste to attack. The Prophet's representatives informed Harrison that they were told by the delegation of Delaware emissaries that the army would not attack until the Prophet responded to Harrison's demands. The Prophet's response went undelivered since the group

supposedly searched for the army on the wrong side of the Wabash. Harrison promised the Indians that he did not intend to attack unless the issues expressed in the demands were not resolved. Harrison and the Prophet's representatives agreed to meet the next morning for a conference.⁷

Harrison inquired about a location with enough wood and water for the army. The Indians informed him that there was a suitable location to the northwest, within in a few miles of Prophet's Town, on what is today known as Burnett Creek. A few officers departed and looked at the site to asses its fitness. After a quick reconnaissance they sent word that the location suited the army's purpose.⁸ The area, in Harrison's words, was:

a piece of dry oak land, rising about ten feet above the level of a marshy prairie in front toward the Prophet's town and nearly twice that high above a similar prairie in the rear, through which and near to this bank ran a small stream [Burnett Creek], clothed with willows and other brushwood. Towards the left flank this bench of land widened considerably but became gradually narrower in the opposite direction and at a distance of one hundred and fifty yards from the right flank terminated in an abrupt point.⁹

Harrison tried to organize his encampment in the form of a hollow-square. A rough trapezoid was as close to a hollow-square as the terrain would allow. The back of the trapezoid was against the creek. The front of the camp's perimeter faced Prophet's Town. An infantry force of regulars and Indiana militia guarded both of these areas. The smallest part of the perimeter was the battle position of more Indiana militia. The eastern side of the encampment was under the control of the mounted riflemen from Kentucky. Dismounted dragoons served as the army's reserve and positioned themselves near the base of the triangle behind the intersection of the 4th U.S. and mounted riflemen.

Harrison, based on the advice of Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew, ordered his men to sleep dressed and on their arms. As darkness engulfed the camp the soldiers settled down to an uncomfortable sleep. The men lit warming fires, and many soldiers, with only their uniforms or a light blanket to provide protection from the weather, tried to rest. A heavy guard of almost two companies patrolled the perimeter, and everyone else slept within a few feet of their assigned battle positions.¹⁰

The Indians, in the meantime, retired to Prophet's Town and began planning for their meeting with Harrison in the morning. Although there remains little historical record of what happened in the Indian camp, a council was probably held to determine the Indian course of action, select war chiefs, and conduct the traditional war dances and war songs. Some authors suggest that a Potawatomi Chief named Winnemac urged the attack. Others suggest that the idea was solely the Prophet's. There is also a tradition that proposes a militant group of Winnebagoes urged attacking the Americans. Shabonee, an Ottawa Chief and one of Tecumseh trusted lieutenants, states that there were two British soldiers at Prophet's Town--dressed as Indians--who urged the Prophet to attack.¹¹

In any case, the Prophet decided to attack the army encampment. The initial plan required the Prophet and his delegation to meet with Harrison in the morning, agree to his terms, and leave the American camp. Two Winnebago volunteers would accompany the delegation into the camp and remain near Harrison. Once the delegation was outside of the camp, the volunteers would kill Harrison with their tomahawks as a signal to start the battle. Sometime during the Indian council meeting the Prophet changed the battle plan. The Prophet, after one of his visions, announced that the American army was half dead and the other half was crazy. The Prophet also

told his followers that his medicine would make the white man's weapons harmless and that bullets would pass harmlessly through the warriors.¹²




Fig. 5. Plan of Encampment, 6 November 1811

The Indians eventually decided to attack before daybreak. The central component of the plan still remained to kill Harrison. One hundred warriors would crawl through the swamps on the northeastern side of the encampment. The warriors were to kill any sentinels, sneak into the camp, and kill Harrison. If they were discovered early, the braves would give the signal for the attack and warriors waiting in ambush would shoot Harrison off of his distinctive light-gray horse. In addition to providing the means

to initiate the main attack, the Indians hoped that the signal would have a psychological impact on the Americans.¹³ Shabonee remembered that “the yell would be so loud and frightful that the whole of the whites would run for the thick woods up the creek, and that side was left open for this purpose.”¹⁴

After the initial assault warriors on several sides of the camp would fall upon the sleeping Americans and destroy them. If the Americans followed the pattern set by St. Clair’s men, the Indians would encounter little resistance as they rushed into the camp and routed an ill-prepared army. The Indians expected to fire at the backs of the American soldiers as they ran away or sought shelter in the nearby woods. Even though the Indians knew that Harrison established a heavy guard around his campsites, they assumed that men who marched all day would be in a deep sleep and unprepared for battle. Regardless of whether or not the attempt at surprise was successful, the most important part of the plan, the Prophet cautioned, was to kill Harrison. The Great Spirit warned that Harrison must die for the attack to succeed.¹⁵

The Engagement

Early in the morning of 7 November 1811, General Harrison was in his tent addressing a few of his officers. An orderly musician was also in the commander’s tent waiting for orders to give the signal to call out the men. A few soldiers had risen early to rekindle the fires before stand-to. Shortly after four o’clock in the morning a shot rang out from the northeastern side of the encampment. Corporal Steven Mars, of the Kentucky militia, fired and wounded an infiltrating Indian warrior. Immediately after Mars fired there was an “awful Indian yell” that surrounded the encampment.¹⁶ The Indians began rushing the camp from several sides in a furious series of assaults.

During the Indian onslaught, the sentries immediately abandoned their posts and ran inside the camp's perimeter.¹⁷ Harrison ran outside, mounted the first horse that he saw, and rode to the location on the perimeter where the fighting was at its peak. Harrison's aide, Colonel Abraham Owen, mounted a light-colored horse. Several Indians waiting in ambush immediately shot and killed Owen.¹⁸ The Indians were unusually aggressive, their fanaticism promoted by the Prophet's promise of success and by the idea that the bullets of their enemy could not harm them. The fight raged for several hours with the Indians attacking from three sides of the encampment. The warriors fought with cunning and personal bravery, but they fought as individuals and in most cases did not coordinate actions between their attacking parties.¹⁹

Within a few minutes of the initial onslaught, the firing nearly engulfed the entire perimeter of the camp. Initially, the firing extended along the left flank, then quickly moved around the front of the encampment, the right flank, and finally along the rear line.²⁰ Harrison continually moved from location to location throughout the battle directing his forces and inspiring the soldiers.

The battle raged for over two hours and Harrison moved from threatened area to threatened area. The first critical event happened on the left flank at the corner of the camp where Barton's company of regulars tied in with Geiger's Kentucky militia. The Indian attack in this area happened so quickly that the left flank of Geiger's company caved in. The fighting was fierce with volunteers and Indians so intermingled that it became almost impossible to distinguish one from the other. Harrison arrived at the scene and quickly ordered Cook's (4th U.S.) company and Wentworth's (IN militia) company (commanded by Lieutenant Peters, as Wentworth was already dead) to restore the angle.²¹

After reducing the Indian penetration at the angle, Harrison rode to the front line which was the section of the perimeter facing Prophet's Town. As Harrison reached the area, he saw Major Daviess busy forming the dragoons as the reserve to the rear of several companies in contact. The elements already in contact continued to receive heavy fire from enemy in a small grove of trees fifteen or twenty yards to their front. The men from the Rifle Regiment were close to the trees engaging the enemy while a militia company to their left was starting to give way in disorder. Harrison ordered Daviess to gather his dragoons and drive the Indians from their position. Daviess, at the head of about twenty dragoons, charged single file into the grove. The party was too small, and the Indians attacked the dragoons on their flanks driving the Americans back with several casualties. Captain Snelling (4th U.S.) and his company charged and immediately dislodged the Indians.²²

Several units of Indiana militia were fighting at the southwest part of the perimeter. The Indian attack in this area was late because they were not in their final assault positions when Corporal Mars shot their comrade on the opposite side of the encampment. Although late, once in position the Indians unleashed a powerful assault on the militiamen. Harrison arrived in the area to find most of the officers already killed or wounded. The security of this important area was under the command of two brand new junior officers recently promoted from enlisted ranks during the march to Prophet's Town. John Tipton, an ensign, was the only surviving officer among Spencer's Yellow Jackets, and Second Lieutenant Thomas Montgomery commanded Warrick's company.

Harrison searched for an element to help restore the line. A fortuitous mistake provided him with a company of Indiana militia. Someone had mistakenly ordered Robb's company from its position in Major Wells' command. An alert staff officer

recognized the error and held the company in place near the center of the encampment. Harrison, advised of the available company, ordered Robb to move to the aid of Spencer's and Warrick's companies. Harrison moved Prescott (4th U.S.) to restore the integrity of Wells' line at the north part of the perimeter.²³

The Indians selected Stone Eater and White Loon (two Miami Indians) as well as Winnemac, a Potawatomi, to be the war chiefs and lead the assaults. The Prophet, the spiritual leader, occupied a position on a small hill overlooking the battlefield.²⁴ The Indian's plan ran into difficulty because the alert sentry threw off the timing of the surprise attack. The loss of surprise forced the Indians to conduct three uncoordinated assaults. In spite of the fact that the overall attack was desynchronized, the Indians managed to maintain a little control within some of the smaller assaulting elements. The pattern of attack seemed to be a series of local assaults during which wildly yelling Indians rushed a particular area of the perimeter. Once driven back, they would quickly reorganize, and on signal, rush the perimeter again. Throughout these assaults individual Indians crawled from cover to cover and attempted to provide suppressive fire.²⁵

The Indian assaults continued until daylight. The night before, the Prophet told his warriors that he would beat his drum as a signal to continue fighting; as long as the warriors could hear the drum, they should continue the attack. For over two hours the Indians attacked fearlessly, spurred on by the promise of the Prophet that the American bullets did not have the power to hurt them. As the seemingly reckless onslaughts became more and more costly to the Indians, runners climbed the small hill to inform the Prophet that his magic was failing. The Prophet nevertheless urged them to continue attacking the American position.²⁶ By daylight, the warriors knew that continued faith in

the words of the Prophet was unjustified and that the attack would not succeed. In the light of dawn the braves could see Harrison "alive riding fearlessly among his troops in spite of bullets, and their hearts [the warriors] melted."²⁷

Harrison had been struggling throughout the night to maintain the integrity of the perimeter and to keep the Indians from breaking through. Once it began to get light enough to see, Harrison thought that he could order a general charge of infantry and mounted troops. The charges would clear the remaining Indians out of any important terrain around the perimeter. Harrison ordered companies to reinforce the left and right flanks in preparation for the counterattacks at first light.

As Harrison dispatched the companies, Major Wells at the northeastern side of the encampment also concluded that counterattacks were needed to dislodge the Indians around the perimeter. Wells, with a mixed force of infantry and dragoons, charged the Indians before Harrison completed the reorganization. The infantry dislodged the Indians at the point of the bayonet, and the dragoons continued the pursuit mounted until the marsh forced them to halt. As Wells drove the Indians back in his area, Lieutenant Larrabee and Captain Cook began moving their companies (4th U.S.) to the right flank of the camp toward the Yellow Jackets. Larrabee's company arrived first, and Larrabee, as the senior officer present, quickly organized the infantry for an immediate assault. The subsequent charge of the regulars and militia routed the Indians to their front.²⁸

After the Battle

The combined efforts of the various charges forced the Indians to break off their attack. After the army repelled the Indian attack, it spent the rest of the day consolidating and reorganizing. The army had taken considerable casualties--37 killed

and 126 wounded.²⁹ Harrison's force buried the dead, treated the wounded, and reestablished chains of command.³⁰

Another part of the consolidation was to recover lost livestock. Horses picketed inside and outside of the camp before the attack were loose. The cattle and hogs outside the camp's perimeter scattered or were stolen by Indians during the attack. Efforts to recover livestock proved unsuccessful until the next day. The lack of fresh meat caused many soldiers to eat the horse-flesh of animals killed in battle. Soldiers also wandered the battlefield scalping dead Indians or snapping off shots at any enemy seen fleeing in the distance. Several soldiers found a wounded Potawatomi chief, and only two things saved the wounded man from being killed on the spot. The first fortuitous incident was several misfires by the weapons of the soldiers who found him. The timely arrival of a message from General Harrison ordering the chief's capture ultimately saved his life. The last thing that the soldiers did was to prepare for a possible follow-on Indian attack. The army built breastworks and maintained 100 percent security throughout the night of 7 November 1811.³¹

Harrison felt that the force had won a decisive victory over the Prophet and his followers. Even though the army routed its Indian attackers, it lacked the capability to conduct a pursuit of the Indian force. After the early morning attack, the army found itself 150 miles from Vincennes, deep in enemy territory, with almost 20 percent of the force as casualties. Additionally, the army was low on rations and other support needed to sustain continued operations. Harrison felt that the Prophet would not be able to gather enough of a force to interdict his movement back to Vincennes. Another attack seemed unlikely, but Harrison realized that any attack, no matter how improbable or small, would reduce the force's capability even more.³² The original objective of the

campaign was to force the dispersal of the Prophet and his followers and destroy the headquarters. Harrison decided to stick to the plan: destroy the headquarters and return to Vincennes.

At sunrise on 8 November 1811, mounted elements occupied Prophet's Town only to find the village abandoned, except for an old woman who had been too sick to travel. A few Indians killed during the battle were found in the buildings, and several recent graves were discovered. Searches of the village and a nearby area resulted in a harvest of more than 5,000 bushels of corn and beans. The soldiers collected any abandoned Indian supplies and foodstuffs that the army could use before burning the town. Harrison's men also discovered evidence of British assistance to the Indians; the retreating warriors had left behind several rifles in shipping wrappers from the British post at Malden (Canada). As their comrades destroyed Prophet's Town, soldiers burned all of the officers' private baggage in order to make room for the wounded on the twenty-two available wagons.³³

By noon of the next day, the army began its difficult journey back to Vincennes. As the army left the battlefield, the wounded chief remained behind under the care of the Indian woman. The chief carried a message from the governor. The message advised the Indians to abandon the Prophet; any tribes that complied would have their past conduct forgiven.³⁴

The army began retracing its steps determined to reach the capital in good order. The army reached Boyd's Blockhouse on 12 November 1811 without incident. A resupply boat arrived at the blockhouse loaded with beef, flour, and whiskey shortly after the army arrived. The wounded transferred from the wagons to the boat and returned to Vincennes via the Wabash River.³⁵ The next day, prior to their departure, the army

burned the blockhouse. Destroying the blockhouse ensured that it would provide no future service to the Indians. The army moved from the blockhouse to Fort Harrison between 13 and 15 November 1811. After leaving Captain Snelling and his company of the 4th U.S. to garrison the fort, the rest of the army closed on Vincennes by 18 November 1811.³⁶

Most of the Indians scattered after the battle and returned to their own tribes or set out for new areas. A few Indians established a camp within twenty miles of Prophet's Town on Wildcat Creek. The Indians who did not join the band on Wildcat Creek spread news of the defeat as they dispersed across the countryside. The Prophet no longer retained the ear of any tribes in the confederacy. In fact, many Indians blamed the loss on the Prophet and considered killing him. The Indians eventually decided to spare the Prophet's life, and about forty Shawnees remained loyal to him.³⁷ However, the defeat at Tippecanoe and his subsequent loss of credibility guaranteed that the Prophet would never have a future role in Indian politics.

Analysis

Combat power is an organization's ability to fight. The U.S. Army's capstone manual FM 100-5, *Operations*, states that there are four main elements that define combat power. The elements of combat power are maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. Maneuver is the movement of combat forces to gain a position advantage. Firepower is the amount of fire delivered by a position, unit, or weapons system. Protection is how the commander conserves his unit's fighting potential. The fourth element of combat power is effective leadership. Leadership is the most important aspect of the dynamic because leaders inspire soldiers as well as provide purpose, direction, and motivation.³⁸

An analysis of the Indian maneuver concludes that widespread superstition and overconfidence in the Indian force negated many of the strong points of the Indian plan. The initial acceptance of the Prophet's prophecies gave the attackers unrealistic expectations about the capabilities of the American force. Furthermore, all of the proposed plans relied on attacking and killing Harrison. Finally, the plan also attempted to capitalize on psychologically intimidating the American force by rushing the encampment and yelling to unsettle the troops. Psychological intimidation often provides an advantage, but its best use is to complement maneuver rather than to replace it. Furthermore, based on the Indians' earlier experiences during campaigns in the 1790s, they should have been aware that intimidation works on poorly trained and disciplined troops but rarely on disciplined ones. The Indians observed Harrison's army several times throughout the army's training period at Vincennes and later during the campaign. The Indians should have been aware of the army's discipline and force protection efforts.³⁹

The planned Indian maneuver required three coordinated assaults. The early compromise of the attack forced the Indians to begin the attack before the separate elements were in their final assault positions. This compelled the Indians to conduct successive assaults rather than a quick attack to penetrate the sentries (and kill Harrison), followed by two nearly simultaneous attacks from opposite ends of the encampment. The lack of coordination between the Indian assaults allowed Harrison to reposition companies inside the perimeter and counter various threats. The Indian efforts were initially violent enough to penetrate the angle of the perimeter on the left flank (Baen). Another attack was also severe enough on the right flank (Spencer's Yellow Jackets) to make that position untenable without reinforcement. Harrison,

through calm battlefield direction, was able to reposition his forces which protected the integrity of the perimeter. The final aspects of army's maneuver relied on conducting a series of local counterattacks at daylight to route the enemy.

The major weapons systems employed were rifles and muskets. The Indians did not take full advantage of all of the muskets available to them because the Prophet preached a return to the traditional Indian lifestyle which included using traditional Indian weapons in warfare. Additionally, the Prophet promised protection against the weapons of the Americans. The unused cache of muskets captured at Prophet's Town indicated that many Indians accepted the Prophet's entreaties to return to traditional Indian methods as well as his guarantees of protection from American bullets.

The army effectively employed most of its weapons systems. The single most important contribution to firepower was the simple way in which the army massed fires to meet the initial Indian assaults. The order, to sleep opposite their posts with weapons loaded and bayonets fixed, allowed soldiers to react quickly as individuals and form immediately into units. The Americans also shifted units to different areas in order to take advantage of a particular weapon or capability. Harrison did this throughout the night in order to restore the perimeter or drive the Indians out of contested areas. Harrison also changed the task organization near the end of the battle in anticipation of the charges that he wanted to execute at first light. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew commanded the militia infantry companies in the front line. Militiamen normally used their personal weapons, and in this case these men used "squirrel rifles" that did not accept bayonets. Harrison shifted a company from the 4th U.S. with muskets and bayonets to Bartholomew immediately prior to the counterattack.⁴⁰

In the area of protection, the Prophet relied on several deception attempts to gain an advantage over the Americans. The efforts at deception focused on creating a story that indicated the Indians were not hostile. First the Prophet sent emissaries to Harrison while the army organized and trained at Vincennes. The purpose of the emissaries was twofold. The emissaries spied on the army, and they tried to assure Harrison that the Prophet was a friend and not a threat. Later, as the army moved toward Prophet's Town from Fort Harrison, the Prophet sent a delegation to meet Harrison. A possible purpose of the delegation was to stall Harrison and allow the Prophet more time to prepare for operations against the army. The final effort by the Indian's at deception was to propose a meeting to discuss terms in the morning.⁴¹ Indian efforts at deception were largely unsuccessful because they mixed these efforts with overtly hostile actions (such as shooting the sentry) which forced Harrison to consistently employ force protection measures. Harrison's vigilance in the area of force protection limited the Indians' ability to achieve overwhelming surprise.

Harrison used deception early in the campaign to hide his real route of march through the new purchase. A reliance on training, discipline, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) protected the force once in the area of Prophet's Town. The SOPs developed to protect the force in a static encampment were the employment of a large guard detail and the conduct of stand-to. The major failure in Harrison's protection effort was the lack of breastworks. Instead of building breastworks, Harrison chose to use the available pioneer tools to cut wood for fires.

Although he remained cautious, Harrison believed he might be able to resolve the campaign without a fight. Consequently, he focused on improving the environmental conditions of soldiers living in the elements. Most of the militiamen did not have tents or

any similar form of protection. The campaign had been in progress for almost sixty days, and the weather varied between rain, frost, and snow. The force also suffered various nonbattle injuries and illnesses during the campaign. Harrison might have harbored concerns about the fitness of the force for combat the next day if the planned negotiations with the Prophet failed. The fires also caused tactical problems for the army. The warming fires provided illumination for the Indians as they fired into the camp. As the battle raged the soldiers realized the fires provided an attacker an advantage and tried to quickly extinguish them. Many soldiers were shot as they approached the fires, consequently, the fires were never completely extinguished. The lack of breastworks and the use of warming fires probably increased the number of casualties among Harrison's force.⁴²

Harrison posted the guard in a way that would counter the Indians' skill and ability to infiltrate a static encampment.⁴³ The guard was large and posted close to the perimeter to limit the number of gaps available for the Indians to penetrate. Another requirement for the guard force was to fight and delay any initial assault by the Indians in order to give soldiers time to occupy their positions on the perimeter. In reality, the guards provided early warning, but the speed and intensity of the first Indian assault caused the guards to immediately abandon their positions. In the end, the early warning was ample enough for soldiers to occupy their positions.

Perhaps the simplest element of protection was Bartholomew's suggestion to have the men sleep on their arms. This suggestion, coupled with Harrison's orders to have soldiers sleep opposite their posts and man the perimeter in single rather than double ranks, was extremely effective. The logic was that in Indian warfare there is no "shock" from bayonet or cavalry charges to resist. Single ranks also offered advantages

in speed because inexperienced troops maneuver faster in single ranks rather than double.⁴⁴ A single rank also reduces the potential for fratricide because there is only one rank firing in one direction during the confusion of battle.

Leadership was a critical element on both sides. The Prophet was not a combat leader but rather a spiritual leader. His brother was the respected warrior. The Prophet did have the leadership ability to embolden his followers and encourage them to attack. The Prophet did not have the leadership ability to lead by personal example during the attack. It also seems that the prophecies used to encourage the fanaticism of the warriors eventually became a detriment to morale once they went unfulfilled.

Harrison performed well as a leader and had a good reputation in the army. Lieutenant Larrabee wrote that Harrison was "a firm man and a verry [sic] good dispenarian [sic] and is acquainted with Indian fiteing [sic], which is different from all others."⁴⁵ Harrison was careful to set the example and share in the hardships encountered by the soldiers. Before the return march to Vincennes, Harrison made sure that his personal property was among the equipment burned when the army had to make room on the wagons for wounded. Harrison also moved throughout the battle area inspiring soldiers and providing direction.

In the heat of the action, his voice was frequently heard and easily distinguished, giving his orders in the same calm, cool, and collected manner with which we had been used to receive them on drill or parade-- The confidence of the troops in the General was unlimited, and his measures were well calculated to gain the particular esteem of the 4th Regt.⁴⁶

Harrison was astute enough to understand the nature of the militiamen and how to gain their loyalty. Harrison realized that the regular army's style of discipline would not get the best effort from militia troops. Harrison limited the types of punishment allowed in the army. The army that Harrison led consisted mainly of units from Indiana

and Kentucky who joined for a short campaign to fight Indians. Harrison knew that individualistic frontiersmen were unfamiliar with organizational discipline. The militia members and volunteers might choose to go home before submitting to the harsh discipline associated with the regular army.⁴⁷

	UNITED STATES	INDIAN CONFEDERACY
MANEUVER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enemy lack of coordination allowed the commander to reposition troops. • Dismounted dragoons employed as reserve. • Bayonet charges used to dislodge enemy. • Mounted charges used to dislodge enemy. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Three planned assaults. • Initial assault compromised before all forces were in attack positions. • Did not reposition, assaults continued in the same general areas.
FIREPOWER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muskets, rifles, and bayonets. • Massed fires and bayonet charges. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Muskets, rifles, bow and arrow, and tomahawk. • Fires usually not massed, delivered by individuals.
PROTECTION	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOPs. • Single ranks. • Sleep opposite post and with weapons loaded and bayonets fixed. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relied on deception. • Relied on stealth. • Relied on psychological impact of their attack
LEADERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strong leadership by General Harrison. • Chain of command quickly reestablished during battle. • Few desertions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prophet's leadership was poor. • Prophecies that did not come true eventually had a detrimental effect on morale.

Fig. 6. Tactical Analysis, Elements of Combat Power

Harrison's standards of discipline seem to have been successful. The army maintained its field discipline throughout the campaign, soldiers manned their positions in spite of serious casualties, and units repositioned and assaulted enemy positions

while under fire. The small number of desertions during the campaign is noteworthy as is the willingness of junior leaders to immediately fill the void of killed or wounded commanders. All of these results imply that the organization developed a respectable foundation of discipline during its training period.

The Prophet's forces failed in large part because of poor leadership. The Prophet tried to enhance the morale of his warriors by making promises, disguised as prophecies, that were not realistic. The approach worked in the initial stages of the battle, and the Indian assaults penetrated the perimeter. Eventually, the failure of the Indian force to achieve its objective of controlling the interior of the camp and killing Harrison caused the force to culminate. The fact that the enemy continued to kill and wound warriors despite the Prophet's promises eventually degraded morale to such a degree that the Indians called off the attack.

Combat power and its application determined the relative success or failure of each side's efforts during the engagement. One engagement often decided the outcome of a campaign during this era. Consequently, understanding the importance of combat power was often crucial to the success or failure of a major military effort. Harrison understood the importance of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership and how these elements contribute to the success of a military operation. Harrison took advantage of the attributes that combine to form combat power in order to defeat the Indian forces at Tippecanoe.

¹Draper Mss. 1X41. This is from General Harrison's official report to the secretary of war, William Eustis. Harrison wrote his initial report from his headquarters near Prophet's Town on 8 November 1811. The second letter, written after the command returned to Vincennes, describes the engagement in detail.

²Beard, 55; Eckert *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 714-715; Logan Esarey, ed., *Governors Messages and Letters*, vol. 1

(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Commission, 1922-1924), 606-607; and Richard J. Reid, *The Battle of Tippecanoe* (Fordsville, Kentucky: Wendell Sandefor, 1993), 26-27. The boatmen were along the shore pulling the boat with a rope. One of the men remained in the boat asleep. An Indian party abandoned Prophet's Town once they heard of Harrison's advance through the new purchase. This party was traveling down the opposite bank of the Wabash when they encountered the boat. One of the Indians swam to the boat and killed the sleeping boatman.

³Draper Mss. 1X39.

⁴Beard, 54; Freeman Cleaves, *Old Tippecanoe* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), 89-91; William M. Cockrum, *Pioneer History of Indiana* (Oakland City, Indiana: Press of Oakland City Journal, 1907), 257; Downey, 86; and Eckert, *Gateway*, 380.

⁵Draper Mss. 1X41.

⁶Draper Mss. 1X41; John Tipton, "John Tipton's, Tippecanoe Journal," *Indiana Magazine of History* 2.4, (1906), 180-181; Pirtle, 39-40; and Walker, 19-20.

⁷Adams, 365; Carter, ed., 133; Draper Mss. 1X41; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 564-566; Isaac Naylor, "Isaac Naylor's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 2 (1906), 164; Walker, 20; and Florence G. Watts, ed., "Lt. Charles Larrabee's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* (1961), 242. The delegation that the Prophet's emissaries referred to is the same delegation addressed in notes 39 and 40, Chapter three. The Indians were probably not as surprised as they professed to be at the rapid advancement of the army since they had partially fortified their village. The breastworks ran around the village to the banks of the Wabash. Fortification of a static position was an unusual tactic for most woodland Indians.

⁸Esarey, ed., *Messages and Letters*, vol. 1, 614. Harrison received severe criticism after the battle for letting the Indians select the army's camp site. The criticism was unjustified because the Indians did not select the camp site or lead the army to their eventual remain overnight (RON) location. Harrison asked the Indians about locations with enough wood and water to support the army since the army passed few suitable locations enroute. The Indians described a general area to Harrison and Major Marston Clarke and Major Waller Taylor from Harrison's staff conducted the reconnaissance for the RON. Clarke and Taylor selected the actual camp site for the army.

⁹Cockrum, 261; and Draper Mss. 1X42.

¹⁰Draper Mss. 1X42; Cockrum, 263-264; George Pence, "General Joseph Bartholomew," *Indiana Magazine of History* 14.4 (Dec 1918), 292; and Walker, 21, 24, 29. The guard consisted of about 130 men and was under the command of the field grade officer of the day. The guard consisted of two captain's guards of four NCOs and forty-two privates (each) and two subalterns (lieutenants or ensigns) guards of twenty

NCOs and privates. Harrison habitually established a strong guard immediately outside of his perimeter each night. The idea of employing guards of this type in Indian warfare was to keep them close enough so that the Indians could not infiltrate between them. The traditional approach of stationing pickets to watch roads and other traditional avenues of approach was not practical because the Indians did not fight in traditional formations. The soldiers not on guard duty slept fully clothed with their weapons and opposite their post on the perimeter. The fires were lit in front of the tents between the troops sleeping on the perimeter and the line of guards. After the battle started the soldiers tried to extinguish the fires but were never completely successful because the Indians engaged them as soon as they silhouetted themselves against the flames in their efforts to put out the fires.

¹¹Cockrum, 239; Esarey, *History*, 188, 334; Hook, 33; Pirtle, 51; Tucker, 224; and Wesley J. Whickar, ed., "Shabonee's Account of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 17 (1921), 356. It is believed that the Potawatomi Indians, led by Winnemac, were the largest contingent at Prophet's Town. Winnemac's leadership of the largest element might have gained him more influence than other leaders during a council.

¹²Beard, 69-71; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 564; Eckert, *A Sorrow in Our Heart*, 556-567; Edmunds, *Quest*, 156-158; Hook, 33; and Pirtle, xv.

¹³Downey, 87; and Whickar, ed., 355-358.

¹⁴Whickar, ed., 358.

¹⁵The summary of the Indian battle plan is from several sources: Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 565-566; Pirtle, 52, 56; Tucker, 224-226; and Whickar, ed., 356-359. Shabonee commented about Harrison's practice of posting a strong guard: "Every night he picked his camping ground and set his sentinels all around, as though he expected we would attack him in the dark. We should have done so before we did, if it had not been for this precaution."

¹⁶Cleaves, 99; Cockrum, 297; Naylor, 165; Pirtle, 52-53; Reid, 32-33; and Walker, 29. Corporal Mars, a member of Geiger's Company of mounted Riflemen, was KIA on 7 Nov 1811.

¹⁷Cockrum, 279-308; Draper Mss. 1X41; and Naylor, 163-169.

¹⁸Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 565; Downey, 87; Pirtle, 53; Tucker, 224-226; and Walker, 30. Some reports claim that Owen found Harrison's horse and mounted it and others claim that Owen owned and rode a light-colored horse throughout the campaign. In any case, the result was the same--Owen was shot and killed.

¹⁹The description of the aggressiveness of the Indian attack and the lack of coordination is summarized from several sources. Tucker, 226 addresses the personal bravery of the Indians and their lack of coordination. Eckert, *The Frontiersmen*, 565-

566, Klinck, ed., 101-102, and Pirtle, 69-70 describe the effect of the Prophet's predictions in promoting Indian aggressiveness during the attack.

²⁰Cockrum, 265.

²¹Cleaves, 99; Draper Mss. 1X43; and Walker, 22, 26.

²²Draper Mss. 1X43; Pirtle, 59; Reid, 36; and Walker, 23-24. The charge that Daviess led was a single-file of dragoons rather than on line (abreast).

²³Cockrum, 265; Draper Mss. 1X43; and Reid, 36-38. Harrison was not sure if Robb's company was driven from their positions or moved because of some mistake. Most sources attribute Robb's movement to an improper order or some other mistake.

²⁴Pirtle, 57. The Miami Indian Tribe was not part of the confederacy even though some individual members of the tribe supported the confederacy. The small hill that the Prophet watched the battle from is known today as "Prophet's Rock."

²⁵Pirtle, 61-62. Indian tactics are from Cockrum, 265 and Watts, ed., 244. Larrabee remembers the signal as a whistling noise on an instrument made for that purpose, Cockrum describes it as a rattling noise made with dried deer hoofs. Both reports could be correct, there were several different tribes involved in the attack and they could have used a variety of signaling techniques.

²⁶Draper Mss. 1X41-44; Drake, 152; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967; New York: Bantam, 1970), 624-627; and Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 438-439. General Harrison remarked that the "Indians manifested a ferocity uncommon even with them."

²⁷Whickar, ed., 358-359.

²⁸Cockrum, 265; Draper Mss. 1X43; Reid, 37-38; and Watts, ed., 244.

²⁹Draper Mss. 1X4, 1X40-44; and Pirtle, 56. See Appendix A for a the breakdown by position of American KIA and WIA. twenty-five American soldiers eventually died of wounds and four died enroute to the battle, making the total number of deaths during the campaign sixty-six. Harrison suggested that the Indians had poisoned or chewed their ammunition to increase the lethality of any wounds. Harrison commented on this because it seemed as if soldiers were dying of wounds from which they would normally recover. Harrison was sure that some of the Indians chewed their ammunition because he saw examples of it in captured ammunition pouches. There are not very many precise estimates of Indian casualties because the Indians usually attempted to recover their casualties. Consequently, most references limit statements of Indian casualties to 36, 38, or 40. These casualty figures are derived from first-hand accounts of the number of Indian dead found on the battlefield the next day. Bodies not yet buried and several recent graves were found the next day by the dragoons at Prophet's Town so the number of Indian casualties is probably higher than even 40.

Harrison, or members of his command, also received subsequent reports that Indian casualties were high. Many reports note that the Indians carried off their dead as well as wounded during the battle. Harrison noted that a soldier had killed and scalped an Indian and the Indian's body was found the next day at Prophet's Town, which confirms the practice of Indians recovering their dead. The Americans were also concerned with recovering the remains of their dead--Harrison reported that three American scalps had been taken and two of them were eventually recovered.

³⁰Naylor, 166. Naylor notes that Ensign John Tipton was elected and commissioned captain of Spencer's Yellow Jackets within one hour of the end of the battle. The commander, Captain Spencer, and both of his Lieutenants were killed during the battle. Tipton, 181 notes that Saml Flanagan, Jacob Zenor, and Phillip Bell were the other soldiers elected to positions in the chain of command to replace the officers killed in action. Lieutenant Larrabee assumed command of a company of the 4th U.S. upon the death of the commander, Captain Baen.

³¹Cleaves, 103; Naylor, 167-169; Pirtle, 71; Tipton, 181; Walker, 33, 35; and Watts, ed., 245.

³²Draper Mss. 1X40. This is from a copy of Harrison's initial report to the secretary of war, written on 8 November 1811.

³³Cockrum, 269; Downey, 89; Draper Mss. 1X44; Edmunds, *Quest*, 159; Naylor, 167-169; Pirtle, 9, 76; Tipton, 181; and Walker, 33-34.

³⁴Draper Mss. 1X44; and Walker, 33, 38. The wounded Indian was treated and left at Tippecanoe. The Indian survived his wounds long enough to deliver the message. Harrison received confirmation of this and reported it to the secretary of war in a report dated 4 December 1811.

³⁵Cockrum, 270; Walker, 35-37; and Watts, ed., 245-246. There were two deserters from the battle. Sergeant Reed and his detachment at the blockhouse captured the deserters and turned them over to Harrison once the army arrived at the blockhouse. Immediately after the battle Harrison dispatched an express rider to Vincennes with news of the engagement. Lieutenant Colonel Miller at Fort Harrison received word of the army's lack of supplies and sent a resupply boat to the blockhouse.

³⁶Adams, 369; Cockrum, 270; and Watts, ed., 245-246.

³⁷Drake, 155-156; Edmunds, *Quest*, 158-160; Edmunds, "Thin Red Line," 13; Draper Mss. 1X48; Pirtle, 62-63; and Walker, 38.

³⁸All definitions for the elements of Combat Power are from *Operations* 2-10 to 2-11.

³⁹In one of Tipton's journal entries he notes that General Harrison threatened to break the officers because they had not been enforcing the requirement to parade in line of battle before reveille (stand-to).

⁴⁰Cleaves, 102; and Pence, 292.

⁴¹Walker, 16. Walker remarked that the Indians "lurked" around Fort Harrison nightly and alarmed the sentries. The attempts to spy on the army or use the delegation to deceive Harrison about the intent of the Prophet are from Whickar, ed., 353-363. Shabonee's account indicates that the Indians wanted to draw Harrison farther into the new purchase and once Harrison's LOCs were extended, attack the army. This would fit the Indian pattern established in earlier combat in the American northwest.

⁴²Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 604-605. After the battle, Harrison claimed that a shortage of pioneer tools forced him to decide between building breastworks or chopping wood for fires. Controversy also surrounds this decision and many of Harrison's detractors believed that Harrison was using the shortage of tools as an excuse for his failure as a commander. Before the battle, in a 29 October 1811 letter to the secretary of war, Harrison commented on a shortage of axes and the poor quality of the axes that were available. Harrison told Eustis that it was taking the army twice as long as expected to build Fort Harrison because of the lack of tools and the poor quality of those that were available.

⁴³Walker, 35. The Indians could approach within a few feet of a sentry without discovery. The sentinel at Fort Harrison was shot from a thicket of bushes about twelve feet to his front.

⁴⁴Draper Mss. 4X42.

⁴⁵Watts, ed., 232.

⁴⁶Walker, 44.

⁴⁷Cleaves, 90; Gunderson, "William Henry Harrison," 24; and Walker, 15-16, 31-32. Wayne was noted for his harsh punishments to enforce discipline in the American Legion. Gunderson notes that Harrison was not as "Draconian" as Wayne and he managed to secure a "fierce bonding" with his troops. Many sources comment on Harrison's ability to exercise an appropriate style of leadership that resulted in effective performances from militia troops. Contrast the desertions of several hundred militia troops during St. Clair's expedition to fifteen reported desertions (Reid, 15) during Harrison's campaign. Reid's figures do not differentiate between regular army and militia deserters; records and accounts that are available indicate that militia and regulars both deserted. Cleaves writes that Harrison directed that soldiers would not receive "petty punishments" for "the most trifling errors of the private soldier." Walker remarked that the order developed "an affectionate and lasting regard for their General." The order was not always followed and some problems ensued as a result. Colonel Boyd (Harrison's second in command) ordered the flogging of a wagoner for a breach

of discipline. The militia captain assigned to conduct the flogging refused. Harrison eventually resolved the situation to the satisfaction of the militiamen. The regular army of the time was recognized for strict discipline developed through a harsh system of punishments. Harrison knew that militia soldiers would not respond to this type of discipline and about 2/3 of his army was militia. Walker said that while at Fort Harrison:

. . . some murmuring took place among them [militia], being heartily sick of the camp, and desirous of returning to their homes. Many, indeed, threatened to leave at all hazards, which caused the Governor much anxiety and trouble. He appeared not disposed to detain any man against his inclination; being endowed by nature with a heart as humane as brave; in his frequent addresses to the militia, his eloquence was formed to persuade; appeals were made to reason as well as feeling--and never were they made in vain--when the militia, unused to military restriction, threatened desertion, his eloquence calmed their passions, and hushed their discontented murmuring--and in a short time all became tranquil, and unanimity reigned throughout the army.

CHAPTER FIVE

BATTLEFIELD STAFF RIDE

A number of soldiers have died of their wounds since their return to Vincennes. Funerals are of a daily occurrence.¹

Mrs. Lydia B. Bacon, *Diary Entry*

Introduction

The current terrain of the encampment does not significantly differ from General Harrison's description. Several small built-up areas and roads encompass the approaches to the encampment. The battlefield is on a small plateau that is generally open throughout most of the area. There is still a drop-off from the encampment site to Burnett Creek, and the terrain in this area remains wooded. The area behind the creek leads to Prophet's Rock and consists of open areas broken by small stands of trees. There is a two-lane road that runs along the hillside below Prophet's Rock.

A fence surrounds most of the encampment area, and there is a set of steps that lead to Burnett Creek. The monument and museum are in the general area that Major Wells and the mounted riflemen from Kentucky occupied. This is the built-up area of the park and leads to the town of Battle Ground, Indiana. The swamps and marshes that protected the Indians from the dragoon's assault no longer exist. The opposite end of the battlefield, near the position of Spencer's Yellow Jackets, is still wooded. Now a two-lane road and railroad tracks run parallel to the positions occupied by the infantry and militia commanded by Floyd (4th U.S.) and Bartholomew (IN militia). The area that leads to Prophet's Town is generally open fields. A historical marker notes the general location of Prophet's Town.

Since the encampment occupied a relatively small area, a survey of most of the battlefield can be made from a single vantage point. The main areas of action during the battle are close enough together to allow a walking tour to cover the events chronologically. Personnel conducting the staff ride can also choose to cover the events in a clockwise or counterclockwise manner. Regardless of the method selected, the participants will be able to see other key pieces of the battlefield from most vantage points.

This chapter contains a map for the suggested route of the staff ride, stands that locate specific events, vignettes, and discussion topics. One day is sufficient for conducting a walking tour of the battlefield that includes discussions at all of the stands. Transportation between Prophet's Town and the battlefield is not required as the distance is less than one and one-half miles. Prophet's Town is on private property, and units will have to coordinate with the owner if they plan any extensive activity at that stand. The vignettes will highlight the specific actions at each stand. The discussion topics should be tailored to fit the particular training objectives of the unit conducting the staff ride.

The Tippecanoe battlefield is part of the Indiana state park system. Visitors to the battlefield will find various monuments and a battlefield museum that are interesting sources of background information and can supplement the field study phase of the staff ride. Additionally, there are several area libraries and a county historical association that can provide information for the visitor to the battlefield. As a starting point, visitors can contact the Tippecanoe County Historical Association at (765) 567-2147.

Suggested Route and Vignettes

Stand 1

Prophet's Town

(A historical marker located near the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers)

Situation: The Prophet was in charge at the Tippecanoe headquarters, where Tecumseh had left strict orders that the Indians were not to engage Harrison's forces. The Tippecanoe headquarters was a large Indian village that was partially fortified with rudimentary breastworks. The town was between one to two miles long and ran generally along the Wabash River. There were between 100 and 200 Indian style huts that made up the living areas of the village. There was also a large storehouse containing corn and beans. Cultivated fields used for farming probably ran to the south of the village; Harrison said that they were about 500 yards "below the town" and extended all the way to the banks of the Wabash.²

Vignette:

He [Tecumseh] was not at the battle of Tippecanoe. If he had been there it would not have been fought. It was too soon. It frustrated all of his plans.

He [The Prophet] was a great medicine. He talked much to the Indians and told them what had happened. He told much truth, but some things that he told did not come to pass. He was called "The Prophet." Your people knew him only by that name. He was very cunning, but he was not so great a warrior as his brother, and he could not so well control the young warriors who were determined to fight.

Perhaps your people do not know that the battle of Tippecanoe was the work of white men who came from Canada and urged us to make war. Two of them who wore red coats were at the Prophet's Town the day that your army came. It was they who urged Elskatawwa [the Prophet] to fight. They dressed themselves like Indians, to show us how to fight. They did not know our mode. We wanted to attack at midnight. They wanted to wait till daylight.³

Teaching Points: Unity of Command, objective.




Fig. 7. Tippecanoe Battle, 7 November 1811 (numbers indicate stand locations)

Stand 2

Encampment at Tippecanoe

(Tippecanoe monument)

Situation: The encampment formed a trapezoid. Spencer's Yellow Jackets were at the western end of the encampment. The front of the trapezoid (the front line) faced Prophet's Town while the rear of the trapezoid (the rear line) abutted Burnett Creek. The eastern end of the perimeter was the position of Wells and the mounted riflemen. The dragoons, dismounted and serving as the army's reserve, were to the rear of the

mounted riflemen and formed at right angles to the riflemen and the front line. Many of the horses and wagons were inside the perimeter. The remainder of the livestock were outside of the perimeter on the prairie.

Soldiers lit warming fires and a large detachment guarded the camp. Breastworks were not built around the perimeter of the camp. Some of the regulars and officers pitched tents, but most of the soldiers slept in the open near their battle positions. All soldiers rested wearing their equipment and accouterments, with weapons loaded, and bayonets fixed. Most of the army slept in the elements, since the militia did not have tents.

Vignette 1:

It was my constant custom to assemble all of the field officers at my tent every evening by signal to give them the watch word and their instructions for the night -- those given for the night of the 6th were that each Corps which formed a part of the exterior line of the encampment should hold its own ground until relieved. The Dragoons were directed to parade dismounted in case of night attack with their pistols in their belts and to act as a Corps de Reserve. The Camp was defended by two Captains Guards consisting each of four noncommissioned officers and 42 privates and two Subalterns Guards of twenty noncommissioned officers and privates. The whole under the command of the field officer of the day. The troops were regularly called up an hour before day and made to continue under arms until it was quite light.⁴

Teaching Points: Commander's guidance, SOPs.

Vignette 2:

At or near 4 o'clock in the morning I was alarmed by the discharge of a gun, on which I immediately repaired to my company, where I found my men all paraded at their posts. The position of the men during the night, together with myself, while at rest was lying on our arms with our clothes on -- as for myself I lay with my boots on greatcoat on & accouterments buckled round me, with my rifle in my arms. At the report of the gun I had no more to do than to throw off my blanket, put my hat on & go to my company which was eight or ten steps from my tent, the time might be one or two minutes, where I found my men as above mentioned.⁵

Teaching Points: SOPs, location of key leaders.

Stand 3

Initial Engagement by the Sentry

(The east side of the camp; the sentries were located outside of the perimeter)

Situation: The orderly was standing by preparing to give the signal for stand-to.

General Harrison was in his tent talking to some of his officers. Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew, the field officer of the day, was inspecting his sentries.⁶ Some soldiers were awake or waking up in preparation for stand-to. Other soldiers were adding fuel to the warming fires as a drizzling rain fell. The sentry near Major Wells' command fired at an infiltrating Indian. The wounded Indian cried out and his companions rushed the camp from several sides pursuing the retreating sentries. As the sentries retired into camp the units on the perimeter were awake and forming for battle.

Vignette 1:

I awoke about four o'clock the next morning. . . . A drizzling rain was falling and all things were still and quiet throughout the camp. I was engaged in making a calculation when I should arrive at home.

In a few moments I heard the crack of a rifle. . . . I had just time to think that some sentinel was alarmed and had fired his rifle without a real cause, when I heard the crack of another rifle, followed by an awful Indian yell all around the encampment. In less than a minute I saw the Indians charging our line most furiously and shooting a great many balls into our camp fires, throwing the live coals into the air three or four feet high.

The sentinels, closely pursued by the Indians, came to the line of the encampment in haste and confusion. My brother, William Naylor, was on guard. He was pursued so rapidly and furiously that he ran to the nearest point on the left flank, where he remained with a company of regular soldiers until the battle was near its termination. A young man, whose name was Daniel Pettit, was pursued so closely and furiously by an Indian as he was running from the guard fire to our lines, that to save his life he cocked his rifle as he ran and turning suddenly round, placed the muzzle of his gun against the body of the Indian and shot an ounce ball through him. The Indian fired his gun at the same instant, but it being longer than Pettit's the muzzle passed by him and set fire to a handkerchief which he had tied round his head.⁷

Teaching Points: Establishing security and force protection measures.

Vignette 2:

The men that were to crawl upon their bellies into the camp were seen in the grass by a white man who had eyes like an owl, and he fired and hit his mark. The Indian was not brave. He cried out. He should have lain still and died. Then the other men fired. The other Indians were fools. They jumped out of the grass and yelled. They believed what had been told them, that a white man would run at a noise made in the night. Then many Indians who had crept very close so as to be ready to take scalps when the white men ran, all yelled like wolves, wild cats and screech owls; but it did not make the white men run.

They jumped up right from their sleep with guns in their hands and sent a shower of bullets at every spot where they heard a noise. They could not see us. We could see them, for they had fires. Whether we were ready or not we had to fight now for the battle was begun.⁸

Teaching Points: Stealth, alternate plans in case of early compromise.

Stand 4

First Indian Attack

(Apex of Geiger's and Barton's companies)

Situation: The Indians gained an advantage almost immediately in the area where Captain Barton's company (4th U.S.) tied in with Captain Geiger's company (Kentucky mounted riflemen). The Indian onslaught happened so rapidly that the Indians broke through the companies to the inside of the camp perimeter. General Harrison arrived in the area, quickly assessed the situation, and ordered Cook's company (4th U.S.) and Wentworth's company (IN militia) (commanded by Peters) from the rear line to the shattered angle formed by Barton and Geiger.

Vignette 1:

At this moment my friend Warnock was shot by a rifle ball through his body. He ran a few yards and fell dead on the ground. Our lines were broken and a few Indians were found on the inside of the encampment. In a few moments they were all killed. Our lines closed up and our men in the proper places. One Indian was killed in the back part of Captain Geiger's tent, while he was attempting to tomahawk the Captain.

The Indians made four or five most fierce charges on our lines, yelling and screaming as they advanced, shooting balls and arrows into our ranks. At each charge they were driven off in confusion, carrying their dead and wounded as they retreated.⁹

Teaching Points: Immediate response to threat, SOPs.

Vignette 2:

I rode to the angle that was attacked. I found that Barton's company had suffered severely and the left of Geiger's entirely broken. I immediately ordered Cook's and the late Capt. Wentworth's under Lieut. Peters to be brought up from the centre of the rear line where the ground was much more defensible and formed across the angle in support of Barton's and Geiger's.¹⁰

Teaching Points: Location of commander and the impact on decision making, assumption of command after leaders are killed or wounded.

Stand 5

Second Indian Attack

(Southeast edge of the line in Floyd's area)

Situation: Harrison rode to the next critical area which was at the front line (facing Prophet's Town). Major Daviess was organizing his dragoons (KY militia) and he repeatedly asked Harrison for permission to attack a group of Indians in a stand of trees fifteen or twenty feet away, who were effectively engaging the soldiers on the front line. Harrison authorized Daviess to drive the Indians from the small grove. Daviess led a single-file charge of about twenty dragoons. The Indians attacked the dragoons on their flanks, killing Daviess and another dragoon, and wounding a third. Snelling and his men attacked into the trees and dislodged the enemy at the point of the bayonet.

Vignette:

. . . having the command of Capt Baens company, and judging it was better to charge the indians in front, than to stand and receive their fires, I so requested of Major Floyd, who commanded the right wing, as did Lieut. Hawkins commanding Whitnes, but was refused on the ground of leaving this part of the line and angle wholly exposed to the indians.¹¹

[T]hese two companies not only had to contend with the enemy in front, but those at the head of the camp, that were nigh this angle. Major Daviss had formed a party troop in the rear of these companies. [T]he commanding in chief arrived here, and seeing the situation of the companies, he ordered Major Daviss to charge those indians in front. [T]he Majors undaunted courage hurried him forward with two small a force to assure success. [I]n the charge the Major received a Mortal wound Coll White killed and one dragoon wounded. [T]he party returned without accomplishing its object, however the indians soon found too warm a reseption [sic] and left the ground in front.¹²

[T]he action had by this time become almost general on all sides. Capt Snelling and Prescott was ordered from this wing, to support the line across the head of the camp [vicinity Major Wells' command, to fill the space vacated by Robb's company], their vacancy supplied [sic] with dragoons. Capt S[nelling] charged and dislodged a boddy [sic] of indians in that direction and nigh this angle. [T]he manner the indians faught [sic] was desperate.¹³

Teaching Points: Commander repositions on the battlefield, use of reserve, other units execute the reserve mission if the reserve fails.

Stand 6

Third Indian Attack

(Spencer's Yellow Jackets on the west side of the camp)

Situation: Spencer's Yellow Jackets (IN militia) were among the last engaged because the Indians in this area were not prepared to assault when the attack was compromised. The Yellow Jackets defended an area too large for them;¹⁴ the attack in this area was particularly savage and quickly decimated the Yellow Jacket chain of command. As Harrison arrived he found that John Tipton, an ensign, was the only surviving officer among Spencer's Yellow Jackets. Thomas Montgomery, a second lieutenant, was commanding Warrick's company (IN militia) which was adjacent to the Yellow Jackets. Harrison ordered Robb's (IN militia) company to move to the aid of Spencer's and Warrick's companies. Harrison directed Prescott's company (4th U.S.) to fill the gap at Robb's old position.

Vignette 1:

[A] blood[y] Combat Took Place at Precisely 15 minutes before 5 in morning which lasted two hours and 20 minutes of a continewel [sic] firing while many times mixed among the Indians so that we Could not tell the indians and our men apart. [T]hey kept up a firing on three sides of us took our tent from the gueard [sic] fire. [O]ur men fought Brave and By the timely help of Capt Cook [actually Lieutenant Larrabee, Cook arrived later] with a Company of infantry we maid [sic] a Charge and Drove them out of the timber across the prairie.¹⁵

Teaching Points: Location of commander, repositioning of forces, assaults used in the defense to disrupt and dislodge attacking forces.

Vignette 2:

"Where's your captain?" "Dead, sir."
"Your first lieutenant?" "Dead, sir."
"Your second lieutenant?" "Dead, sir."
"Your ensign?" "Here, sir!"¹⁶

Teaching Points: Re-establishment of the chain of command.

Stand 7

Bayonet and Dragoon Charge

(East side of the camp vicinity the Kentucky mounted riflemen)

Situation: Harrison wanted to conduct coordinated assaults from each end of the encampment at first light. Major Wells, unaware of Harrison's intent, prepared to attack the Indians at his end of the encampment. Wells marshaled infantry and dragoons for the difficult task. The infantry attacked with fixed bayonets and drove the Indians back. The dragoons, now mounted, continued the attack until the marsh prevented continued pursuit.

Vignette 1:

Major Wells who commanded on the left flank not knowing my intentions precisely, had taken the command of these companies [and] had charged the enemy before I had formed the body of Dragoons with which I meant to support the Infantry, a small detachment of those [dragoons] were however ready and proved amply sufficient for the purpose. The Indians were driven by the Infantry

at the point of the Bayonet and the Dragoons pursued and forced them into a marsh where they could not be followed.¹⁷

Teaching Points: Use of counterattacks, impact of subordinate initiative on synchronization, situation awareness

Vignette 2:

As soon as daylight came our warriors saw that the Prophet's grand plan had failed--that the great white chief was alive riding fearlessly among his troops in spite of bullets, and their hearts melted.

After that the Indians fought to save themselves, not to crush the whites. It was a terrible defeat. Our men all scattered and tried to get away. The white horsemen chased them and cut them down with long knives [swords].¹⁸

Teaching Points: Morale, assignment of unachievable objectives.

Stand 8

Final Counterattack

(Vicinity Spencer's Yellow Jackets)

Situation: Light was beginning to break over the battleground. Harrison had already repositioned several companies to reinforce the left and right flanks in preparation for the daylight assaults. Wells, unaware of Harrison's desires, began his series of assaults to destroy the Indians in his area. Companies from the 4th U.S. moved into position to support the battered Yellow Jackets. As soon as the infantry arrived in position they charged with the bayonet and drove the Indians out of position.

Vignette:

... at the same time I received an order (as did Lieut Hawkins) and proceeded accordingly to support the rear line. [O]n my arrival the indians had gained ground upon Spencers company, being the senior officer present, commanded and formed the companies, charged the indians killed five and put the rest to flight. Capt Cook (and company) was also ordered to this point, but arrived too late to bare any share of the charge.¹⁹

Teaching Points: Use of counterattacks, junior leader initiative and ability.




Fig. 8. Interior Movements, Tippecanoe Battle, 7 November 1811: (A) Cook and Peters are ordered to reinforce the angle formed by Geiger and Barton. (B) Robb is driven from his position or mistakenly moves out of position and is halted by a staff officer; Robb is eventually ordered to reinforce the Yellow Jackets. (C) Prescott fills the spot on the left flank that was vacated by Robb. (D) Snelling, Albright, and Scott from the front line and Wilson from the rear line are ordered to the left flank. The bayonet charges on this flank are ordered by Wells before Harrison has the dragoons completely organized and prepared to assist. (E) Larrabee and Cook are ordered to the right flank in preparation for the daylight bayonet charges.

Stand 9

Prophet's Rock

(Marker on the hill 500 yards west of the encampment)

Situation: During the battle, the Prophet established himself on a small hill overlooking the battlefield. To inspire the warriors and contribute his mystic powers that would help

guarantee success in battle, the Prophet beat a drum and shouted incantations to the Great Spirit. Throughout the morning runners informed the Prophet that his magic failed to stop the bayonets and bullets of the enemy. The Prophet urged the warriors on and promised that the prophecy would be fulfilled. As daylight broke over the battle ground, the warriors realized that the attack had failed and abandoned further attempts.

Teaching Points: Poor exercise of command and control, poor leadership.

Stand 10

Encampment

(Tippecanoe monument)

Situation: 7- 8 November 1811. Throughout the day the army consolidated and reorganized. The soldiers erected breastworks about four feet high to strengthen their defensive position, treated the wounded, buried the dead, and reestablished their chains of command. That night the force maintained one hundred percent security in case of another attack. The next day (8 November 1811) a mounted force moved to Prophet's Town and found an empty village. The army seized any usable supplies that it could transport. All remaining captured supplies and material were burned along with the village. A captured and wounded Indian was treated and left at the village under the care of an Indian woman.

Vignette 1:

... no company suffered like ours. [W]e then held an Election for officers. I was elected Capt. Saml Flanagan first Lieut and Jacob Zenor second Lieut and Philip Bell Ensign. [W]e then built Breast-works our men in much confusion, our flower [flour] been too small and our beeve [beef] last [lost]. Last night onley[sic] half Rations of whisky [sic] and no corn for our horses. [M]y horse killed I got [M]cmahons to Ride 37 of them had been killed wounded and lost last night. I had one quart of whisky [sic].²⁰

Teaching Points: Reestablish the chain of command, reestablish security.

Vignette 2:

. . . the day was spent in attending to the police of the camp fortifying the same, and preparing to attack the town the next day. [T]he night of the 7th was cold and rainey [sic], and but a little Soldiers rest obtained. [A]t sunrise the 8th inst the dragoons were sent to discover the situation of the town, and in 15 minuets [sic] an express arrived informed that the indians where leaveing [sic] town and all its contents had crossed the [W]abash and that the Dragoons had possession of the town. [A] number of waggons [sic] where dispatched, and returned from town loaded with beans corn and peas. . . . [T]he day was spent burning and destroying the town of Tippicanoe [sic], and preparing for the march the next day.²¹

Teaching Points: Prepare for future operations, focus on accomplishment of campaign objectives, redeploy upon accomplishment of campaign termination criteria.

¹Lydia B. Bacon, *The Biography of Mrs. Lydia B. Bacon* (Boston, 1856), 35. Mrs. Bacon was the wife of Lieutenant Bacon (4th U.S.) and she accompanied her husband from their post at Pittsburgh to Vincennes.

²Draper Mss; 1X41; and Walker, 20, 30.

³Wesley Whickar, ed., "Shabonee's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 17 (1921) 356).

⁴Draper Mss. 1X42. Naylor, 169 describes the watch word. The watch word for the night of 6 November 1811 was "wide awake, wide awake." The present day 151st Infantry Regiment, Indiana Army National Guard retains the watch word as their regimental motto.

⁵Report submitted 8 January 1812, by Captain Joel Cook, 4th U.S., in Presidential Papers Microfilm, *William Henry Harrison Presidential Papers Microfilm Series 1: 1734-1813 Aug, Reel 1*.

⁶George Pence, "General Joseph Bartholomew," *Indiana Magazine of History* 14.4 (Dec 1918), 292.

⁷Isaac Naylor, "Isaac Naylor's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 2 (1906) 165).

⁸Shabonee, in Wesley Whickar, ed., "Shabonee's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 17 (1921) 357.

⁹Isaac Naylor, "Isaac Naylor's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 2 (1906), 165-166.

¹⁰ General Harrison's report to the secretary of war, in Draper, Mss. 1X42.

¹¹ Lieutenant Larrabee commanded Captain Baen's company because Baen was serving as an acting major (battalion commander) during the battle. Larrabee continued to command the company after the army's return to Vincennes because Baen was wounded during the battle and subsequently died, 9 November 1811. The reference to Hawkins commanding Whitnes refers to the fact that Captain Whitney (Whitnes) resigned from the army in July 1811 and Lieutenant Hawkins commanded his old company. The information on Whitney is summarized from note 21, Watts, ed., 243. Green, 125 and Walker, 6 note that Whitney resigned because of a scandal that resulted from some of the unorthodox disciplinary measures he used while he was a company commander.

¹² Colonel White was a militia officer whose unit was not called up to participate in the campaign. Colonel White enlisted and served as a private during the campaign. Colonel White was not the only officer that volunteered to serve at a lower rank. Major Wells was a major general in the Kentucky militia who volunteered to serve as a private. Harrison appointed Wells as a major and gave him command of the mounted riflemen from Kentucky. See George Fauntleroy White "Memoir of Colonel Isaac White," *Indiana Magazine of History* 15.4 (1919), 327-341 for more information on Colonel White.

¹³ Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, 4th U.S., in Florence G. Watts, ed., "Lt. Charles Larrabee's Account of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* (1961), 243-244.

¹⁴ Draper Mss. 1X43. Harrison, in his report to the secretary of war, acknowledged that the Yellow Jackets were assigned a position on the perimeter that was too large for them to cover.

¹⁵ John Tipton, in "John Tipton's Tippecanoe Journal," *Indiana Magazine of History* 2.4 (1906), 180-181.

¹⁶ Exchange between General Harrison and Ensign John Tipton as cited in Downey, 88.

¹⁷ General Harrison's report to the Secretary of War, in Draper Mss. 1X43.

¹⁸ Shabonee, in Wesley Whickar, ed., "Shabonee's Account of the Battle of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* 17 (1921), 357.

¹⁹ Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, 4th U.S., in Florence G. Watts, ed., "Lt. Charles Larrabee's Account of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* (1961), 244.

²⁰ John Tipton, in "John Tipton's Tippecanoe Journal," *Indiana Magazine of History* 2.4 (1906), 180-181.

²¹Lieutenant Charles Larrabee, 4th U.S., in Florence G. Watts, ed., "Lt. Charles Larrabee's Account of Tippecanoe," *Indiana Magazine of History* (1961), 244.

APPENDIX A

TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

My order of march hitherto had been similar to that used by
General Wayne¹

General Harrison, *Post-Battle Report*

Raising Armies

United States Forces

During the years between the American Revolution and the War of 1812, various mixtures of regular, militia, and volunteer units conducted the major campaigns. Units from the regular army, Indiana, and Kentucky fought at Tippecanoe.² In order to ensure that there were adequate forces available for military duties, Congress enacted several pieces of legislation regarding national defense. These acts directed the organization and strength of the military.

The post-Revolutionary War years saw an emphasis on establishing an efficient navy as the primary military tool to support American policy. Ground combat operations were to rely on militias. In light of this policy, it is not difficult to understand why militia units from Indiana and Kentucky provided the bulk of forces during the Tippecanoe campaign.³

Congress placed so little emphasis on maintaining an army that the army was disbanded, with the exception of one artillery battery to guard stores at West Point, in 1784. There were several reasons that Congress felt that the United States could afford to rely on a well-regulated militia for defense. One reason was that the oceans provided the country with a measure of protection. Another reason was that the country was too poor to maintain a large standing army. Since the oceans provided some measure of

protection and the country could not afford an army, a reliance on militias seemed not only safe but also necessary.⁴

Eventually, Congress began to see the need for some type of regular force to protect the frontier. The Constitution gave Congress the authority to raise and appropriate funds for the maintenance of an army for two year periods. The first post-Revolutionary War army was composed of men on detached service from militias. Congress requested that several states provide men from their militias for a one year period of service. The army was eventually organized and Josiah Harmar was appointed as the commander.⁵ This general practice of raising an army for specific emergencies and for a limited duration continued until the first decade of the nineteenth-century.

The regular army eventually grew in size but it still remained extremely small. Even so, it was entrusted with a large territorial area of responsibility. Prior to the War of 1812 army units garrisoned posts along the Canadian border. Army units had responsibilities to protect the American coastline that reached to the mouth of the Mississippi. Army units also had the responsibility to patrol borders along Spanish Florida and the Indian frontier. The 1808 act of Congress allowed the regular army fewer than ten thousand men to accomplish all of these tasks.⁶

Militias were designed to provide for local defense and local governments organized and recruited militia units. The Militia Act of 1792 provided the guidance for forming, organizing, and equipping a citizen militia in each state. The Militia Act required free white male citizens between the ages of 18 and 45 to serve in state militias. The act also provided guidance on the weapons and equipment for members of the militia and how the states should organize their militias into battalions, regiments, and

divisions. The 1792 Militia Act also authorized the President to call up the militia for federal service not in excess of three months in any year. The general principals of the Militia Act prevailed without major revision until 1903.⁷

There were several traditional limitations, dating to Colonial America, on the employment of militia units. Militias were used for short periods of service (generally three months) and did not serve outside of the boundaries of their home area without special consent. Volunteer organizations developed to supplement the militia system. Volunteer units usually equipped themselves and paid dues to maintain meeting places. Some of the units were independent of the militia system but most were incorporated into the system with special privileges. The services of volunteers remained relevant and important after the Revolutionary War because volunteers provided the federal government with manpower that could be used for longer periods of time and without regard to geographic limitations.⁸

The Militia Act directed that members of the militia were required to equip themselves with certain minimum items of equipment. One problem was that members of militia units often refused to bring their personal weapons to drill and train with them. There was an extremely practical reason for this attitude among the frontiersmen; if the militia soldier damaged his weapon during training there was not a promise of compensation for the broken firearm. The Militia Act was amended in 1798 to allow the federal government to sell or loan weapons to volunteer companies. The amendment also set aside 30,000 weapons for sale to the states. This amendment did not achieve the desired result because the states were somewhat reluctant to purchase weapons; in 1808 Congress appropriated \$200,000 to arm militias with muskets.⁹

Congress also had the duty to authorize payment of militias for active service. There was no authorization allowing payment of militia when Harrison started his march to secure the new purchase. Letters between Harrison and Eustis addressed the problem of paying militias. In the summer of 1811, Eustis informed Harrison that the act authorizing payment of the militia had expired; consequently militia called out the previous year could not be paid. Eventually Eustis authorized Harrison to employ Boyd's regulars and a few militia units in the new purchase even though there were no funds to pay militia. Eustis was confident, however, that Congress would authorize payment of the militia in the next session.¹⁰

Indian Confederacy

Indians organized war parties for various reasons. There was not a formal procedure in a legislative sense to organize war parties. There were several cultural traditions that were fairly common among the woodland Indians that were used to organize combat forces. Indian combat elements varied in size from small raiding parties to large formations of over one thousand. Generally, the confederacies that were organized after the Revolutionary War to fight white encroachment in the Old Northwest used all of these cultural traditions to organize. Many of the confederacies that were organized were loose associations that came into being for a specific purpose. The fighting elements of these coalitions often consisted of various war parties from allied villages that decided to join the confederacy.

Wampum belts were a form of record keeping used to commemorate important public occasions. The message on the belt was contained in the shapes and colors of the design. The belts also accompanied important agreements such as treaties. A wampum belt with a primarily black design was often used to indicate war or the

intention to go to war.¹¹ Wampum belts were one possible communication tool between tribes attempting to organize coalitions. An organizer of a confederacy could dispatch messengers to potential allies with war wampum belts to request their support during future combat operations. The recipient who accepted the invitation could organize a war party and join his new ally in council.

The act of burying a tomahawk into the village war post was a common sign to indicate that a member of the community wanted to form a war party. The act was more than symbolic because it announced intentions and it opened membership in the war party to anyone who wished to join. Another method to organize a war party was to send messengers to outlying villages to solicit volunteers. Once the decision was made to conduct the expedition, ceremonial war dances preceded the war party's departure.¹² Any warrior who wanted to join a particular coalition could organize a war party to accompany him.

Council meetings, which could be single village or multi-village meetings, were often the forum used to address collective issues. Lighting a council fire signified that the negotiations or deliberations were in session. This forum was one of the means used to facilitate organization or decision-making in Indian coalitions. Although the council may determine a course of action for the tribe (such as peace with the United States), warriors could still form war parties outside of the aegis of tribal policy and conduct combat operations. War dancing and ritual purification, such as fasting, might accompany a war council. The council held by the Indian confederacy before the attack on St. Clair's army consisted of more than 3,000 Indians.¹³

Equipping Armies

United States Forces

It is difficult to determine the type of uniforms and equipment used by American soldiers during the years between the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 because the army was relatively small, few examples of uniforms and equipment remain, and local contractors often produced uniforms and equipment which might or might not be in accordance with the government regulation. Another drawback to any attempt to reconstruct uniforms of the period is that the uniform regulations prior to 1821 were vague.¹⁴ Because the War of 1812 followed the Battle of Tippecanoe so quickly, one may draw some general conclusions about uniforms and equipment from the War of 1812 and apply them to the uniforms and equipment worn in the fall of 1811.

The regular infantry probably wore high-collared waist length uniform coats with red facings on the cuffs and collars. Whitened buff-leather belts and pantaloons were also probably worn. Black cylindrical caps, each with an oblong silver plate that identified the unit, were authorized in 1810. A wooden canteen, bayonet, musket, M1808 cartridge box, and knapsack completed the infantryman's standard load of equipment. The M1808 contract musket was in service at the time of Tippecanoe and the Lherbette patent model knapsack was adopted in 1808.¹⁵

The regulars from the Rifle Regiment were authorized a different uniform. The riflemen were authorized leather caps with cap devices "U.S.R.R." reflecting their unit of service. The rifleman's winter uniform was green cloth faced with black. The summer uniform consisted of a green hunting shirt and pantaloons edged with a buff fringe. Since the regulars deployed to the Indiana Territory in late summer the soldiers might have been clad in their summer issue uniforms. A 3-inch wide black waist belt, scalping

knife, tomahawk, and M1803 rifle completed the standard uniform and equipment for the rifleman.¹⁶

There was little standardization of equipment among militia. Militiamen used whatever was available, whether personal items or equipment from government stocks, and uniform requirements were up to the individual. Harrison, for example, wore a uniform that included a fringed hunting shirt made of calico.¹⁷ Volunteers, such as Daviess' Dragoons, supplied their own mounts in addition to other items of equipment. Joseph Daviess told his volunteers that they should have a brace of pistols and clothes that, "ought to be a blue coatee and pantaloons without any scarlet, a hat or leather cap covered with bear skin, boots, spurs and a pair of tanned leather moccasins to spare."¹⁸ The recruits apparently equipped themselves in accordance with Daviess' desires.

Adam Walker, a regular army soldier, wrote that:

The Dragoons, commanded by Major Daviess, consisting of about 120 men, were well mounted and handsomely equipped, and composed of some of the most respectable citizens from Kentucky and Indiana.¹⁹

The unit that Daviess sponsored was a volunteer unit and composed of members who were probably wealthy or substantially more financially secure than the average frontiersman who composed the majority of the militia units. So it is not surprising that Daviess and his volunteers maintained a higher standard of equipment than the normal militia troops. The average militia soldier was a hardy frontiersman that looked the part. Adam Walker was shocked at the appearance of the militiamen when he first encountered them and remarked that:

. . . their appearance caused us to doubt whether we had not actually landed among the savages themselves. Many of these militia spoke the French language; ---their dress was a short frock of deer skin, a belt around their bodies with a tomahawk and a scalping knife attached to it. and were nearly as destitute of discipline as the savages themselves.²⁰

Although initially not impressed with the militiamen's appearance, Walker gave them credit for their ability to use a particular piece of equipment to live off of the land.

The hatchet, however, was found to be a very useful article on the march –they had no tents; but with their hatchets would in a short time form themselves a secure shelter from the weather, on encamping at night.²¹

The hatchet also performed a role as a weapon for the American militiaman, and a British officer that served in North America during the War of 1812 wrote:

In fact, the backwoodsmen of Kentucky and Ohio . . . differ very immaterially from the natives in their appearance . . . and the knife and hatchet are as formidable weapons with them as they are with the Indians²²

The types of firearms that were employed by the armed forces of the time varied with the types of units employed. Regulars carried the standard service arm and militia soldiers that were not equipped from government stores carried personal weapons.²³

The type of personal rifle that a militia soldier was likely to use is often called the long rifle or Kentucky rifle. The rifle was accurate in excess of two hundred yards. The Kentucky rifle of this period was a flintlock between .32 and .38 caliber and had varying barrel lengths up to about 48-inches. Even though the rifle was an accurate weapon it was generally not suitable for military service because it did not accept a bayonet and it took about twice as long to load as a musket because of the rifling. The regulars from the Rifle Regiment were equipped with the Model 1803 rifle, a weapon similar in design to the Kentucky rifle. The fact that this rifle has the same limitations as its civilian counterpart is probably the reason that the riflemen were equipped with muskets during the Battle of Tippecanoe.²⁴

Muskets, on the other hand, while only effective between eighty and one hundred yards, allowed massed ranks to fire more rapidly and attack the enemy with

bayonets. There were also various types of ammunition employed during this period. The standard "one ounce ball" of ammunition could be supplemented with three buckshot. This configuration was called "buck and ball." During the Tippecanoe battle the soldiers used a load of twelve buckshot rather than the standard ball.²⁵

Indian Confederacy

Indian warriors relied on their traditional weapons as well as firearms. Traditional weapons included scalping knives, tomahawks, and war clubs as well as the bow and arrow. Trade with Europeans and Americans significantly improved the quality of the Indian weapons and tomahawks with stone blades were replaced with ones that were made of steel or iron. Trade also ensured that rifles and muskets were available to the Indians. British government agents from Canada often supplied the Indians with firearms, lead, and powder.

The war club was a heavy weapon about two feet in length and made of ironwood or maple with a large ball or knot at the end. Indian bows were usually of one piece construction and made from ash, hickory, or oak. The traditional tomahawk was replaced with one of European or American manufacture. These improved hatchets, called trade tomahawks, were often a combination tomahawk and pipe.²⁶

Indian flintlocks, acquired through trade with Europeans, were called trade fusils or tradeguns. The Hudson Bay Company and Northwest Company produced large numbers of these weapons. These Northwest guns, as later model trade fusils are often called, probably derive their name from the association with the Northwest company in lower Canada or because of their widespread employment on the American frontier. During the 1790s, Great Britain began to issue firearms of the trade fusil pattern to North American Indians. The weapons, known as presentation fusils because they were

gifts to the Indians, were a method to maintain Indian loyalty. The presentation fusils were generally .60 caliber with 36-inch barrels and were produced under crown contract until sometime around 1815. The presentation fusil is probably one of the more common firearms used by the Indians during the Battle of Tippecanoe.²⁷

A warrior's personal equipment might consist of a blanket and extra moccasins or the materials to repair or make new moccasins. Warriors also carried cord to bind prisoners, personal weapons, a powder horn, and bullet bag. The individual warrior often carried a pouch containing medicine to treat wounds. Rations were usually carried in a bearskin bag. Parched corn mixed with maple-sugar was one of the more common individual rations. Most Indians carried some device that had spiritual significance for the owner. A sacred war bundle containing charms that represented ones ancestry, symbolized past victories, and had magical powers to protect the owner was common.²⁸

Training Doctrine

United States Forces

Doctrine during the nineteenth-century consisted of a few regulations about drill and formations, how to establish encampments, and how to post guards. In 1811 the United States Army still used the same drill and field service regulation developed by Baron Von Steuben during the Revolutionary War.²⁹ Much of what a commander did in the field depended on his personal experience. Harrison's concept of military doctrine evolved from personal study and what he learned from General Anthony Wayne. It seems that the two important lessons that Harrison learned from Wayne relate to the importance of training and maintaining security while in the field.

The regulations developed by Baron Von Steuben focused on procedures for drilling individuals and formations. Although the major emphasis of the regulations was

drill they did address tactical movements through defiles and prescribed procedures for establishing an encampment and posting guards. During the initial stages of the army's organization Harrison made efforts to properly train the force to conduct operations against the Indians. In order to prepare for combat the command conducted several training exercises. *Tipton's Journal* makes several references to training events or "sham battles." The army's headquarters also published orders that directed training exercises prior to the army's departure from Fort Harrison.³⁰

It is also important to note that Harrison modified many of the procedures in Von Steuben's regulations to fit the Indian threat. Harrison modified standards for camp organization, reveille, and guard duty during the campaign. According to the regulation, commanders positioned units in an encampment in a square or rectangular manner with specified areas for officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and the logistical wagons. Guards patrolled the outside of the camp on avenues of approach and on the interior of the camp near the wagons and mess areas. Troops paraded without weapons at reveille for roll call.³¹ Figure 9 shows an example of a camp layout in accordance with the regulations of the era.

Harrison modified all of these procedures and had units sleep in the immediate vicinity of their battle positions with their weapons and equipment worn. Guards formed a tight ring around the camp and Harrison directed that the command would be alert and at their posts before reveille. Although Von Steuben does not discuss the use of breastworks it seems that this was an accepted practice if the threat dictated it, and in any case it was a procedure that Harrison knew.³²




Fig. 9. Specifications for a regulation camp organization are from Frederick William Von Steuben, *Baron Von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual A Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition* (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1985) 75-79, 91-95.

There was another uniquely American aspect of training that Harrison probably emphasized and that was marksmanship. Europeans emphasized volume of fire during infantry combat and trained accordingly. In fact, some armies did not bother to teach their soldiers to aim their muskets. American's emphasized marksmanship training to reinforce the American practice of firing aimed shots in battle.³³ The effect of this American practice was often devastating. Shabonee saw the effects of American marksmanship while on a scouting mission for the Prophet and commented that "I saw some of the men shoot squirrels, as they rode along, and I said, the Indians have no

such guns. These men will kill us as far as they can see.”³⁴ A British officer that fought against United States troops during the War of 1812 remarked that:

... the English soldier, in particular, has but little chance with the American rifleman, who conscious of his advantage, and taking a deliberate aim, seldom fails to attain his object. . . .³⁵

Indian Confederacy

The Indian confederacy does not appear to have had a systematic training program, although it does seem that Prophet's Town was a type of training center for the Indian confederacy. The types of daily life and training events that occurred in the village were probably not significantly different from those experienced during routine village life. Northwestern Indian tribes did not fight in the same disciplined and organized style that an American or European professional force used. Consequently, there would be little utility for Indians to train in the regimented style associated with professional armies.

Prophet's Town was a large village and was probably organized in the traditional style of the woodland Indians. Large villages of the period consisted of streets and a number of living areas called wigwams. The wigwams were bark covered structures with hides hung over the entrances as doors. Although the village had a variable population over the years, it was probably large enough to house about 1,000 warriors and 300 family members.³⁶

The training regime at Prophet's Town was martial and religious in nature. The Prophet was the spiritual leader of the confederacy (under the guidance of Tecumseh). The Prophet provided the spiritual direction through his lectures, prophecies, and prayers. The Prophet oriented his discussions on values that included a return to the traditional Indian lifestyle, and separation of white and Indian cultures. The martial

aspect of the training focused on hunting, manufacturing equipment needed for battle, and athletic contests. The athletics ran the gamut of activities from running and wrestling contests to sports that required the use of weapon skills such as the bow and arrow and war clubs.³⁷

Tactical Doctrine

United States Forces

There were several different types of maneuver forces employed during the campaign. Harrison's army consisted of units that were designated as infantry, riflemen, mounted infantry, and dragoons. Although there was not a great deal of written doctrine about how to employ each type of unit there were some general principles that did evolve.

The employment of mounted elements was an area significantly lacking in American military doctrinal development. The American army did not develop a complex set of tactical doctrine and drills for cavalry as European armies had. During the Revolutionary War, horses were mainly used as mounts for officers and messengers. Mounted units were usually assembled for emergencies and then disbanded. Although the American tactical experience with mounted troops was limited, small amounts of cavalry formations were used during the Revolutionary War and General Wayne's Legion included a troop of dragoons in every sub-legion and a compliment of mounted volunteers.³⁸

The general principles of the age divided mounted troops into units of dragoons and cavalry. Dragoons were soldiers that were trained to fight either mounted or on foot. The dragoons usually carried pistols, light swords, and carbines. Cavalry, on the other hand, were trained to fight exclusively on horseback and their equipment

consisted of a heavy saber and pistols. Mounted troops were employed to scout, protect flanks, and pursue or flank an enemy. The shock effect of a cavalry charge was also designed to break up an enemy formation. The American distinction between cavalry and dragoons was hazy at best. To confuse doctrinal matters more, the American militia on the frontier added another mounted arm: the mounted riflemen, who used his mount for transportation and dismounted to engage the enemy with rifle fire.³⁹

American Infantry formations were similar to European formations and imitated European tactical doctrine to a large degree. linear formations that deployed into two ranks were commonplace. Units moved to the battle area in open platoon columns and then deployed into line. Infantry formations relied on the line because it was the battle formation that brought the most weapons to bear on the enemy and produced the greatest volume of fire. Unlike their European counterparts who used three ranks, the Americans used two ranks because it allowed an organization to cover more ground. The American formations also relied on aimed rifle and musket fires to increase the lethality and effectiveness of their formations.⁴⁰

Artillery was another important arm to compliment infantry and cavalry formations but it did not play a role at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Some of the literature indicates that Harrison took a few small canons as part of his expeditionary force, however, there are no references regarding its actual employment during the battle. It is unlikely that canon fires were employed during most of the battle because of the potential for fratricide, since any canons would probably be positioned on the inside of the perimeter and would have to fire over the heads of the soldiers on the line of battle, a difficult task for a direct fire weapon system (eighteen-century artillery was a direct fire weapon unlike today's artillery which is an indirect fire weapon).

An important combat multiplier for Harrison's army was the intelligence function. Nineteenth-century armies did not have doctrinal methods to conduct intelligence operations. The scope and success of any intelligence operation was almost completely left to the proficiency of the commander to gather and interpret data. Harrison developed an intelligence network that included government agents, traders, whites that had lived among the Indians, and Indian informants. Part of the reason that Harrison's intelligence gathering operations were successful is because he relied on people that were familiar with Indian culture and custom. In this way Harrison was able to properly interpret indicators of hostility such as the exchange of war wampum belts or war dancing at councils. Harrison also developed sources that could help him confirm information. After Tecumseh told Harrison that he was going south to recruit additional members for the confederacy, Harrison immediately dispatched spies to find out when Tecumseh actually departed.⁴¹

Harrison also maintained a small tactical intelligence gathering capability with the Spies and Guides. The small detachment conducted reconnaissance for the main body during the march. The various mounted elements were also used by Harrison to increase his reconnaissance and security capability. Spencer's Yellow Jackets were a detached element that reported to Harrison and his staff. The Yellow Jackets conducted reconnaissance and security tasks such as finding fords or screening to the flanks or in front of the main body.

A unique force protection measure of the era was to take hostages. In order to ensure that each side would honor truces, hostages could be exchanged between the hostile factions. Eustis addressed the idea of taking hostages in his 18 September 1811 letter to Harrison. Harrison's officers also encouraged him to take hostages before the

battle.⁴² Harrison apparently did not feel that the measure was needed and declined to take any Indians as hostage. In any case, there were no guarantees that the measure would prove successful or that Harrison could ensure the safety of the hostages and protect them from members of his own command.

Indian Confederacy

Indian warfare was decentralized although they did go to war to achieve operational or strategic goals. Indians might go to war for several reasons such as honor and prestige, dreams, or revenge, which is why a brave might form his own war party. The Indian confederacies of the post-Revolutionary war period were not the first to try to achieve operational or strategic objectives. The Iroquois Indians provide an example of an intertribal war at the operational level. Near the end of the seventeenth-century, Iroquois war parties attacked south into Virginia, east to the Atlantic coast, north to the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers, and almost as far west as the Mississippi River. The Iroquois began the war because they wanted to eliminate their competitors in the fur trade with the Europeans, clearly an operational goal.⁴³

Indian war parties usually employed ambushes or raids as their primary offensive tactics. Indian operations were normally dismounted and some war parties were able to travel twenty-five miles a day. Indians usually organized into three groups while on the march: scouts, a main body, and hunters to sustain the force. War parties usually moved during the day until they were within two or three days of the enemy; once they were within a few days of the enemy they moved at night. War parties made their final preparations for an attack close to the objective area. These final preparations included a rudimentary sand table style rehearsal, singing medicine songs, and building litters to assist in the recovery of wounded personnel. Individuals within the war party were also

designated to carry extra supplies of medicine, corn, and water. Another brave was usually designated to beat a drum to inspire the war party as they conducted the assault.⁴⁴ The last collective action was to move into ambush, battle, or attack positions.

On signal the war party attacked. After the initial contact, the preliminary battle plan was often discarded and the skirmish became a series of personal fights. Examples of individual courage were valued in Indian society so the warriors normally fought as individuals, rather than as part of a team that conducted coordinated movements to achieve an objective. After an attack some war parties might remain on the battlefield for a cannibalistic feast (this was not common practice among most woodland Indian cultures). Normally, a war party looted as quickly as possible and began moving back to their home territory. Taking prisoners as well as scalps was a very prestigious event; the prisoners were often tortured to death once the war party returned home. Although there was a great deal of distinction associated with capturing enemy personnel, war parties did not hesitate to kill prisoners that impeded their march back to safe territory.⁴⁵

The triumph of an Indian attack over an adversary relied on individual effort rather than collective discipline. The difference between victory and defeat for a war party might also rely on how quickly the war party exfiltrated from enemy territory and returned to a relatively safe region. These factors made it extremely difficult for Indian armies to conduct complex operations such as pursuits. Indians did not have the command and control capability for that type of operation since collective discipline was lost as soon as an attack began and actions on the objective immediately following an

attack often focused on looting, cultural rituals, or exfiltration. Successful Indian attacks usually culminated in the immediate area of the objective.

The Indian forces at Tippecanoe organized into three basic attacking elements. Three war chiefs led the attack and the Prophet observed the battle from a hillside about 500 yards from the encampment. Estimates on the size of the Indian force at Tippecanoe range from 300 to 900 Indians. Groups from several tribes participated in the attack and bands of Shawnee, Ottawa, Chippewa, Potawatomi, Wyandot, Kickapoo, Winnebago, and Sacs are reported to have been present. Individuals, whose tribes were not part of the confederacy also fought at Tippecanoe. Two of the assault leaders, White Loon and Stone Eater, were members of the Miami tribe which was not a part of the confederacy.⁴⁶

The Indian confederacy also conducted extensive intelligence operations. Most of the Indian intelligence gathering that relates to the Tippecanoe campaign seems to be tactical in nature. The confederacy began collecting intelligence as the army assembled at Vincennes. Indians met Harrison at Vincennes to reassure him that the Prophet was not a threat. The real purpose for their trips to Vincennes was to gather intelligence on the army. The Prophet continued to employ scouts to conduct reconnaissance while the army was at Fort Harrison. Overall the Prophet's intelligence operations were not successful during the campaign. The confederacy lost contact with the army after they crossed the Wabash River. The loss of contact contributed to the failure of the Prophet's efforts to delay Harrison's approach through negotiation.

¹From Harrison's report on the campaign to Secretary of War Eustis on 18 November 1811, in Draper Mss. 1X41.

²In addition to the 4th U.S., 7th U.S., and Rifle Regiment, the 2nd U.S. was represented at the battle. Captain Piatt was assigned to the 2nd U.S. and served as Harrison's Quartermaster.

³Weigley, 97-105.

⁴William H. Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1957) 11; and John K. Mahon *The American Militia: Decade of Decision, 1789-1800* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1960) 6-7.

⁵Urwin, 30. U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sect. 8.

⁶Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army, from its Organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903* vol. 2 (Washington: GPO, 1903) 570-571; Matloff, ed., 115; and Weigley, 109, 115-116. The 1808 act authorized seven infantry regiments, one rifle regiment, one light dragoon regiment, one light artillery regiment, one artillery regiment, and an engineer corps. Total authorized strength was 9, 921 officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted soldiers.

⁷Dan Hill, *The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1964) 9; Steuben, "Appendix: United States Militia Act" *Baron Von Steuben's Revolutionary War Drill Manual: Facsimile Reprint of the 1794 Edition* (New York: Dover Publications, 1985) no pagination; and Weigley, 94. The Militia Act required members to have a musket or firelock, bayonet and belt, two spare flints, knapsack, a pouch with a box that contained not less than twenty-four cartridges; or a good rifle, knapsack, shot pouch, powder horn, twenty balls, and one quarter pound of powder.

⁸Mahon, *Decade*, 1-2; and Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 18, 67. During the War of 1812 the governors of Connecticut and Massachusetts initially refused to release their militias for federal service. In 1813, both states relented but would only allow their militias to be used to guard their own state coasts. Shortly before the War of 1812 Congress authorized the formation of several volunteer units. Volunteer units could be used generally without restriction regarding geographic location. This was important since part of the theater of war included a foreign country (Canada).

⁹Mahon, *History*, 58, 66; and Riker, 21-22. A member of a militia unit that damaged his rifle would have to pay about \$13.00 for a new one; a large sum at the time.

¹⁰Carter, ed., 126, 130-131; and Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 547-548. The letters are dated 11 July 1811, 21 August 1811, and 22 August 1811. The letters authorize Harrison to move into the new purchase with a respectable force that would consist of regulars and militia. When Eustis wrote the letters he believed that problems with the Indians at Prophet's Town could be solved without violence. The pattern of

letters between the Secretary of War, Harrison, and the President prior to August 1811 indicate a desire to resolve the situation peacefully. In March 1811, Eustis told Harrison to defer his plans for establishing a post in the new purchase because the President wanted to avoid any "uneasiness" with the area tribes (113-114). In May 1811, the government issued a proclamation of public sale for the lands gained by the Treaty of Fort Wayne (119). This indicates that the government meant to settle the area which would probably not help to resolve the issue peacefully. Finally in September 1811, Eustis authorized Harrison to compel the Prophet to disperse by force if necessary. The letter also authorizes Harrison to establish a post in the new purchase (133-134). Regarding calling out the militia and the issue of their payment, Harrison, as governor, had the authority to call out the militia and he also felt that a significant body of volunteers could be raised. A local merchant, Charles Smith, who was also a lieutenant in the militia, covered the government's debt and the militia soldiers were paid for their prior service. Pay receipts for some members of the militia that served at Tippecanoe can be found in the *Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Soldiers Who Served From 1784-1811*, (Microfilm, copy number M905, roll numbers 22 and 32). A private was paid \$6.66 per month, a sergeant, \$8.00 per month. The foragemaster, Lieutenant Bunting, was paid \$25.00 per month for his duties. Lieutenant Berry (KIA, 7 Nov 1811) earned \$33.33 per month.

¹¹Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984) 227-229; Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 35; and Maxwell, ed., 130-131. Geometric shapes or stick figures were incorporated into the design of the wampum belt and each had special significance. A row of white diamond shapes connected together might represent a chain of friendship, a black bird in the design might represent bad news, and a raised hatchet might represent war.

¹²Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 20; and Maxwell, ed., 126; and Raymond Scheele, "Warfare of the Iroquois and their Northern Neighbors" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1950), 30.

¹³Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984) 187-189, 226, 229; Maxwell, ed., 129; and Scheele, 29-30. Lighting the council fire signified that the council was in session. There was not a set duration for council meetings and councils could last days or weeks. Americans often adopted this practice of councils when treating with Indians. After the Battle of Fallen Timbers, General Wayne invited the Indian leaders to a council at Greenville. The council fire for the Treaty of Greenville negotiations was lit on 15 June 1795. 1,100 Indians representing twelve tribes were present at the negotiations. The negotiations lasted more than six weeks and the council officially closed on 10 August 1795. Wayne also issued peace wampum belts to each group of Indians as they arrived at Greenville.

¹⁴Duncan J. Campbell and Edgar M. Howell, *American Military Insignia 1800-1851* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1963) 7.

¹⁵Campbell and Howell, 11-12; Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 658; and Philip Katcher, *U.S. Infantry Equipments 1775-1910* (Great Britain: Osprey, 1989) Plate B,

46. Pants or pantaloons were authorized during at the time of the Battle of Tippecanoe. On 6 December 1811 the 4th U.S. issued an order that forbid soldiers from cutting off their pantaloons which indicates that at least some of the soldiers were issued pantaloons.

¹⁶Campbell and Howell, 11-12; and John R. Elting, ed., *Military Uniforms in America Volume II: Years of Growth 1796-1851* (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1977) 40-41.

¹⁷Bacon, 26-27.

¹⁸Green, 120.

¹⁹Walker, 13.

²⁰Ibid., 12-13.

²¹Ibid., 13.

²²Klinck, ed., 199.

²³Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 484, 585. A 10 November 1810 letter from Harrison to Eustis indicates that pistols and horseman's swords were ordered for the mounted militia. The equipment was to be deposited at Newport, KY. Any deficiencies in arms and equipment were to be made up from these public stores. Soldiers armed with muskets were to be issued twenty-four rounds of ammunition and riflemen were to receive 1/2 lb. of powder and 1 lb. of lead.

²⁴Beard, 61; M. L. Brown, *Firearms in Colonial America: The Impact on History and Technology 1492-1792* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1980) 264-267, 272-273; Draper 1X42; Elting, ed., 40-41; G. W. P. Swenson, *Pictorial History of the Rifle* (New York: Bonanza Books, 1972) 19; and Urwin, 26. The original Kentucky rifles were actually made by German and Swiss gunsmiths in the Pennsylvania Colony before the Revolutionary War. The Kentucky rifle is also called the Pennsylvania rifle or Pennsylvania-Kentucky rifle.

²⁵Draper Mss. 1X44; Urwin, 25; and Walker, 24.

²⁶Johnson, *American Indians of the Southeast* (Great Britain: Osprey, 1995) 18; Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 22; and Maxwell, ed., 127.

²⁷Brown, 366-368.

²⁸Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 20, 23; and Maxwell, ed., 126, 149.

²⁹Frederick William Steuben, "Publisher's Note" no pagination; and Urwin, 25. Steuben's manual was the official army regulation from 1779-1812.

³⁰Cleaves, 88, 93; and Cockrum, 254. Tipton notes sham battles on 8, 26, and 27 October 1811. Cleaves discusses a training exercise conducted on 22 October 1811. Cockrum has copies of the orders published by Harrison's headquarters directing training on 23 October 1811. Cleaves notes that at the end of October 1811, Harrison wrote to the secretary of war that "I have used every exertion in my power to perfect them in the maneuvers which they are to perform."

³¹Steuben, 75-79, 86, 91-94; and Walker, 21, 34-35. The procedure used throughout the campaign to form a line of battle was for the soldiers to step five paces in front of their tents. Harrison also directed that the units form in single ranks. These procedures allowed units to form quickly with minimum confusion. As lessons were learned during the campaign procedures were modified. After the Indian attack, fires were still used but they were built outside of the line of sentinels. Any fires in camp were extinguished when the soldiers went to sleep. This put an attacking enemy between the line of battle and the fires. The sentry procedures were also modified after the battle. The sentries put a stake in the ground at a man's height and then draped a blanket and hat on the stake. The sentry then moved to cover behind a log or tree to watch his post. Prior to the battle the sentries walked their posts.

³²Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 604-605; Pirtle, 52; and Steuben, 75-79, 86, 91-94. Harrison's written order published 27 September 1811 established the SOP for camp guards and the order of march.

³³Gifford, 319-320; and Urwin, 26, 34. General Wayne was noted for his emphasis on marksmanship training while organizing and training the American Legion.

³⁴Whickar, ed., 355.

³⁵Klinck, ed., 199-200.

³⁶James A. Maxwell, ed., *America's Fascinating Indian Heritage* (New York: The Reader's Digest Association, 1978) 112; and McCollough, ed., 25.

³⁷Drake, 105; McCollough, ed., 25; and Scheele, 51.

³⁸Swafford Johnson, *History of the U. S. Cavalry* (Greenwich: Crescent Books, 1985) 12-14, 22, 26, 32; and Matloff, ed., 112-113. There were four sub-legions in the Legion. The first cavalry manual for the United States Army was written by Phil Kearny in the 1830s.

³⁹Elting, ed., 50; and Swafford Johnson, 12-14, 22.

⁴⁰Steven Ross, *From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics, 1740-1866* (Cranbury: Associated University Press, Inc., 1979) 25-27, 179; and Urwin, 26.

⁴¹Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984) 427-428.

⁴²Cleaves, 96.

⁴³Scheele, 17-20.

⁴⁴Johnson, *Woodland Indians*, 20, 24; and Scheele, 17, 34, 53.

⁴⁵Scheele, 36, 39-41.

⁴⁶See Cockrum, 269 for a list of the tribes in the attack. Eckert *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984) 438; Edmunds, *Quest*, 159; and Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 604-605, 628. Accurate figures for the Indian confederacy's strength during the attack have never been determined. Eckert believes that there were just over 300 Indians in the attack while Edmunds reports Indian strength as between 600 and 700. Harrison was not sure of the numbers of Indians in the attack and received varying reports on Indian strength throughout the campaign. Harrison's 8 November 1811, report remarks that Indian strength must have been considerable. On 18 November 1811, Harrison wrote that "I am possessed of no data by which I can form a correct statement. It must have been considerable and perhaps not much inferior to our own." See Draper Mss. 1X40, 1X44. A few weeks before the attack Harrison was fairly certain that the prophet had at least 350 of his own warriors and revised this to 450 later on. As the army moved toward Prophet's Town it encountered several large trails leading from the Illinois River area toward Prophet's Town; Harrison began to believe that the Prophet was joined by a substantial number of additional Indians and revised his estimate to about 600 Indians.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES ORDER OF BATTLE

... should you defeat the American army, you have not done. Another will come; and if you defeat that, still another--one like waves of the Greatwater, overwhelming and sweeping you from the face of the earth.¹

Chief Little Turtle, *Remark to Tecumseh*

William Henry Harrison published his order assuming command of the expeditionary force on 16 September 1811. Harrison also published a series of orders that described the organization of the army. The infantry formed one brigade commanded by Colonel Boyd. Regular army infantry units were commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Miller (4th U.S.) and Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew commanded the militia infantry. Lieutenant Colonel Miller became ill and remained at Fort Harrison. Major Floyd assumed Miller's duties and Captain Baen was appointed as acting major.² Figure 10 shows the infantry task organization.

The same series of orders (and subsequent guidance when additional mounted units arrived) established the organizational structure for the various mounted units. Joseph Daviess from Kentucky was commissioned as a major in the Indiana militia and placed in command of the Dragoons. General Samuel Wells of the Kentucky militia was also commissioned as a major in the Indiana militia and placed in command of a mounted battalion. Spencer's Yellow Jackets were designated as a detached corps that would report to General Harrison and his staff.³ Figure 11 shows the task organization for mounted units.

In addition to his duties as the infantry brigade commander, Colonel Boyd served as Harrison's second in command with the rank of "acting brigadier general." In order to fulfill his duties, the order of battle shows that Boyd had two staffs to support him in his

dual role. As the second in command and commander of troops (Harrison was the commander in chief and the expedition commander), Harrison assigned Boyd an aide de camp and an adjutant. As the infantry brigade commander, Boyd had his normal staff from the 4th U.S. available. Boyd was not the only soldier with multiple duties, some members of Boyd's 4th U.S. staff also filled dual roles and worked on Harrison's staff as well as Boyd's.




Fig. 10. Infantry Task Organization, 6-7 November 1811. Lieutenant Colonel Miller is not reflected as part of this organizational chart because Miller remained behind at Fort Harrison. Major Floyd assumed Miller's field duties and responsibilities after the army departed from Fort Harrison.




Fig. 11. Mounted Elements Task Organization, 6-7 November 1811.

United States Order of Battle

The companies varied in size during the campaign. The 4th U.S. deployed to the Indiana Territory under strength because of troop illness and desertions. The elements from the 7th U.S. and The Rifle Regiment were both small detachments rather than full strength companies. The size of militia and volunteer companies varied from region to region. The unit size really depended upon the number of eligible men and the recruiting ability of the man organizing the unit. Officers were commissioned into the state militia by the governor. Volunteer organizations elected their officers.

The following list is the United States order of battle for the Tippecanoe campaign, 16 September 1811 to 18 November 1811. Unit strengths, when known, are listed next to the unit as: (officer/NCO/privates). Any soldier that was promoted during the campaign is only counted once and counted in the strength of his original grade. For example, John Tipton was promoted from private to ensign on 21 October 1811, and to captain on 7 November 1811. Rather than count Tipton several times, he is counted once as a private for strength purposes. Soldiers with special duties such as musicians, saddlers, and trumpeters are counted in the NCO endstrength.⁴

Commander

Governor William Henry Harrison, Commander-in-Chief.

General Staff

Lieutenant Colonel William McFarland, Adjutant General

Colonel Abraham Owen, Aide de Camp (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Major Henry Hurst, Aide de Camp

Major Waller Taylor, Aide de Camp

Major Marston G. Clark, Aide de Camp

Thomas Randolph (Civilian), Acting Aide de Camp (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Captain Piatt, Chief Quartermaster

Captain Robert Buntin, Quartermaster of the Militia

Dr. Josiah Foster, Chief Surgeon

Dr. Hosea Blood, Surgeon's Mate

Second Lieutenant Robert Bunting Jr., Indiana Militia Foragemaster

The Troops

Colonel Boyd, Commander of the Brigade with the rank of Brigadier General

George Croghan, Aide de Camp

Lieutenant Nathan Adams, Adjutant

Field and Staff of Indiana Militia

Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Major Regin Redman, Aide de Camp

Sergeant Major Chapman Dunslow

Field and Staff of Indiana Infantry Militia

Lieutenant Colonel Luke Decker (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Sergeant Major William Ready

Field and Staff of Dragoons of Indiana Militia

Major Joseph H. Daviess (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Major Benjamin Parke (Promoted, 7 Nov 1811)

Sergeant Major William Prince

Captain Spier Spencer's Company of Mounted Riflemen of the Indiana Militia (4/10/46)⁵

Captain Spier Spencer (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Captain John Tipton (Promoted, 7 Nov 1811)

Spies and Guides of the Indiana Militia (1/0/18)⁶

Captain Toussant Dubois

Company of Indiana Militia (4/7/48)

Captain Jacob Warrick (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Lieutenant Thomas Montgomery (Commander from 7 to 9 Nov 1811)

Captain James Smith (Assumed command on 9 Nov 1811)

Company of Mounted Riflemen of the Indiana Militia (3/5/69)

Captain David Robb

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/11/57)

Captain John Norris (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/6/59)

Captain William Hargrove

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (8/4/66)

Captain Thomas Scott

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/8/37)

Captain Walter Wilson

Company of Infantry of Indiana Militia (3/8/6)

Captain Andrew Wilkins

Company of Riflemen of Indiana Militia (3/10/56)

Captain John Bigger

Detachment of Mounted Riflemen of Indiana Militia (1/1/20)

Lieutenant Thomas Berry (KIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Light Dragoons of Indiana Militia (4/9/70)

Captain Benjamin Parke (Promoted to major, 7 Nov 1811)

Company of Light Dragoons of Indiana Militia (5/9/20)

Captain Charles Beggs

Field and Staff of a Battalion of Kentucky Light Dragoons

Major Samuel Wells

Company of Kentucky Mounted Militia (3/7/18)

Captain Peter Funk

Company of Mounted Riflemen of Kentucky Militia (3/9/50)

Captain Frederick Geiger (WIA, 7 Nov 1811)

Field and Staff of the 4th U.S. Infantry⁷

Colonel John Boyd

Lieutenant Colonel James Miller

Lieutenant Colonel Zebulon Pike⁸

Major G. R. C. Floyd

Sergeant Major Winthrop Ayre

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/9/50)

Captain Josiah Snelling

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/9/50)

George W. Prescott

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/7/38)

Captain William C. Baen (Acting major, DOW, 9 Nov 1811)

First Lieutenant Charles Larrabee (Commander, 7 Nov 1811)

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/9/42)

Captain Joel Cook

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (3/8/35)

Captain Return B. Brown

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/5/21)

Captain Robert C. Barton

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (4/9/61)⁹

First Lieutenant Charles Fuller

Infantry Company, 4th U.S. (2/8/21)¹⁰

First Lieutenant O. G. Burton

Infantry Company, 7th U.S. (25 total)¹¹

Lieutenant Albright

Company of Riflemen, The Rifle Regiment (2/8/28)¹²

Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins

	KIA	DOW	WIA
AIDE DE CAMP	1		
LIEUTENANT COLONELS			2
MAJORS		1	
ADJUTANT			1
SURGEON'S MATE			1
CAPTAINS	1	2	2
SUBALTERNS	2		3
SERGEANTS	1		9
CORPORALS	2		5
MUSICIANS			1
PRIVATES	30	22	102
TOTAL	37	25	126

Fig. 12. United States Casualties, Tippecanoe Campaign. The report was copied from war department records. The report only shows one aide killed in action. Randolph was a civilian aide and may not be reflected in military records. *Source:* Draper Mss. 1X4.

¹Jennings C. Wise, *The Red Man in the New World Drama: A Politico-legal Study, with a Pageantry of American Indian History* (Washington DC: W. F. Roberts Co., 1931), 325.

²Beard, 47-49; Draper Mss. 1X41-44; Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 597, 604. Brigade order dated 25 October 1811.

³Beard, 47-49; and Draper Mss. 1X41-44.

⁴Beard, 102-133; Cockrum, 279-308; Draper Mss. 1X43; Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 569-570, 632. Heitman, 391; Pirtle, 35; Reid, 16-30; and Walker, 84-85. The dates of the campaign were determined based on two orders issued by Harrison's headquarters. The first order was a "Military Order" dated 16 September 1811 in which Harrison assumes command of the military expedition. A Brigade order which is dated 18 November 1811 dissolves the brigade. If an officer was KIA or WIA during the battle, and his replacement is known, the replacement is listed along with other relevant data. This order of battle only lists key personnel and more complete rosters are available in Beard, Cockrum, and Pirtle. However, even these rosters are not complete since unit strengths for the 7th U.S. are missing and all of Harrison's personal staff are not reflected. There were at least two Negro men that accompanied the army, at least one of whom was Harrison's personal servant (probably a slave). Several sources, including Harrison's correspondence and reports, refer to the two men and their presence during the campaign. One of the main reasons to maintain an army roster was to record an individual's campaign participation for pay purposes, and since slaves and other types of servants were not eligible for militia service, and hence were not compensated financially, there was no reason to include them on these types of documents.

⁵This company was known as Spencer's Yellow Jackets. The Yellow Jackets were under the direct control of General Harrison's headquarters for reporting purposes and taskings.

⁶This company reported directly to General Harrison.

⁷Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 646. A regimental order dated 23 November 1811 assigned Lieutenants Burton (Welch's company), Fuller (Wentworth's company), and Larrabee (Baen's company) to permanent command of their respective companies. The same regimental order promoted several enlisted soldiers, most of whom were recognized for their good conduct in action at Tippecanoe.

⁸Trevor Dupuy, et. al., *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military Biography* (New York: Castle Books, 1995), 598; Zebulon Pike, *Zebulon Pike's Arkansas Journal: In Search of the Southern Louisiana Purchase Boundary Line* ed. by Stephen Hart and Archer Butler (Colorado Springs, CO: Stewart Commission of Colorado and the Denver Public Library, 1932), xivi; and John Terrell, *Zebulon Pike: The Life and Times of an Adventurer* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1968), 46-149. Several years prior to the Battle of Tippecanoe, Lieutenant Colonel Zebulon Pike led the expedition that is credited with the discovery of Pike's Peak, and the mountain is named in his honor. After the

Battle of Tippecanoe, Pike was promoted to colonel of the 15th U.S. in July 1812. Pike was later promoted to brigadier general in March 1813. Pike led the successful American attack on York, Upper Canada (Toronto) in April 1813. Pike was seriously wounded in a powder magazine explosion after the initial assault of York. Pike died of his wounds on 27 April 1813 shortly after being informed that the British forces had surrendered.

⁹Beard, 119. This company was formerly commanded by Captain Paul Wentworth and is sometimes referred to as "Wentworth's company." Wentworth resigned from the service on 29 October 1811.

¹⁰Beard, 120. This company was formerly commanded by Captain Welch and is sometimes referred to as "Welch's company."

¹¹Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 646. In May 1810, Secretary Eustis informed Governor Harrison that Captain Posey and a company (7th U.S.) would move from the detachment at Newport, Kentucky to Vincennes and report to Harrison for further instructions. The company was actually about twenty-five soldiers that were attached to the 4th U.S.; Albright commanded the company during the battle of Tippecanoe. Harrison refers to the company as "Posey's company of the 7th Regt. headed by Lieut. Albright." See Draper Mss. 1X43 and Carter, 20.

¹²Beard, 119, 121; Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 646; and Walker, 5. There were about sixteen soldiers from this company at the Battle. The difference between Esarey's figures and those on the army roll might be because of illness, or the performance of details or duties elsewhere (the blockhouse, Fort Harrison, etc.). This is the company formerly commanded by Captain Whitney. There is also another Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins in the 4th U.S.; Second Lieutenant Abraham Hawkins was assigned to Captain Burton's company.

APPENDIX C

CHRONOLOGY

<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
1754	French and Indian War begins (called the Seven Years War in Europe).
1763	French and Indian War ends. England gains Canada and French possessions east of the Mississippi River.
1763	Proclamation of 1763. Great Britain issues a Proclamation that restricts the authority of Colonial governments to administer territory and establish settlements west of the Allegheny Mountains. The interior region west of the Allegheny Mountains is set aside for Indian use, and administered by the Royal Government in England. The purpose of the Proclamation is to separate Indian and Colonial settlements.
1775	American Revolution begins. Almost all Indian tribes in the American northwest are allied with Great Britain.
1776	Declaration of Independence.
1779	Americans seize Vincennes from the British.
1781	Articles of Confederation adopted by the United States. Cornwallis surrenders to Washington at Yorktown.
1783	Treaty of Paris ends the American Revolution. The United States gains possession of all British territory east of the Mississippi and south of Canada. The new American territory includes the Indian Territory protected by the Proclamation of 1763.
1787	Constitution adopted by the United States. Northwest Ordinance adopted. The ordinance established the Northwest Territory (present day Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota). The ordinance stated the conditions for statehood and directed that the area would become no less than three and no more than five states.
1789	The United States Constitution becomes effective. George Washington becomes first President of the United States. Washington establishes a policy of settling the area that would become the Northwest Territory by giving land grants to ex-soldiers or offering the land for sale at extremely inexpensive prices.
1790	Harmar's expedition. Indian forces, led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, defeat American forces led by General Josiah Harmar.

- 1791 St. Clair's defeat. Indian forces, led by Chiefs Little Turtle and Blue Jacket, defeat American forces led by General Arthur St. Clair. The defeat is the worst defeat of American arms during the Indian Wars. Only twenty-four Americans are not wounded or killed--over 900 Americans are engaged.
- 1792 Kentucky becomes a state.
- 1793 War between Britain and France begins, the United States declares neutrality.
- 1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers. American forces led by General Anthony "Mad Anthony" Wayne defeat Indian forces led by Chief Blue Jacket.
- 1795 Treaty of Greenville, a result of the American victory at Fallen Timbers. The United States cedes much of the Northwest Territory to the Indians. The United States retains the right to establish several administrative areas (and routes between them) in Indian Territory. The treaty also stipulates that the Indians in the territory are under the protection of the United States. The Indians have the right to sell the land ceded to them by the United States, but they can only sell it to the United States.
- 1795 The Jay treaty between the United States and Great Britain is signed. The treaty requires Great Britain to turn over its military posts in the United States no later than 1796.
- 1796 John Adams elected President. Great Britain turns over British forts on United States territory to the United States. As a consequence of the turn over, the United States gains unrestricted access to the American side of the Great Lakes.
- 1800 Spain cedes Louisiana to France. The Indiana territory is established (present day Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota). William Henry Harrison is appointed the first governor.
- 1801 Thomas Jefferson becomes President. Jefferson declares his unofficial policy to Harrison: extinguish Indian title to territory by forcing the Indians into a state of indebtedness to the United States or forcing them across the Mississippi.
- 1803 Ohio becomes a state. The United States buys the Louisiana territory from France. The Louisiana Purchase greatly expands the territory of the United States.
- 1807 Embargo act closes United States ports to trade. Britain and France generated maritime policies during the Napoleonic Wars that impacted negatively on United States trade. Britain also had a policy of impressing sailors. The Embargo act was a response to these British and French actions. The act restricted any international trade in United States ports.

- 1808 James Madison elected President. Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa (the Prophet) establish Prophet's Town at the confluence of the Tippecanoe and Wabash Rivers, Indiana Territory.
- 1809 Illinois Territory established. The area of present day Michigan becomes a separated territory. Harrison concludes the Treaty of Fort Wayne. The Embargo act is repealed.
- 1810 Company from the 7th U.S. ordered to Vincennes. Harrison is informed that Congress has ratified several treaties made with the Indians. Congress passes an act approving sale of the land gained in the Treaty of Fort Wayne in April. Tecumseh and Harrison have their first meeting; the meeting is held at Vincennes.
- 1811
- May Proclamation of sale is issued for public lands gained as a result of the Treaty of Fort Wayne.
- July 4th U.S. in Pittsburgh, PA is attached to Governor Harrison. The regiment arrives in Vincennes in September 1811.
- July Harrison and Tecumseh conduct their second meeting at Vincennes. After the conference Tecumseh departs on a trip through the American south to recruit more Indian tribes into his confederacy.
- Aug The secretary of war informs Harrison that Congress has not appropriated funds for paying the militia. The secretary advises Harrison that he expects the appropriations and to organize militia needed for a campaign against the Prophet.
- Sep The 4th U.S. and a company of the Rifle Regiment arrive at Vincennes. Harrison organizes and trains forces for the upcoming campaign at Vincennes and Fort Knox. Once organized the army moves north and establishes Fort Harrison (near present day Terre Haute, Indiana).
- Sep The secretary of war authorizes General Harrison to approach Prophet's Town and order the Indians there to disperse. If they refuse, Harrison is authorized to attack and compel them to disperse by force.
- 10 Oct A sentry is shot and wounded by Indians at Fort Harrison.
- 29 Oct The army departs Fort Harrison.
- 31 Oct The army crosses the Wabash River as part of a deception.

- 2 Nov The army builds Boyd's Blockhouse on the Vermillion River.
- 3 Nov The army crosses the Vermillion River and enters Indian Territory.
- 6 Nov The army arrives outside of Prophet's Town and agrees to meet with Indian representatives the next day to discuss peace terms. The army establishes its camp on Burnett Creek.
- 7 Nov Battle of Tippecanoe. Indian attack on American forces is repulsed.
- 8 Nov General Harrison's forces destroy Prophet's Town.
- 9 Nov The army departs the Prophet's Town area.
- 12 Nov The army reaches Boyd's Blockhouse. The army is resupplied and casualties are evacuated by boat down the Wabash River to Vincennes.
- 18 Nov The army arrives in Vincennes.
- 1812 The United States declares war on Great Britain. Anti-British sentiment caused by British maritime policies and the belief that the British are providing aid to the northwestern Indians (particularly Tecumseh's confederation) cause the War of 1812. Combined British-Indian forces operate in the American northwest throughout the summer. The Indian forces are commanded by Tecumseh and British forces are commanded by General Brock (and later General Proctor). Americans surrender Fort Macinac and Detroit. Fort Dearborn (Chicago, Illinois) is seized by the British and Indians.
- 1813 American fleet commanded by Oliver Hazard Perry defeats the British fleet on Lake Erie. General Harrison's force defeats a British-Indian force at the Battle of the Thames (Ontario, Canada). Tecumseh is killed during the battle.
- 1814 Treaty of Ghent ends the War of 1812.
- 1816 Indiana becomes a state.

APPENDIX D

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

There was an unofficial policy for many years in Indiana that resulted in naming new counties after participants in the Battle of Tippecanoe. There are ten counties in Indiana named after participants. The counties are Spencer, Tipton, Bartholomew, Daviess, Floyd, Parke, Randolph, Warrick, Dubois, and Harrison (Harrison county was organized before the battle).¹

The characters, groups, and events that are central to this part of Indiana history continue to be commemorated in other ways. Streets (Tecumseh Street), schools (Shawnee Middle School), and geographical areas (Tippecanoe County and Battle Ground, Indiana) provide reminders throughout daily life of an important part of the state's history.

The biographical sketches are designed to familiarize the reader with some of aspects of the lives of the individuals that participated in the campaign. The sketches may provide insight into how some of the perspectives of these characters developed. The sketches can also be used to enhance role playing during the staff ride. Participants can become familiar with a particular character and discuss their actions during the engagement.

During any discussion of a character as part of the staff ride, the role player should discuss what the character did, its impact on the battle, and why they think the character acted that way. Characters can be addressed at a stand where the event happened, at the beginning of the field study phase in order to set the stage for the campaign, or throughout the staff ride. For example, the role players assigned to

Harrison and Tecumseh can discuss how their actions set the stage for the campaign and the impact of Harrison's subsequent actions on the battlefield. Role players assigned to Wells and Daviess can discuss how they might have influenced Kentucky to support the campaign with troops, as well as their battlefield actions.

United States

Joseph Bartholomew (1766-1840). Born in New Jersey and lived in Pennsylvania and Kentucky before moving to the Indiana Territory in 1798. Commander of the Clark County Militia. During the Tippecanoe campaign the infantry was organized into a provisional brigade with Colonel Boyd as the commander and Lieutenant Colonel Bartholomew commander of all militia infantry (Bartholomew reported directly to Boyd). The morning of the battle Bartholomew commanded the militia infantry in the front line. Bartholomew, an experienced Indian fighter, was the officer that recommended that the men sleep on their arms, 6-7 November 1811. Bartholomew was also the field officer of the day and he was wounded during the engagement. In the 1790s Bartholomew helped to survey the boundaries designated by the Treaty of Greenville. Bartholomew's military service included combat in Indian campaigns during the War of 1812 and he was granted a pension for his 1812 war service. Bartholomew was active in state politics, eventually serving in the state legislature. Bartholomew County, Indiana was organized in 1821.²

John Parker Boyd (1764-1830). Harrison's second in command and commander of the provisional infantry brigade and all regular army troops during the Tippecanoe campaign. Commissioned as an ensign in the United States Army in 1786. Resigned his commission in 1789 and departed for India where he was a mercenary until his

return to the United States in 1808. Boyd was promoted to colonel and he assumed command of the 4th U.S. on 7 October 1808. Promoted to brigadier general during the War of 1812. Honorably discharged from the army in 1815. Boyd employed unpopular and severe disciplinary measures during the campaign that caused several problems with the militia units. After the Battle of Tippecanoe Boyd was the center of controversy. Boyd claimed that the militia would have been routed were it not for the efforts of the regular army units. The resulting debate also included discussions about Harrison's fitness as the commander at Tippecanoe. Apparently, Boyd's officers did not agree with their commander. Several of his company grade officers, to include three company commanders, wrote statements reflecting their confidence in Harrison as a battlefield commander. A group of field grade officers from the militia and 4th U.S. wrote similar statements.³

Joseph Hamilton Daviess [Daveiss, Davis] (1774-1811). Major commanding a Battalion of Dragoons of Indiana Militia during the Tippecanoe campaign. Daviess was born in Virginia and moved to Kentucky in 1779. Daviess was a United States District Attorney in Kentucky and was also well-known as an orator. Daviess was active in recruiting volunteers from Kentucky for service in the campaign. Daviess joined the campaign as a private volunteer and was promoted to major by Harrison and placed in command of the dragoon battalion (three troops). Daviess was killed in action leading a charge of dragoons on 7 November 1811. Daviess was killed in the same action as Isaac White. Daviess County, Indiana was organized in 1817. Counties in Kentucky and Illinois have also been named for Daviess.⁴

Toussant Dubois. Captain, commanded the Company of Spies and Guides of Indiana Militia during the campaign. Dubois was a French trader who was very familiar with the area Indians. Dubois County, Indiana was organized in 1818.⁵

William Henry Harrison (1773-1841). "Old Tippecanoe." Commander in chief of the Indiana militia and overall commander of all military forces engaged at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Born in Virginia, attended Hampden-Sidney College, and later studied medicine at the College of Physicians and Surgeons in Philadelphia. Commissioned as an ensign in 1791 and promoted to lieutenant in 1792. Served as Major General Anthony Wayne's Aide de Camp at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 and was a signatory to the Treaty of Greenville (1795). Promoted to captain in 1797 and commanded Fort Washington (near present day Cincinnati, Ohio) until he resigned from the army in 1798. Appointed as the first secretary to the Northwest Territory in 1798 and became the territory's representative to Congress (1799). Appointed governor of the Indiana Territory in 1800 and served as the commander in chief of the Indiana militia while governor. After Tippecanoe Harrison was a military commander during the War of 1812. Harrison was a major general of Kentucky militia (1812), brigadier general, regular army (1812), and major general, regular army (1813). Harrison was the commander in chief in the Old Northwest during the War of 1812. Forces led by Harrison recaptured Detroit during the War of 1812 and defeated British-Indian forces at the Battle of the Thames (Ontario, Canada) in 1813. Tecumseh was allied with the British during the War of 1812 and subsequently killed by Harrison's forces during the Battle of the Thames. Harrison resigned from the army in 1814 and settled in Ohio. Harrison's war time service was recognized by an 1818 resolution in Congress for his

actions at the Battle of the Thames. After his army service, Harrison served in Congress, the state senate, and the United States Senate. Harrison also served for a short time as the United States minister to Columbia. Harrison ran for President of the United States unsuccessfully in 1836. Harrison's political career culminated in winning the 1840 Presidential election. Harrison was President from 4 March 1841 to 4 April 1841, when he died in office. Harrison County, Indiana was organized in 1808.⁶

Charles Larrabee (1782-1862). Commissioned 13 June 1808. Served as a company commander in the 4th U.S. during the Battle of Tippecanoe. Larrabee commanded Captain Baen's company because Baen served as an acting Major, battalion commander, during the battle. Baen was killed at Tippecanoe and Larrabee retained command of the company after the campaign. Larrabee was promoted to captain in 1812 and received a brevet to major on 9 August 1812, for gallant conduct. Larrabee resigned from the army in 1825.⁷

Isaac Naylor (1790-1873). Born in Virginia and moved to Kentucky in 1793 and Indiana Territory in 1805. Naylor was a sergeant in a Company of Riflemen of Indiana Militia during the Battle of Tippecanoe. Naylor's brother also fought at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Isaac Naylor fought in Indian campaigns during the War of 1812. After his military service Naylor became a circuit court judge and served in that capacity for twenty years.⁸

Benjamin Parke. Commander of a Company of Light Dragoons of Indiana Militia during the Tippecanoe campaign. Promoted to Major on 7 November 1811, after Major Daviess was killed. Assumed command of the battalion of dragoons after Daviess was

killed. After the campaign Parke served as a territorial congressman and a judge.

Parke County, Indiana was organized in 1821.⁹

Thomas Randolph (d1811). Indiana Attorney General and Acting Aide de Camp (as a civilian) to General Harrison during the Battle of Tippecanoe. Killed in action on 7 November 1811. Randolph County, Indiana was organized in 1818.¹⁰

Spier Spencer (d1811). Captain and commander of a Company of Mounted Riflemen of Indiana Militia during the Battle of Tippecanoe. Killed in action 7 November 1811. Spencer's twelve year old son accompanied him on the campaign and fought as a rifleman during the engagement. Spencer's company was known as Spencer's Yellow Jackets because of the light-colored buckskin hunting shirts worn by members of the company. Spencer County, Indiana was organized in 1818.¹¹

John Tipton (1786-1839). An enlisted soldier assigned to Spencer's Yellow Jackets during the Tippecanoe campaign. Promoted to ensign 21 October 1811 and to captain on 7 November 1811. Assumed command of the company after all of the other officers were killed. Tipton was born in Tennessee where his father was killed by Indians in 1793. Tipton and his family moved to the Indiana Territory in 1807. Tipton's military service after Tippecanoe included promotion to major, service in a frontier ranger company, and combat in engagements with Indians during the War of 1812. Tipton was a Justice of the Peace and Indian agent for Logansport and Fort Wayne. Tipton was active in politics and eventually served as a United States Senator from Indiana, 1831-1839. Tipton was the chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs while in the United States Senate. In 1829 Tipton bought the land that encompassed the

battlefield and donated the area to the state in 1836. Tipton County, Indiana was organized in 1844.¹²

Jacob Warrick (d1811). Captain and commander of a company of Infantry of Indiana Militia during the Tippecanoe campaign. Killed in action 7 November 1811. Warrick County, Indiana was organized in 1813.¹³

Samuel Wells. Major and commander of a Battalion of Kentucky Light Dragoons. Wells was a major general in the Kentucky militia who volunteered to serve as a private during the campaign. Harrison promoted Wells to major in the Indiana militia and placed him in command of two companies of mounted riflemen.¹⁴

Isaac White (c1776-1811). Born in Virginia and moved to the Indiana Territory in 1800. Colonel and commander of the Knox County Militia. Colonel White's militia unit was not called up for the campaign. Colonel White enlisted as a private in the dragoons and was killed in action 7 November 1811. White died in the dragoon assault led by Major Daviess. White County, Indiana was organized in 1834. A county in Illinois is also named for Isaac White.¹⁵

Indian Confederacy

Shabonee (1775-1859). An Ottawa Indian and grand nephew of Pontiac. Shabonee lived for many years in what is now Illinois and eventually became a Peace Chief of the Potawatomi Indian Tribe. Shabonee was an Indian scout for the Prophet's forces during the Tippecanoe campaign and participated in the attack on the encampment, 7 November 1811. Shabonee was one of Tecumseh's trusted lieutenants and fought with Tecumseh throughout the War of 1812 and at the Battle of the Thames. Disgusted with the way that the British treated their Indian allies during the War of 1812,

Shabonee transferred his allegiance to the Americans. Shabonee warned settlers of impending Indian raids during the Black Hawk Wars (1832). Shabonee was awarded land in Illinois as a reward for his services but eventually left it to join his tribe which had moved to Mississippi. Shabonee returned to Illinois to find his land purchased by land speculators at public auction. American citizens, grateful of Shabonee's prior service, purchased a farm for him in Illinois. Shabonee spent the remainder of his life on his land in Illinois; he is buried in Morris, Illinois.¹⁶

Stone Eater. Miami Indian and one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison's encampment on 7 November 1811.

Tecumseh [Techumthe, Tecumtha] (c1768-1813). Shawnee Indian warrior that organized the Indian confederacy engaged by General Harrison's forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Tecumseh was not at the Battle of Tippecanoe, he was traveling in the area that is now the southern United States, attempting to recruit Creek Indians and other tribes for his confederacy. Tecumseh returned to Tippecanoe in February or March 1812. Upon his return Tecumseh discovered that his brother the Prophet, against his express orders, attacked Harrison's force (at Tippecanoe). Tecumseh's father was Shawnee and his mother was Creek. Tecumseh's father was killed at the Battle of Point Pleasant (present day West Virginia) in 1774. Tecumseh's older brother was killed during a raid in Kentucky with Tecumseh, Shabonee, and a war party of Cherokee Indians. Tecumseh fought as a member of the Indian confederacy led by Little Turtle and Blue Jacket in the victory over General Arthur St. Clair's forces. During the campaign Tecumseh served as a spy and scout for the confederacy. Tecumseh led a war party against General Wayne's forces at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. After the

Indian defeat at Fallen Timbers Tecumseh refused to attend the peace council at Greenville. Tecumseh allied himself with the British after the Battle of Tippecanoe and led Indian forces in Canada and the American northwest during the War of 1812. Tecumseh was killed at the Battle of the Thames by forces under the command of General William Henry Harrison. Throughout his adult life Tecumseh was well-known and respected as an orator, political organizer, and war leader by both Indians and whites. Tecumseh was celebrated for his refusal to allow torture or the killing of prisoners by forces under his command; torture and killing prisoners were practices not uncommon among all warring sides during the Indian wars.¹⁷

Tenskwatawa (c1774-1834). "The Prophet." Led the Indian forces at the Battle of Tippecanoe. Tenskwatawa was not a war chief or leader but a spiritual leader for the members of the confederacy organized and led by his brother, Tecumseh. Tenskwatawa authorized the attack against the express orders of his brother, Tecumseh, who was away recruiting other tribes for the confederacy. Tenskwatawa's original name is Laulewasika or "He-makes- a-loud-noise." He later changed his name to Elkskwatawa which means "The Prophet," and finally changed his name to Tenskwatawa or "Open Door." The Prophet lost his right eye as a youth while practicing with a bow and arrow. As a young man the Prophet was known to be a drunk. The Prophet eventually reformed himself and created a religious cult. The Prophet rose to prominence among Indians after the death of an old Shawnee prophet in 1805. The Prophet assumed the older prophet's former role in the community and gained fame because of the accuracy of his predictions. It is believed that Tecumseh provided his brother with accurate predictions and that Tenskwatawa did not have any significant

powers of prophecy. The Prophet's teachings emphasized abstinence from alcohol, separation of Indian and white races, and a return to the traditional lifestyle (which included using traditional Indian weapons). Disavowed by Tecumseh after the defeat at Tippecanoe, the Prophet allied himself with the British and wandered throughout the American northwest and Canada. In 1815, the Prophet and a small band of followers moved to Missouri and then to Wyandotte County, Kansas in 1828. The Prophet was a pensioner of the British government as a reward for his loyalty during the War of 1812.¹⁸

White Loon. Miami Indian and one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison's encampment on 7 November 1811.

Winnemac (d1812). Potawatomi Indian Chief and one of the Indians selected to lead the attack on Harrison's encampment on 7 November 1811. Winnemac had been an ally of Governor Harrison's prior to Tippecanoe. Winnemac eventually changed his allegiance to Tecumseh and was the leader of a large party of Potawatomi warriors at Prophet's Town. Winnemac was the leader of the war party that intercepted the Delaware Chiefs enroute to join Harrison and forced the chiefs to accompany him to Prophet's Town. Winnemac was killed in 1812 by Johnny Logan. Johnny Logan was Tecumseh's nephew and a Shawnee Indian scout for the American Army.¹⁹

¹Ronald L. Baker and Marvin Carmony, *Indiana Place Names* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975), xii; McCollough, ed., 4; Pirtle, 78; and Watts, ed., 225.

²Baker and Carmony, 9; Pence, 287-303; and Draper Mss. 1X142-144.

³Cleaves, 86-91; Draper Mss. 1X142-44; Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 634-635; Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 2, 5-11; Heitman, vol. 1, 236; Presidential Papers, Series 1: 1734-1813 Aug, Reel 1; and Watts, ed., 228. Bartholomew (Indiana militia), Decker (4th U.S.), Floyd (4th U.S.), Wells (Kentucky militia), Parke (Kentucky militia), and Purcell (4th U.S.) were the field grade officers that wrote the statement on Harrison's conduct. The statement, in part, reads "That the victory was obtained by his [Harrison's] vigilance and activity." Snelling, Cook, and Barton were the three 4th U.S.

company commanders that completed a similar statement. Several other officers completed similar statements.

⁴Baker and Carmony, 39; Cleaves, 93; Cockrum, 280; Draper Mss. 1X142-44; Green, 120-122; Pirtle, 80-86; and White 335-338.

⁵Baker and Carmony, 43; Cockrum, 282; and Alameda McCollough, *The Battle of Tippecanoe: Conflict of Cultures* (The Research and Publications Committee of the Tippecanoe County Historical Association, 1991), 21.

⁶Baker and Carmony, 67; Trevor Dupuy, et. al., 317; Green, 12-16, 34-44, 47-55; and Heitman, vol. 1, 505-506.

⁷Draper Mss. 1X142-44; Heitman, vol. 1, 616; and Watts, ed. 225-247.

⁸Cockrum, 292; and Naylor, 163-169.

⁹Baker and Carmony, 126; Cockrum, 268, 280, 294; and Draper Mss. 1X142-44.

¹⁰Baker and Carmony, 137; Cleaves, 88; and Cockrum, 279.

¹¹Bacon, 32; Baker and Carmony, 156; Cockrum, 280-281; and Draper Mss. 1X142-44.

¹²Baker and Carmony, 165; Cockrum, 281; Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 521; Green, 122, 126; McCollough, ed., 23; Pirtle, 90; and Tipton, 170-184.

¹³Baker and Carmony, 173; and Cockrum, 282.

¹⁴Cockrum, 296; and Draper Mss. 1X142-44.

¹⁵Baker and Carmony, 179; and George Fauntleroy White, "Memoir of Colonel Isaac White," *Indiana Magazine of History* 15, no. 4 (1919), 327-341.

¹⁶McCollough, ed., 8; and Whickar, ed., 353-354.

¹⁷Dupuy, 735-736; Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 148, 184-187; and McCollough, ed., 17-18.

¹⁸Eckert, *Gateway to Empire* 19, 96, 343-349; McCollough, ed., 19-20; and Pirtle, 2.

¹⁹Cockrum, 269; Drake, 57-59; Eckert, *The Frontiersmen* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967; New York: Bantam, 1970), 651; and Eckert, *Gateway* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1983; New York: Bantam, 1984), 30, 281-282.

APPENDIX E

METEOROLOGICAL DATA

. . . it stopt [sic] Raining and Began to Snow and Blow hard . . . it was the Disagreeablest [sic] night I ever saw¹

John Tipton, 19 October 1811, *Diary Entry*

The weather was relatively severe for troops operating without proper environmental protection. It is likely that the precipitation and low temperatures impacted upon the health and combat effectiveness of the force as well as the overall mobility of the march units and supply trains.

Generally, it seems that the weather consisted of rain and cold temperatures for much of the campaign. The soldiers, many of whom did not have tents to provide environmental protection or changes of clothing (as well as opportunities to clean their clothes), would have suffered from illness and fatigue during the campaign. There were at least seventy to eighty members of Harrison's command that did not fight at Prophet's Town due to illness.²

The areas through which the army traveled varied from open prairie to heavy forests. The impact of weather on the terrain probably caused some measure of difficulty for the mobility of mounted and dismounted elements as well as the supply trains (which consisted of wagons and livestock). The army needed to conduct frequent river and stream crossing operations because of Harrison's desire to prevent compromise (by crossing the Wabash and taking an unexpected route). Additionally, several streams and creeks cross-cut the route of march. In spite of the fact that the weather offered challenges for mobility, Harrison's command still managed to maintain

rates of march of over ten miles per day after they departed from Fort Harrison. Figure 13 details weather observations for October and November 1811.

October 1811

Sun	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat
		1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9 <i>heavy rain a.m. and p.m.</i>	10 <i>rain early a.m.</i>	11	12
13	14 <i>cloudy showers p.m.</i>	15 <i>cloudy rain p.m. windy</i>	16	17 <i>frost a.m.</i>	18 <i>cloudy windy</i>	19 <i>rain snow windy</i>
20 <i>cold cloudy</i>	21 <i>clear cold</i>	22	23 <i>cold cloudy windy</i>	24 <i>cold a.m.</i>	25 <i>cold a.m.</i>	26
27 <i>clear warm</i>	28	29	30 <i>rain a.m. cold cloudy windy</i>	31		

November 1811

Sun	Mon	Tues	Wed	Thurs	Fri	Sat
					1	2
3 <i>cloudy</i>	4 <i>cold cloudy windy rain</i>	5 <i>cloudy</i>	6 <i>cold rain p.m.</i>	7 <i>rain a.m. and p.m. cold</i>	8 <i>rain-cold early a.m. cloudy</i>	9 <i>cold cloudy</i>
10 <i>cold cloudy</i>	11 <i>cold cloudy</i>	12 <i>clear-cold water freezes</i>	13 <i>warm</i>	14 <i>cold</i>	15 <i>cold</i>	16 <i>cold</i>
17 <i>cold</i>	18 <i>cold</i>	19 <i>cold cloudy rain</i>	20 <i>cloudy</i>	21 <i>cloudy</i>	22 <i>cold a.m.</i>	23 <i>cloudy</i>
24 <i>cloudy rain a.m.</i>						

Fig. 13. Meteorological Data, Tippecanoe Campaign (October and November 1811)

The light data for the week of the engagement indicates that the percentage of illumination was seemingly sufficient for night operations. The last quarter moon was on 7 November 1811. On 6 November 1811 the percentage of illumination was 68 percent and decreasing thereafter. At the time of the Indian attack the illumination was about 58 percent. The illumination degraded to 39 percent by the time that the army began its retirement to Boyd's Blockhouse on 9 November 1811.³ However, cloud cover that normally accompanies rain probably reduced any advantage gained because of the illumination (it rained almost daily during the week of the attack).

¹Tipton, 176.

²Esarey, ed., *Messages*, vol. 1, 597-598; and Reid, 15. There were various reasons for a soldier's absence. A few of the categories and statistics for absences from the army's 12 October 1811 strength report are 69 sick, 60 extra duty, and 126 absent for various reasons. On 12 October 1811 the army was authorized 1225 soldiers and had 762 present for duty.

³All of the light data is from the United States Naval Observatory, *Astronomical Applications Department* [on-line]; available from http://www.usno.navy.mil/cgi-bin/aa_pap; Internet; accessed 5 February 1998.

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